Evaluation of the 2012/13 Farm Input Subsidy Programme, Malawi: Final Report by Dorward, Andrew et al.
i 
 
EVALUATION OF THE 2012/13 FARM INPUT 
SUBSIDY PROGRAMME, MALAWI 
FINAL REPORT 
November 2013 
 
Andrew Dorward*, Ephraim Chirwa**, Mirriam Matita***, Wezi Mhango***, Peter Mvula**,  
Ed Taylor****, Karen Thorne**** 
Further inputs provided by Anthony Whitbread, Anne Sennhenn& Kristina Grotelüschen ***** 
 
* SOAS, University of London, ** Wadonda Consult and Chancellor College, University of Malawi, 
*** Wadonda Consult and Lilongwe University ofAgriculture and Natural Resources,**** University 
of California (Davis), ***** University of Goettingen 
 
Undertaken for the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security 
 
Funded by: 
DFID 
 
Acknowledgements and Disclaimer 
Different team members contributed to different sections of the report. The team would like to 
express their thanks to members of staff of the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security, members 
of the fertiliser and seed industry, staff of donor organisations, farmers and others who have 
generously given time and information for the compilation of this report.  Any errors or omissions 
remain the responsibility of the authors.  
The views expressed in this report imply no endorsement by the Ministry of Agriculture and Food 
Security, DFID, or any other party. 
 
This material has been funded by UKaid from the Department for International Development; 
however the views expressed do not necessarily reflect the organisations’ official policies. 
 
ii 
 
EVALUATION OF THE 2012/13 FARM INPUT SUBSIDY PROGRAMME, MALAWI 
FINAL REPORT 
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Executive Summary 
This report evaluates the 2012/13 Malawi Government Farm Input Subsidy Programme (FISP). The 
main objective of the evaluation is to assess the impact and implementation of the FISP in order to 
provide information regarding  
• the overall value for money of investments in the FISP as regards its contributions to 
agricultural production, food security, farmers’ and consumers’  welfare  
• means by which future implementation of the FISP might be changed in order to improve its 
effectiveness and efficiency 
The evaluation combined qualitative and quantitative methods of data collection and analysis. 
Quantitative data were collected through a national survey in April and May 2013 of 2,000 
households, a survey of retail shops selling inputs in six districts, and from a variety of secondary 
sources including Logistics Unit reports on programme implementation and  Ministry of Agriculture 
and Food Security data on market prices. The quantitative data were triangulated by qualitative data 
from focus group discussions with smallholder farmers in 14 districts, and key informant interviews 
with government staff, input distributors and beneficiary and non-beneficiary households. The 
analysis is based on descriptive statistics and econometric, crop yield simulation and local economy 
wide modelling. 
We consider in turn the two main questions that the report addresses, beginning with the overall 
contributions and value for money from the FISP.   
The FISP medium term plans sets out the objectives of the FISP as being to ‘increase food security at 
household level through agricultural output growth’ by increasing agricultural productivity and input 
market development. However economic theory and experience from other countries suggests that 
if implemented consistently, effectively and efficiently at a manageable cost the programme has the 
potential to drive broad based national economic growth and diversification by raising the 
productivity of the agricultural land and labour held by the large rural population, lowering food 
prices, raising real wages, and stimulating non-agricultural demand and supply. This depends upon 
the ability of the programme to cost effectively increase seed and fertiliser input use in maize 
production, drive up maize productivity and improve input supply services (the direct impacts of the 
programme) with the support of complementary policies that support low maize prices, rising real 
wages and rural diversification (the indirect impacts of the programme).   
Increases in production and maize productivity as a result of the programme are difficult to assess. 
Bringing together evidence from a wide range of sources, section 7 of the report suggests that the 
programme led to increased production of around 723,000MT of maize and 32,000MT of legumes. 
Malawi’s rapidly growing population means that the programme’s incremental production benefits 
are increasingly important for Malawi’s national food security. These benefits are however 
undermined by likely informal exports (despite an export ban) encouraged by pressures from the 
relatively low dollar denominated maize prices in Malawi following the major devaluation of the 
Kwacha. The programme also led to increased profitability of maize production by beneficiary 
households and increased rural incomes by between MK50,000 and MK70,000per household 
receiving and using a full pack of fertiliser and maize seed (ignoring spillover effects and benefits 
from  receipt of fertiliser that does not contribute to incremental production).For many poorer 
beneficiaries, who receive only one coupon for 50 kg of fertiliser, it seems that benefits are only 
sufficient to reduce their food insecurity, and are not enough to enable them to advance their 
livelihoods – to ‘step out’ or ‘step up’ rather than just ‘hang in’. Addressing this in the context of 
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both limited fiscal resources and rapidly growing population pressure is a major challenge facing the 
programme and the Government and country as a whole. There is, however, evidence that the FISP 
is encouraging some diversification out of maize into increased legume production.  
Assessment of the potential wider indirect impacts of the programme (addressed in section 8) 
requires comparison of situations with and without the subsidy. A Local Economy Wide Impact 
Evaluation (LEWIE) model, a novel form of CGE modelling, investigating this suggests that there are 
significant spillover local growth effects from the subsidy as a result of both its injection of cash into 
the economy and of the increase in real incomes caused by its raising land and labour productivity. 
However real wage rates fell during 2012/13 as a result of rising maize prices, which, as mentioned 
above, have been affected by the devaluation of the Malawi Kwacha and consequent export and 
inflationary pressures. It is not possible to estimate possible effects of FISP in reducing the extent of 
the fall in wages. These wider influences on maize prices pose a major challenge to the welfare of 
poor Malawians and to the Malawian economy, with or without the FISP. Policies that address this 
and promote low and stable domestic maize prices are essential for FISP to deliver improved food 
security and the wider growth benefits outlined above – and some specific options are suggested.  
The overall benefit cost ratio (BCR) for the FISP is estimated at 1.7taking account of only direct 
impacts, and at1.8if wider indirect impacts are also included. Fiscal efficiency (the ratio of net 
economic benefits to government expenditure) is estimated at 0.75for direct impacts and 1.04 
including indirect impacts.  Analysis of national food security scenarios with and without the FISP 
suggests that in the last 6 years it may have led to average annual savings of maize imports of some 
385,000MT, directly offsetting up to between 85 and 110%  of programme costs. Benefit cost ratio 
estimates are however sensitive to some of the parameters used in their calculation, notably maize 
prices, incremental maize productivity, and fertiliser costs. The Fiscal Efficiency of the programme 
and its overall cost are also affected by likely high rates of input leakage and of displacement of 
unsubsidised farmer purchases by subsidised inputs, and by the subsidy rate and low farmer 
contributions. The importance of low and stable maize prices for programme benefits has been 
discussed above. More attention to these issues in the implementation of the programme could lead 
to substantial increases in the effectiveness and efficiency of the programme with increased benefits 
and/or reduced costs.  
Analysis of determinants of maize productivity shows that yields are generally increased by early 
planting, early and good weeding, use of hybrid seed, use of inorganic nitrogenous fertiliser and of 
phosphate where soils are phosphate deficient, and use of organic fertilisers. Returns to use of 
inorganic fertiliser are also increased by use of hybrid seed, use of organic fertiliser, and higher plant 
density. Gains from using subsidised inorganic fertiliser and hybrid seed may also be substantially 
reduced if use of subsidised inputs leads to delays in planting. These observations, which are widely 
known, underpin many aspects of the design and implementation of the FISP, for example the 
increasing provision of hybrid and legume seeds in the subsidy package, the intention to provide 
coupons and inputs early in the season (with priority given to the south, then centre then north), 
and the inclusion of both nitrogenous and compound fertilisers. Analysis of the implementation of 
the programme in section 4 and of the timing of receipt of coupons by households in section 6 
shows that a number of reasons (some of them beyond the immediate control of programme 
management) have led to late access to coupons and inputs – and this tends to raise costs and  
increase displacement as well as reduce yields.  Incremental production is also affected by 
displacement rates and by leakages of inputs through theft and corruption.  
Programme costs have been held in check from 2009/10 with much better physical control of 
quantities of subsidised fertilisers. As noted in section 4, there are opportunities for reducing 
fertiliser procurement costs (and improving timeliness of delivery) through modified tender and 
payment procedures. Programme costs could also be reduced by increasing farmer contributions as 
a proportion of input costs, and there is a difficult balance here between on the one hand supporting 
those who can least afford inputs and benefit most from a high rate of subsidy, and on the other 
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hand reducing overall programme costs. A third way of reducing programme costs and/or increasing 
benefits is to reduce displacement and leakage, with improved security of coupons (where there has 
been substantial improvements in 2011/12 and 2012/13); better transport tendering and monitoring 
procedures (the latter building on approaches trialled with ESOKO in 2012/13); more timely input 
delivery, market opening and coupon distribution; and better targeting   of inputs to poorer farmers 
unable to afford unsubsidised inputs. Increased farmer contributions may also decrease the 
incentives for theft, corruption and leakage. Determination of more precise numbers of farm 
families and (building on useful innovations in 2012/13) greater farmer access to and understanding 
of publicly available beneficiary lists could also improve targeting outcomes and accountability and 
control of coupons. Greater use of use of such systems will, however, have to take account of the 
support for and benefits from the widespread ‘sharing’ of coupons in the Central and Southern 
Regions.  
Increasing attention to matters of accountability, access to coupons, and conditions at markets are 
to be welcomed and will no doubt be built on as more information becomes available on their 
strengths and weaknesses.  
Despite its high cost, the FISP is making a positive set of contributions to the welfare of Malawians, 
and this represents a considerable achievement by all those involved in its resourcing, design and 
implementation in challenging conditions. These contributions are however threatened by 
macroeconomic pressures; by high and increasing population pressure in rural areas; by the high 
visibility of instances of late implementation, corruption and theft; by evidence of poor targeting; 
and by political and economic pressures. These contributions and these pressures call for renewed 
efforts to both work for and demonstrate improved efficiency and effectiveness and increased 
benefits and probity of the programme. 
In order to facilitate wider and better informed debate around the FISP, this report will be 
supplemented by two short policy briefing papers summarising key issues raised regarding FISP 
implementation and impacts. The value of this report is, however, that it brings together in one 
place a comprehensive review of the programme. Readers are advised to refer to those sections that 
are of direct interest and not be put off by the size of the report as a whole. The ‘summary and 
conclusions’ section at the end of the report contains a longer and more detailed summary of the 
report.  
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1 Introduction 
This report presents the main conclusions of an evaluation of the 2012/13Farm Input Subsidy 
Programme (FISP). The main objective of the evaluation is to assess the impact and implementation 
of the FISP in order to provide information regarding  
• the overall value for money of investments in the FISP as regards its contributions to 
agricultural production, food security, and farmers’ and consumers’  welfare  
• means by which future implementation of the FISP might be changed in order to improve its 
effectiveness and efficiency 
The evaluation addresses the major processes and factors that affect the impact of the input subsidy 
programme as set out in figure 1.1. At the heart of figure 1 is the implementation of the input 
subsidy programme (1). The scale of this and the way that it is done impact directly on voucher 
recipients (2a), on the input supply system (3) which is composed of private sector suppliers, 
ADMARC and SFFRFM, and on the macro-economy and its management (4). The livelihoods, 
activities and welfare of voucher recipients then affect relationships within rural communities and 
local and wider markets for maize and ganyu(2b), and this impacts upon non-recipients (2c). All of 
these components interact with each other and with wider factors in the environment, shown on 
the right hand side of the diagram. Another set of interactions arise between impacts of the input 
subsidy on the one hand and impacts of other (formal and informal) social protection measures. 
 
 
Figure 1.1 Analytical Framework for FISP Evaluation 
2. Rural Household Impacts
1.Subsidy Implementation
Implementation efficiency & cost 
effectiveness: scale, cost, 
procurement & distribution 
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The evaluation has been implemented and managed in five modules related to the analytical 
framework set out in figure 1.1, and supported by cross cutting activities. Table 1.1 shows in broad 
terms how the modules contribute to evaluation of elements along the FISP impact pathway.  
 
Table 1.1  Main module contributions to evaluation of FISP impact pathway 
  Impact Pathway 
Modules  Implementation Outputs Impacts 
Implementation  X   
Household survey  X X X 
Input supply system  X  X 
Maize & labour markets    X 
Modelling & economic 
analysis 
  X X 
 
The report is structured in 11 sections. Following this introduction is a brief presentation in section 2 
of background to the 2012/13 FISP.  Section 3 provides a description of data sources and analytical 
methodologies used. Section 4 then summarises the implementation processes and achievements of 
the 2012/13 FISP. Sections 5 to 10 then provide the major information regarding the outputs and 
impacts of the 2012/13 FISP, broadly following the modular approach to the study, though 
recognising strong interactions between modules. Section 5 considers impacts on input suppliers, 
section 6 reports on beneficiaries’ access to and use of coupons and subsidised inputs, including 
issues around coupon distribution and factors affecting household access to coupons and subsidised 
inputs. Sections 7 and 8 then discuss direct impacts on production and wider impacts on rural 
livelihoods and the rural economy, before section 9 briefly considers impacts on the macro 
economy. Section 10 reports on benefit cost analysis and national food security contributions before 
section 11 concludes with a synthesis of the main findings.  
Evaluation of the FISP is a complex and challenging task: 
• The programme is highly politicised due to its importance to the people of Malawi and its 
very large cost; 
• There are multiple stakeholders with a wide range of differing and often strong interests in 
different aspects of the programme; 
• There are multiple potential direct and indirect impacts of the AISP which interact with and 
are dependent upon other major policies, and these interactions occur at multiple levels  
and involve a variety of different logistical, market, livelihood, fiscal, social and political 
processes which are often highly variable, changing, imperfectly understood, and the subject 
of much debate; 
• There are likely to be dynamic impacts of the program that influence maize production and 
price levels in future years (e.g., the impacts of the input subsidy program have undoubtedly 
affected current maize prices, which influence real incomes, future price expectations and 
land and labour allocation decisions, and these in turn have wide ranging effects on 
economic activities and welfare).; 
• There is considerable variability between and within areas regarding programme 
implementation and impact. 
There are consequently significant data and methodological difficulties in undertaking the analyses 
required to provide clear answers about the impact of the programme.  
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In this context it is important that any evaluation of FISP takes full account of the context of FISP in 
Malawi, of its history and performance since its inception in 2005/6, and of the findings of the wide 
range of studies and reports on this.  
In order to facilitate wider and better informed debate around the FISP, this report will be 
supplemented by two short policy briefing papers summarising key issues raised regarding 
programme implementation and impact. A key feature of this report, however, is its bringing 
together in one place a comprehensive review of the programme. Readers are advised to refer to 
those sections that are of direct interest and not be put off by the size of the report as a whole. The 
final concluding section also summarises the main issues raised in each section.  
 
2 Background 
The FISP was implemented for the first time in 2005/6, although it was at that time known as the 
Agricultural Input Subsidy Programme or AISP. Full information on the background to its introduction 
and on the specific features of Malawian smallholder agriculture and rural livelihoods that affect the 
potential roles of FISP in promoting food security, agricultural productivity and wider pro-poor 
growth can be found in Chirwa and Dorward (2013a) chapter 4 and School of Oriental and African 
Studies et al. (2008). Information is provided on the evolution of the programme over time and 
changing design, implementation, costs, outputs and impacts throughout this report. Further 
information can be found in previous evaluation reports and a variety of papers listed at and 
downloadable through http://www.soas.ac.uk/cedep/research/malawi-subsidies/. 
Background information on the theory and practice of agricultural input subsidies can be found in 
Chirwa and Dorward (2013a) chapters 2 and 3, with further publications available at or through 
http://www.soas.ac.uk/cedep/research/agricultural-input-subsidies/.  
 
3 Data sources and methods 
A variety of information sources have been used in preparing this report. These are best considered 
in terms of the five modules outlined earlier: 
A. Input subsidy implementation module: This module relies heavily on monitoring 
information from the Logistics Unit, supplemented with information from a variety of 
stakeholders and information sources. 
B. Household survey module: This module involved in-depth qualitative focus group 
discussions and key informant interviews together with single-visit household and 
community surveys, with a sample of 2,000 households in 100 enumeration areas (EAs) 
across 14 districts in the three regions and representing all livelihood zones except the very 
small Chitipa Msuku Hills zone (see tables 1.2 and 1.3 for details of the sample). To provide 
2012/13 estimates,  household observations were weighted by EA household population and 
zone household population estimated from 2008 census household records inflated by 
intercensal rural household growth rates. A further sample of 120 households were sampled 
in six enumerations areas in Lilongwe and Zomba districts with resident enumerators 
working closely with sampled households to record plot areas and yields for maize and 
legume crops. This provided in-depth, richer information not collected in the single visit 
survey. Quantitative surveys were supplemented by systematic focus group discussions in 
sampled enumeration areas to provide crucial insights into farmers’ experience and 
perceptions of subsidy programme implementation and impacts on rural livelihoods.  
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Table 1.2 Household and Community Survey Samples by District 
District 
Number 
of EAs 
Household 
Interviews 
Community 
Interviews 
Key Informant 
Interviews 
Focus Group 
Discussions 
Chitipa 5 100 5 3 2 
Karonga 6 120 6 3 2 
Mzimba 7 140 7 3 2 
North 18 360 18 9 6 
Kasungu 5 100 5 3 2 
Nkhotakota 6 120 6 3 1 
Lilongwe 15 300 15 3 1 
Dedza 4 80 4 3 2 
Ntcheu 6 120 6 3 2 
Centre 36 720 36 15 8 
Mangochi 12 240 12 3 2 
Machinga 5 100 5 3 2 
Phalombe 4 80 4 3 2 
Blantyre 7 140 7 3 2 
Thyolo 11 220 11 3 2 
Chikhwawa 7 140 7 3 2 
South 46 920 46 18 12 
Total 100 2000 100 42 26 
 
Table 1.3 Sample Household Characteristics by Zone and Region 
Livelihood zone 
Sample Rural 
households 
% 
Female 
headed 
% Youth 
headed 
HH size 
(persons) 
Cultivated 
area (ha) 
Border Productive Highlands 80 80,770 24% 15% 4.6 1.02 
Chitipa Maize and Millet 
&Misuku 
100 38,535 39% 5% 5.6 1.00 
Central Karonga 40 9,593 21% 0% 5.2 1.06 
Kasungu-Lilongwe Plain 400 770,132 21% 11% 4.7 1.10 
Lower Shire 140 150,598 18% 7% 4.8 0.80 
Middle Shire 100 108,954 21% 14% 4.9 0.98 
Mzimba Self-Sufficient 100 102,084 32% 11% 4.2 0.72 
Northern Karonga 40 25,226 31% 3% 4.8 1.27 
Nkhata Bay Cassava 40 64,878 23% 7% 5.1 1.01 
Northern Lakeshore 120 61,683 19% 1% 5.4 0.85 
Lake Chilwa - Phalombe Plain 180 301,821 29% 10% 5.5 1.03 
Pirilongwe Hills 80 48,926 39% 14% 4.8 0.80 
Rift Valley Escarpment 120 270,484 31% 12% 4.5 0.96 
Shire Highlands 221 314,409 36% 12% 4.2 0.78 
Southern Lakeshore 80 91,425 36% 6% 5.2 0.78 
Thyolo-Mulanje Tea Estates 120 164,775 24% 13% 4.1 0.78 
Western Rumphi and Mzimba 40 49,944 16% 6% 5.0 1.32 
Total 2001 2,654,237 26% 10% 4.7 0.96 
Region  
      North 360 322,516 27% 7% 5.0 1.14 
Centre 720 1,115,355 23% 11% 4.7 1.05 
South 921 1,216,366 29% 11% 4.5 0.82 
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C. Input supply system module: This module involved a census and survey of retailers in a sub-
sample of the EAs sampled in the household survey and district service centres supplying 
them, together with key informant interviews. It also drew on information from the 
household survey. Table 1.3 provides details of the sampled districts and suppliers. The 
module encompassed both private sector and parastatal suppliers, with a particular interest 
in the subsidy programme interactions with and impact on independent agro-dealers.  
 
Table 1.4  Summary of Interviews Completed by Type of Trader 
District 
Type of Input Trader 
Total 
Distributor 
for Major 
Importer 
ADMARC SFFRFM 
Cooperative 
or 
Association 
Independent 
Agro-Dealer 
Other** 
Karonga 4 14 0 0 32 0 50 
Mzimba 6 9 1 6 28 0 50 
North 10 23 1 6 60 0 100 
Kasungu 9 8 1 0 30 2 50 
Lilongwe 10 10 3 0 27 0 50 
Dedza 10 0 1 0 22 0 33 
Centre 29 18 5 0 79 2 133 
Mangochi 4 10 1 3 32 0 50 
Zomba 5 14 3 0 28 0 50 
Chiradzulu* 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 
Blantyre 3 5 0 1 37 4 50 
Thyolo 3 9 1 0 32 0 45 
Mulanje* 0 0 0 0 3 0 3 
Phalombe 1 6 0 0 6 0 13 
South 16 44 5 4 140 4 213 
Total 55 85 11 10 279 6 446 
* These districts are not sampled districts but the input sellers were on the border of districts and also serve 
farmers from the sample districts;  
** includes wholesales and supermarkets 
 
D. Maize and labour markets module: Maize markets were investigated using MoAFS retail 
price information, FEWSNet information on cross border trade volumes and information on 
farm gate and retail prices collected from the household surveys. Labour markets were 
investigated using information from IHS3 and module B household and community survey 
data and focus group discussions supplemented with data gathered in the resident 
enumerator survey.  
E. Modelling & economic analysis module: Wider FISP impacts cannot be estimated from 
comparisons of subsidy recipient and non-recipient households. Allowance for the indirect 
or wider economy impacts of FISP and their mediation of direct impacts therefore requires 
formal modelling of impact pathways within the economy and/or estimation of indirect 
impacts from direct impacts using plausible and empirically determined estimates of the 
relationship between direct and indirect impacts. General equilibrium effects were 
investigated by building up Local Economy Wide Impact Evaluation (LEWIE) models 
(developed by Taylor, (Taylor, 2012).  
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4 Programme implementation & costs 
Implementation of the subsidy programme involves a large number of complex and very significant 
logistical and organisational tasks with critical seasonal deadlines.  In 2012/13 this involved selection 
of over 1.5 million beneficiaries from 4.4 million registered farm households, printing and 
distribution of over 6 million coupons, and purchase and distribution of over 3 million bags of 
fertiliser and of nearly 3 million bags of seed –to tight deadlines, to a large proportion of Malawi’s 
farmers (many of whom are illiterate or semi-literate) widely dispersed across the whole country, 
some in remote and poorly accessible areas, with the constant temptation and threat of fraud or 
theft of highly valuable commodities worth  around MK51 billion (US$140 million) in total. 
We present information on the major tasks and stages of programme implementation in terms of 
input (fertiliser and maize and legume seed) procurement, beneficiary identification and coupon 
distribution, and coupon redemption.  We do not reproduce the detailed information and 
recommendations provided in the Logistics Unit Report beyond summarising and drawing attention 
to critical issues, and relating them to information from other sources. The focus is on issues 
relevant to cost effective implementation, that is implementation achievements that contribute to 
beneficial impacts from the programme (in terms of beneficiary input access that promotes 
achievement of FISP’s production and food security objectives at minimum cost). This section 
reports on implementation in terms of delivery and distribution processes and outcomes relying 
primarily on information from the Logistics Unit and weekly task force reports. Subsequently 
sections 5 and 6 provide information on input supplier and farmer perspectives on coupon and input 
distribution and access.  
4.1 Fertiliser procurement and distribution 
As has been the case since the 2008/9 season, fertiliser procurement was entirely the responsibility 
of government, with no retail sales of subsidised fertiliser procured by private companies. Planning 
and tendering for fertiliser importation and procurement for fertilisers was initiated earlier than in 
previous years, with bidding documents issued in mid-March 2010 for public opening in early May. 
However in July it was announced that there would be a fresh call. Bids were opened in mid-August 
and tender awards were announced in mid-September. A total of 150,000MT was to be procured, 
with 55,000MTS of NPK (23:21:0:4S and 23:10:5:+6S+1.0Zn) and 65,000MTS of Urea procured under 
the tender and a further 15,000MTS NPK and 5,000MTS Urea to be supplied by SFFRFM and 
5,000MTS NPK and 5,000MTS Urea to be supplied by ADMARC. Prices by supplier are shown in figure 
4.1. This shows quite large variations in prices. For NPK there was a price spread a little under 
$100/MT fairly evenly distributed across all suppliers, while for urea there was much a greater and 
more uneven price spread of about $150/MT. The spread on NPK is much narrower than in 2010/11 
(when it was around $200/MT) but is larger for urea (the 2010/11 spread was $100, excluding one 
exceptional award). In 2010/11, however, urea prices were lower than NPK prices, as is normally the 
case with world prices. Apparent discrepancies may be explained in part by the need for the late 
tender awards to take account of stock availability in country, with high price tenders with 
immediately available stock being preferred over lower price awards requiring importation, and over 
lower price tenders where bidders did not meet other award criteria. However the four highest 
priced awards for urea were all delivered in late November or in December.  
 7 
 
 
Figure 4.1 2012/13 Mean Fertiliser prices by supplier 
Source: Calculations from Logistics Unit, 2013 
 
Figure 4.2 therefore compares unit fertiliser costs incurred by the programme with international 
prices and market prices starting from the 2009/10 season (as 2008/9 world prices were 
exceptionally high).  
 
Figure 4.2 Unit fertiliser costs comparisons, 2009/10 to 2012/13 
Sources: Calculations from Logistics Unit annual reports; World Bank Commodity Prices; FAM.   
 
The breakdown of awards by region and fertiliser type is given in table 4.1. This table shows that 
82% of procurement was supplied by private importers and 18% by SFFRFM and ADMARC.  There 
were no stocks brought forward from the previous season. Figure 4.3 shows a comparison of 
procurement sources over the life of FISP. 
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Table 4.1 Fertiliser procurement and availability by region and type (MT) 
Fertiliser NPK UREA Total Share 
South 35,425 35,425 70,850 46% 
Centre 31,820 31,820 63,640 41% 
North 9,975 9,975 19,950 13% 
National 77,220 77,220 154,440 100% 
ADMARC  5,000 5,000 10,000 6% 
SFFRFM  13,010 5,000 18,010 12% 
Private sector  59,210 67,220 126,430 82% 
Source: Logistics Unit (2013) 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3 Fertiliser sources, 2005/6 to 2012/13 
Sources: Calculations from Logistics Unit annual reports, Nakhumwa (2006).   
 
Late delivery of stocks meant that there were none of the storage problems with deliveries as faced 
in previous years (with insufficient SFFRFM depots space to accommodate incoming stocks).Figure 
4.4 shows cumulative deliveries to depots and ‘uplifts’ from depots to markets for each year of the 
programme, as a percentage of total parastatal sales (cumulative sales data have not been available 
since 2011/12 following the discontinuation of monitoring of market sales by an independent 
monitor).Comparison of 2012/13 with earlier years shows that volumes and percentages of 
deliveries to depots in 2012/13 lagged considerably behind previous years in September and 
October (the best achievements being in 2009/10 and 2010/11) though by end November volumes 
(but not %s) had caught up with 2011/12 and were ahead of 2011/12 by end December. Uplifts from 
depots to markets were broadly in line with 2011/12, and slightly ahead by end December, but some 
way behind 2009/10 and 2010/11 performance.  Early depot deliveries in 2007/8, 2008/9 and 
2009/10 all benefited from significant stock brought forward from the previous season, so the early 
deliveries in 2010/11 were particularly noteworthy. 
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Figure 4.4 Cumulative deliveries to and ‘uplifts’ from depots by month 2006/7 to 2012/13 
(% of final parastatal sales by end each month) 
Source: Calculations from Logistics Unit annual and weekly reports 
 
Limited uplifts (less than 40%) by the end of October are a matter for concern as this is critical for 
early planting and fertiliser application and to reduce travelling difficulties and demands on farmers’ 
valuable time once the rains have come. Early fertiliser availability is particularly critical for NPK and 
in the Southern regions where the rains generally come earlier. Figure 4.5 therefore shows the % of 
NPK and Urea deliveries to and uplifts from depots by region by month. This shows that at the end of 
October in % terms NPK deliveries in the South were lagging behind NPK deliveries in the Centre, 
which in turn lagged behind those in the North, while in all regions NPK and Urea deliveries were 
roughly at par. By the end of November NPK and Urea deliveries were roughly even in all regions 
(with NPK slightly ahead in the South). However around 25% of NPK deliveries were still outstanding 
in the South and in % terms the South still lagged behind the Centre which lagged behind the North. 
Similar patterns are found for uplifts, with some lags, as would be expected. However at the end of 
November more than 35% of NPK uplifts were still outstanding in the South. Late rains in many parts 
of the South may have reduced the worst effects of late NPK delivery, but it will still have led to 
disruption of farmers’ other activities, and more crowding and queues during input  sales, and late 
rains cannot be relied on.  
 
 
Figure 4.5 Cumulative deliveries to and ‘uplifts’ from depots, 2012/13  by region by month 
(% of final parastatal sales by end each month)  
Source: Calculations from Logistics Unit annual and weekly reports 
 
The primary reason for late deliveries and uplifts in 2012/13 appears to have been late tender 
awards, as described above. However the lack of any improvement in delivery and uplift timing since 
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2009/10, with increased delays after 2010/11 (i.e. in the last two seasons, for different reasons) 
must be a matter for concern given the importance of early access to inputs by farmers. 
It is, however, also important to note that farmers’ access to inputs is not determined solely by the 
timing of fertiliser deliveries to depots and markets. Figure 4.6 sets out the range of activities 
involved in the implementation of FISP.  
 
 
Figure 4.6 Critical activities in FISP implementation 
 
This shows that prior to coupon redemption there needs to be coupon issue to farmers (with prior 
issuing of coupons which depends upon farmer registration and beneficiary identification as well as 
secure coupon printing and distribution), input procurement and distribution (which includes for 
fertilisers contracting and coordination of transport from depots to markets), and the opening of 
markets. These interact, and delays in market opening or coupon issues, for example, lead to storage 
problems at markets which can then lead to backing up of transport and storage problems at depots.  
Figure 4.7 therefore presents the timing of some of these other critical activities in 2012/13 (in bold) 
in comparison with previous years (with earlier, i.e. lower in the graph, being better). Although 
information is not available on the timing of voucher printing in 2012/13, late awarding of fertiliser 
tenders has been discussed above, while voucher allocations and the despatch of lists to districts 
was initially proceeding in good time but was then delayed by the late allocation of extra inputs and 
vouchers. Seed supply tenders contact tenders were, however, finalised in good time. Late opening 
of markets has also been a contributory factor in previous years: it is not clear how far this was an 
issue in 2012. 
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Figure 4.7 Timing of completion of contracts & voucher processes 
Source: Calculations from Logistics Unit annual and weekly reports 
 
There were significant concerns regarding security and monitoring of fertiliser while being 
transported from depots to markets. This was raised with the evaluation team in September and a 
monitoring system involving mobile phone communication between depots, markets and a 
coordination centre was proposed. This was not implemented but continuing concerns led to the 
trial of a similar system involving ESOKO and funded by USAID.  Logistics Unit (2013) notes that in 
the transport tender awards there was a large increase in the number of different transporters who 
were  awarded contracts (from between 23 to 26 in the previous four years to 43 in 2012/13), and 
that it appeared that some of these  companies were actively engaged in theft of supplies being 
carried. Failures to conduct proper checks on vehicles when loading at depots also led to some theft 
by unauthorised vehicles. Logistics Unit (2013) estimates that a total of 608 MTS of fertiliser was lost 
or stolen in transit, and after recovery of some monies for this (MK48,383,912), financial losses 
amounted to MK109,787,088. These losses must however be considered as under-estimates given 
the potential for thefts by transporters to be linked with other fraudulent practices regarding 
coupon distribution and markets’ stock control. The ESOKO system appears to have considerable 
potential for improving monitoring and control of fertiliser transport and market stocks and sales. It 
needs, however, to overcome challenges as regards mobile phone signal coverage, market clerks’ 
access to and use of air time, consistent integration with wider management and stock control 
systems (see ESOKO reports), and challenges in setting up the system each year with temporary 
markets.  
Logistics Unit (2013) notes the following: 
• There is a need for pre-qualification of those wishing to tender for supply of fertilisers, 
to ensure that awards are only made to bona fide suppliers.  
• The bid validity period should be reduced to 30 days and awards made within that 
period. This should reduce price hedging and cut costs  
• Bid documents should set out required delivery times and request bidders to indicate 
specific delivery periods for the tonnage they supply, and supplier failures to meet their 
own stipulated delivery periods should then attract specified penalties.  
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• Payment processes should be revised, with suppliers being reimbursed in Malawi 
Kwacha at the current rate of exchange for the US dollar (the currency in which bids are 
submitted)with payment of a specified percentage in dollars to an external account 
• The tender process for transporters should be tightened up, with evaluation of evidence 
of capacity and performance, vehicle availability and financial resources.  
• Earlier development of a ‘delivery matrix’ for fertiliser allocation and despatch to 
markets 
 
There continue to be significant delays in payment of invoices from seed and fertiliser suppliers, and 
these raise suppliers’ costs and hence pricing to the programme. Figure 4.8 shows significant delays 
in payment in November and December, measured in terms of both absolute and percentage 
amounts owing. The 2012/13 absolute figures in Malawi Kwacha are inflated by the effects of the 
devaluation of the Kwacha, but outstanding invoices in November and December are also very high 
in percentage terms. These raise financing costs for suppliers and will be built into prices in tender 
bids. Payments by the end of January were, however, much improved, although outstanding claims 
due to changes in exchange rates between the time of invoicing and payment are not reported. 
 
 
Figure 4.8 Outstanding invoice payments by season 
Source: Calculations from Logistics Unit annual and weekly reports 
 
4.2 Seed procurement 
Seed companies and government agreed that farmers should be able to buy maize seed with a seed 
coupon with a maximum  MK150 cash top up from farmers, and that these coupons would be 
redeemed by government for a price of MK 2,650 /coupon. Seed companies were responsible for 
stocking retail outlets (agro-dealers, input supply shops, and ADMARC and SFFRFM markets) with 
5kg packets of hybrid seed, 8kg packets of OPV seed and 3 kg packets of soya seed and 2 kg packets 
of other legume seed (beans, cowpeas, pigeon peas, or groundnuts) for redemption by farmers, 
with redemption by government at a price of MK1250 per voucher. Retailers returned coupons to 
seed companies who were responsible for claiming reimbursement from the Government (through 
the Logistics Unit).  
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4.3 Coupon printing, allocation and distribution 
Coupon allocation involved updating the farm households register, local (village) processes of 
selection of beneficiaries, allocation of coupons by district and within district by EPA, printing of 
coupons, distribution to districts, and issue of coupons to beneficiaries. These activities are critical as 
regards coordination of numbers of beneficiaries identified, coupon printing and issue, and 
allocation and transport of fertiliser supplies to markets, with total demand matching fertiliser 
procurement.   
Registers of farm households in all districts were updated in the field from March to August and then 
cleaned by the Logistics Unit and sent back to districts for checking. This information formed the 
basis of an initial district allocation of coupons in mid-July with four coupons per beneficiary to allow 
each beneficiary to receive a set of subsidised inputs consisting of one hybrid or OPV maize seed 
pack (5 or 8 kg), one 50 kg bag of NPK, one 50 kg bag of urea, and one legume seed pack. District 
allocations were subdivided by EPA and village using the farm family register in each district, and the 
EPA and village allocations were distributed to DADOs together with blank registration forms for 
entry of beneficiary names.  This allowed beneficiary identification to start in each district as soon as 
the farm family register was finalised. However district allocations were increased somewhat on 2nd 
November, requiring updating of the beneficiary lists in a number of districts.  As a result beneficiary 
selection was not completed by all districts until the last week of November. Beneficiary lists were 
then printed by the Logistics Unit with beneficiary details by village and sent in triplicate to MoAFS, 
and summaries of fertiliser requirements by market compiled. Table 4.2 shows beneficiary 
registrations by region. 
 
Table 4.2 Final Beneficiary Registrations by Region (Households)1 
 
Target % by 
Region 
% Male 
headed 
% Female 
headed 
Unallocated 
North 199,500 13% 33% 57% 10% 
Centre 636,400 41% 40% 59% 1% 
South 708,500 46% 50% 48% 2% 
Total 1,544,400 100% 44% 54% 2% 
Source: Calculations from Logistics Unit (2013) 
 
 
As in previous years there is some unevenness in allocations between districts and regions when 
compared with estimated population.  Figure 4.9 compares changes in fertiliser voucher redemption 
by region per household over the life of the programme, using MoAFS farm family and NSO rural 
household estimates (note that in 2012/13 each registered beneficiary was supposed to receive two 
fertiliser vouchers).  
 
                                                          
1 It should be noted that it may not be clear if the beneficiary listing distinguishes between male and female 
heads or male and female recipients. 
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Figure 4.9 Estimates of fertiliser voucher redemption per household by region by year using  
MoAFS farm family estimates (left) and NSO rural household estimates (right) 
Source: Calculations from Logistics Unit annual reports, NSO(2008). 
 
The following observations are of interest from Figure 4.9:   
• There have been significant differences in fertiliser supply over the life of the programme, 
with it rising from 2005/6 to 2007/8, and then falling back to 2009/10, with roughly similar 
supply in subsequent years. Overall fertiliser redemptions per NSO rural household in 
2012/13 are roughly the same as they were in 2005/6, the first year of the programme, but 
are lower than in all subsequent years except 2011/12. Redemptions per MoAFS farm family 
are lower than in 2005/6.   
• There are marked differences between supply per farm family registered by MoAFS and 
supply per rural household estimated from NSO census figures, with supply per MoAFS farm 
family much lower than supply per NSO rural household. This is because MoAFS national 
farm family estimates are just over 60% higher than NSO rural household estimates. This 
difference is lower in the southern region and highest in the Central region. MoAFS figures 
show more farm families in the Centre than the South. 
• Both MoAFS and NSO estimates show differences in availability per household between 
regions, with these regional differences declining over time. Availability has been highest in 
the north in all years, but increasing regional equity has meant that supply to the north 
declined sharply from 2008/9 to 2009/10. Supply per MoAFS farm family in the central 
region also shows a very sharp decline form 2007/8 to 2009/10, below supply in the 
southern region, but supply per NSO rural household is now almost identical for the two 
regions. The low supply per MoAFS farm family in the central region in recent years is due to 
very rapid increases in MoAFS central region farm family registrations over the period 
compared with the southern region   
Although commendable rough balance in coupons per rural household or farm family appears to 
have been achieved across the three regions, this does not appear to be the case across districts, as 
shown by Figure 4.10, which compares 2012/13 coupon allocations per registered farm family across 
districts. Allocations vary from less than 20% of farm families being registered beneficiaries in 
Chikwawa and Nsanje, and then a range from just over 30% to 55% of farm families being registered 
beneficiaries in the rest of the country. The reasons for some of this variation may be inferred (for 
example lower allocations to Chikwawa and Nsanje may be associated with farmers’ perceptions 
that their soils are more fertile and hence common anecdotal reports of large scale sales of 
subsidised fertiliser from these districts). Variations between other districts are not so easily 
explained, and even where there may be agronomic and administrative reasons for such variation, it 
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is not clear how they fit in with programme objectives, targeting policies, and local expectations of 
equitable benefits. 
 
 
Figure 4.102012/13 District coupon allocations: registered beneficiaries as a % of registered farm 
families 
Source: Calculations from Logistics Unit (2013) 
 
Coupon distribution and access depended on the implementation of the formal allocation processes 
described above.  Coupons were despatched to districts and bundled by EPA and village. Tight 
security measures were followed to the extent that no details of the coupons were released prior to 
the opening of the programme on 6thNovember. There is no evidence that fertiliser coupon 
distribution exceeded the formal allocations detailed above (a situation that arose with the issuing 
of supplementary coupons from 2006/7 to 2008/9), and general agreement that the security 
features of the coupon were generally effective in preventing fraud.  
4.4 Coupon redemption and input sales 
Fertiliser coupons had to be redeemed by beneficiaries at ADMARC or SFFRFM markets with the 
payment of MK500. Seed coupons could be redeemed (without payment or for up to MK150 for 
hybrid and some OPV packs) at agro-dealers and other input sellers who had made arrangements 
with seed suppliers for seed coupon redemption, as well as at ADMARC or SFFRFM markets.  Sales 
occurred when suppliers had stocks and beneficiaries had coupons Reported fertiliser and seed sales 
are detailed in table 4.3. 
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Table 4.3 Subsidised fertiliser and seed sales 
 
Fertilisers (MT) Seed ('000 packs) 
Region NPK Urea Total Maize Legume 
North 9,923 9,900 19,823 196 167 
Centre 31,681 31,698 63,379 631 599 
South 35,331 35,313 70,644 702 661 
Total 76,936 76,910 153,846 1,529 1,427 
Source: Calculations from Logistics Unit (2013) 
 
With the seed coupons, farmers purchased 5,978 MT of hybrid seed and 2,667 MT of OPV seed, 
together with 2,973 MT of legume seed (comprised of 652 MT of beans seed, 41 MT of cow peas 
seed, 1,867 MT of groundnuts seed, 358 MT of soya seed and 56 MT of pigeon pea seed).  Figure 
4.11 shows how subsidised fertiliser and seed sales have changed over the life of the programme.  
 
 
Figure 4.11 Subsidised fertiliser and seed sales by year 
Source: Calculations from Logistics Unit annual reports 
 
As figure 4.11 shows, there were large increases in maize and legume seed sales from 2008/9to 
2010/11, with a subsequent fall back in sales of maize seed in 2011/12, but sustained legume seed 
sales. However, local shortages of particular legume seeds continue to constrain farmer choice and 
purchases.  
We consider later (in sections 5 and 6) different stakeholders’ perceptions of the implementation 
process, and estimates of coupon distribution and use for different categories of rural people.  
4.5 Programme costs 
Overall costs of the programme are difficult to estimate due to lack of documented administrative 
costs borne by the MoAFS and other organisations involved in the implementation of the subsidy. 
The available figures therefore reflect the documented costs of the programme. Figure 4.12 shows 
these with some added estimated costs in an attempt to estimated total programme costs. A 
detailed cost breakdown from which figure 4.12 is derived is available in Annex 1. 
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Figure 4.12 Trends in Farm Input Subsidy Costs, 2005/06 – 2012/13 
Note:  All costs are after deduction of farmers’ redemption and include estimated costs. 
Sources: Calculations from Logistics Units reports; previous evaluation reports 
 
The following points should be noted regarding figure 4.12.  
• Very high international fertiliser prices led to inflated costs in 2008/9, and this was 
exacerbated by poor physical control of voucher distribution from 2006/7 to 2008/9. 
Programme costs fell dramatically from 2008/9 to 2009/10 and 2010/11, due to reduced 
fertiliser prices and to improved control of subsidy volumes. These savings on fertiliser costs 
were offset to a very limited extent by increased volumes and costs of subsidised maize and 
legume seed. 
• Data are presented in US$ because the major devaluation of the Malawi Kwacha in 2012 and 
early 2013 means that 2012/13 costs are not comparable with early years when the value of 
the Malawi Kwacha was relatively constant (at 140MK/US$ from 2005/6 to 2009/10, rising 
to 151 in 2010/11 and 167 in 2011/12). An exchange rate of MK365/US$ was used in 
converting MK budget and expenditure figures in 2012/13.  
• The FISP Budget as announced in the national budget is for seed and fertiliser, and therefore 
should be compared with seed and fertiliser expenditure.  
• The total cost of FISP in 2012/13 is estimated at just over or US$144 million or MK 52.8 
billion.  
• The cost of FISP is consistently estimated as over 50% of the MoAFS budget (this has been 
adjusted to allow for increases in FISP over-expenditure but not for other over-expenditures) 
and the FISP budget in the last three years has been between 7% and 10% of the national 
budget. 
• Donors contributed to the 2012/13 FISP directly and through budget support. The direct 
support constituted 12% of the estimated total costs after deduction of farmer repayments 
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and covered costs of seeds, the logistic unit operating costs, coupon printing, support to the 
ACB and police,  and monitoring and evaluation. Donors also supported the subsidy 
indirectly through budget support.  
• Fertiliser procurement has accounted for an average of 77% of total programme costs over 
the 2011/12 and 2012/13 seasons. One reason for the high expenditure on fertiliser is 
beneficiaries’ small contribution to fertiliser costs. Farmers’ redemption payments for 
fertiliser have fallen from MK950 to MK500 over the life of the programme.  As a result of 
these falls in Kwacha  contributions together with increases in international fertiliser prices 
and the 2012 devaluation of the Kwacha, farmer contributions have fallen from 
approximately 35% to 3% of the cost of delivered fertiliser (including transport but excluding 
any overhead and administration costs).This dramatic fall is illustrated in figure 4.13.  
 
 
Figure 4.13  Beneficiaries’ fertiliser  redemption contributions as % total delivered costs, 2005/06 – 
2012/13 
Note:  Delivered costs include procurement and transport costs but exclude administrative and overhead 
costs 
Sources: Calculation from Logistics Units reports 
 
• This high proportion of fertiliser costs in overall programme costs means that if net fertiliser 
costs can be reduced through improved tendering procedures, as discussed earlier in section 
4.1, and/or through increased beneficiary contributions then there is considerable potential 
for reducing overall programme costs. For example a 5% reduction in fertiliser prices could 
reduce programme cost by just under 4% or some US$5.5 million or some MK2.0 billion. If in 
addition farmer contributions were raised to say (as an illustration)MK1500 per bag (around 
10% of total cost), then this could save an additional US$8.4 million or MK3.1 billion. Taking 
these together could save around MK5.1 billion or US$14 million (just under 10% of total 
programme cost). Larger increases in beneficiary contributions could of course save more. 
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5 Impacts on the Private Sector 
5.1 Introduction 
This section reviews the impacts of the FISP on the private sector. It is based on the analysis of data 
from the input supplier survey and household survey. The focus is to review the performance of 
various players in the supply of agricultural inputs in the 2012/13 agricultural season. The input 
supplier survey was carried out in February/March 2013 in 10 districts (see section 3). Table 5.1 
shows the sample distribution of input suppliers by district. In each district, the sample is dominated 
by independent agro-dealers, accounting for more than 50% of the input suppliers in the districts. 
The highest ADMARC/SFFRFM representation in the district samples was in Phalombe (38%), 
followed by Zomba (34%) and the lowest was in Dedza (3%), due to a high number of refusals for 
interviews. Nonetheless, these proportions are not necessarily representative of the distribution of 
suppliers in the district, but rather the suppliers that were available at the time of the survey. At the 
time the survey was being conducted, some of the suppliers had closed their seasonal market and 
the seasonal agro-dealers had also left the areas in which they were operating. 
 
Table 5.1 Distribution of Sample Input Suppliers by District (%) 
District N Distributor/ 
Importer 
ADMARC / 
SFFRFM 
Independent 
Agro-Dealers 
Other 
Suppliers* 
Total 
Karonga 
Mzimba 
Kasungu 
Lilongwe 
Dedza 
Mangochi 
Zomba 
Blantyre 
Thyolo 
Phalombe 
50 
50 
50 
50 
33 
50 
50 
50 
47 
16 
8.0 
12.0 
18.0 
22.0 
27.3 
8.0 
10.0 
6.0 
6.4 
6.3 
28.0 
20.0 
18.0 
26.0 
3.0 
22.0 
34.0 
10.0 
21.3 
37.5 
64.0 
56.0 
60.0 
52.0 
69.7 
64.0 
56.0 
74.0 
72.3 
56.3 
0.0 
12.0 
4.0 
0.0 
0.0 
6.0 
0.0 
10.0 
0.0 
0.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
Note: * Co-operatives and general wholesalers. 
 
 
5.2 Characteristics of Input Suppliers 
Table 5.2 presents the general characteristics of the input supply system. Overall, only 38% of the 
input suppliers operated throughout the year, 57% were only targeting rain-fed cultivation and 6% 
operated intermittently. We did not find cases where suppliers were only targeting dimba 
cultivation.  There are district level variations in the timing of the operations, with the highest 
proportion operating throughout the year observed in Zomba (56%) and the lowest observed in 
Phalombe and Blantyre. The proportion of suppliers targeting only rain-fed cultivation is highest in 
Blantyre (76%) and Karonga (74%) and lowest in Thyolo (36%). These differences in the timing of 
operations are also reflected in the mean number of months the suppliers remain open: 6.8 months 
in the 2012/13 agricultural season, with Zomba recording the longest period and Phalombe 
recording the lowest period.  
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Table 5.2  Operational Characteristics of Input Suppliers by District 
District N Years of 
Operation* 
Timing of Operations (%) Mean Number of 
Months of operation in 
2012/13 
Year 
Round 
Rain-fed 
only 
Irregular 
Karonga 
Mzimba 
Kasungu 
Lilongwe 
Dedza 
Mangochi 
Zomba 
Blantyre 
Thyolo 
Phalombe 
 
Total 
50 
50 
50 
50 
33 
50 
50 
50 
47 
16 
 
446 
7.80 
7.09 
8.32 
8.79 
5.16 
7.90 
6.58 
3.10 
5.54 
6.08 
 
6.75 
26 
42 
36 
52 
52 
26 
56 
18 
47 
6 
 
38 
74 
58 
64 
44 
48 
58 
44 
76 
36 
63 
 
57 
0 
0 
0 
4 
0 
16 
0 
6 
17 
31 
 
6 
5.46 
6.68 
6.38 
7.98 
7.76 
6.20 
8.24 
5.50 
8.21 
5.31 
 
6.84 
Note: * This variable had a lot of ‘don’t know’ responses particularly for major distributors and parastatals and 
therefore understates the period of operation. 
 
The operational characteristics by supplier categories are reported in Table 5.3 and show that it is 
distributors that mostly operate throughout the year. The suppliers that are mostly targeting rain-
fed cultivation are independent agro-dealers (67%) and ADMARC/SFFRFM (56%). ADMARC/SFFRFM 
and agro-dealers operate for only half of the season while distributers service the farming 
communities for 11 months in the agricultural season. The private sector also generates higher 
employment, as reflected in the number of permanent employees among distributors and other 
suppliers. The independent agro-dealer system generates the lowest average permanent 
employment per operation. These figures show that providing incentives to distributors to sustain 
markets in the economy may have important employment benefits, although in comparing 
employment benefits with for example agro-dealers it may be better to consider turnover per staff 
member. 
 
Table 5.3  Operational Characteristics of Input Suppliers by Supplier Category 
Operational Indicator Distributor/ 
Importer 
ADMARC / 
SFFRFM 
Independent 
Agro-Dealers 
Other 
Suppliers* 
Timing of Operations (%) 
Year Round 
Rain-fed Only 
Irregular 
Mean operational months 
Mean permanent workers 
Mean temporary workers 
N 
 
87 
9 
4 
11.0 
4.3 
0.4 
55 
 
39 
56 
5 
6.5 
2.5 
1.8 
96 
 
27 
67 
6 
6.0 
0.8 
0.9 
279 
 
56 
38 
6 
8.4 
3.3 
0.5 
16 
Note: *Co-operatives and general wholesalers. 
 
Most of the suppliers also sell other goods in addition to agricultural inputs (Table 5.4). Overall 
around 50% of annual sales come from non-agricultural input business among distributors, 
ADMARC/SFFRFM, and other suppliers, but just under 30% among agro-dealers.  There is high 
diversification of goods sold among distributors, and this is consistent with the argument that to 
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support market operations throughout the year they need to cater for other needs of the rural 
communities.   
Table 5.4 Other Goods Sold by Supplier Category (% outlets) 
 
Non-Input Goods Sold 
Distributor/ 
Importer 
ADMARC / 
SFFRFM 
Independent 
Agro-Dealers 
Other 
Suppliers* 
Groceries 
Maize 
Hardware and building materials 
Clothing and house wares 
Other non-input goods 
N 
89 
40 
95 
33 
29 
55 
2 
75 
0 
0 
58 
96 
21 
12 
8 
7 
5 
279 
69 
0 
56 
56 
0 
16 
Note: * Co-operatives and general wholesalers. 
 
Table 5.5 shows the mean proportion of agricultural input sales accounted for by each type of input 
as reported by input suppliers. Among distributor outlets, 49% of agricultural input sales come from 
the sale of fertilizers and 26% come from maize and legume seed sales. Grain storage chemicals and 
agricultural equipment are also important sources of sales. ADMARC and SFFRFM mostly rely on 
fertiliser sales (92% of sales), with small maize and legume seed and no sales of vegetable seeds or 
feed stocks. Agro-dealers tend to specialize in maize and legume seed sales (accounting for 52% and 
26%, of sales respectively). Fertiliser sales are not at all important among agro-dealers (contributing 
6% of total agricultural sales). One likely reason for specialisation of agro-dealers in seed sales 
maybe relatively lower capital needs to invest in retail of seeds compared to the capital 
requirements for the fertiliser business. 
 
Table 5.5 Proportion of Agricultural Input Sales in 2012/13 (%) 
 
Inputs 
Distributor/ 
Importer 
ADMARC / 
SFFRFM 
Independent 
Agro-Dealers 
Other 
Suppliers* 
Fertiliser 
Maize seeds 
Legume seeds 
Vegetable seeds 
Herbicides 
Grain storage chemicals 
Feed stocks 
Agricultural equipment 
N 
48.5 
17.8 
8.0 
1.3 
2.9 
7.4 
1.8 
8.3 
55 
91.8 
6.8 
0.3 
0.0 
0.4 
1.7 
0.0 
0.2 
96 
6.0 
51.9 
26.2 
3.8 
3.0 
4.4 
0.1 
1.9 
279 
11.7 
52.6 
5.9 
3.6 
0.5 
14.5 
2.7 
14.3 
16 
Note: * Co-operatives and general wholesalers.  The proportions do not add to 100 as these were averages 
based on the proportions reported by input suppliers.  
 
5.3 Seed and Fertiliser Stock Flows 
In the input supply survey, data was also collected for stock levels and movements of both 
subsidized and unsubsidized inputs. Table 5.6 shows the proportion of suppliers in each group that 
had stocks of various inputs for sale (subsidized and commercial) in the 2012/13 agricultural season.  
Overall, 85% of the input suppliers had stocks of maize seeds, 62% had stocks of legume seeds and 
50% had stocks of fertilizers. Almost all the distributor outlets had stocks of fertiliser and maize 
seeds. There was also high incidence of stocks of grain storage chemicals (89%) and agricultural 
equipment (91%) among distributor outlets. ADMARC and SFFRFM mainly stocked fertilisers. Agro-
dealers tend to specialize in maize and legume seeds, with 99% and 85% with stocks for the 2012/13 
 22 
 
season, respectively. A high proportion of other suppliers also reported stocks of maize seeds 
(100%), grain storage chemicals (75%), agricultural equipment (56%) and vegetable seeds (43%). 
 
Table 5.6 Proportions of Suppliers with Stocks in 2012/13 by Supplier Group (%) 
 
Inputs 
Distributor
/ Importer 
ADMARC / 
SFFRFM 
Independent 
Agro-Dealers 
Other 
Suppliers* 
All 
Fertiliser 
Maize seeds 
Legume seeds 
Vegetable seeds 
Herbicides 
Grain storage chemicals 
Other chemical products 
Feed stocks 
Agricultural equipment 
N 
96.4 
98.2 
65.5 
27.3 
49.1 
89.1 
65.5 
12.7 
90.9 
55 
99.0 
34.4 
1.0 
0.0 
2.1 
10.4 
8.3 
0.0 
2.1 
96 
25.1 
98.9 
85.3 
34.4 
25.1 
34.8 
24.4 
1.1 
21.5 
279 
31.3 
100.0 
31.3 
43.8 
12.5 
75.0 
6.3 
12.5 
56.3 
16 
50.0 
85.0 
62.8 
26.5 
22.6 
37.7 
25.3 
2.7 
27.1 
446 
Note: * Co-operatives and general wholesalers. 
 
5.3.1 Seed Stocks 
The input supply survey obtained information on the stocks and flows of various seed types from 
input suppliers as a measure of business activities. Table 5.7 shows the stocks available for 2012/13 
season and the amounts sold within the season by the type of supplier. There were still some stocks 
that were carried over from the 2011/12 season and sold in the 2012/13 season. However, when 
retailers were asked what they plan to do with the 2012/13 remaining seeds, 99% indicated that 
they will return to suppliers. ADMARC and SFFRFM mainly specialized in maize seed and the only 
legumes available in small quantities were groundnut seed and soya bean seed.  There is, however, a 
general problem on the availability of legumes, and suppliers almost sold all the stocks within the 
season.  Most of the legume seeds were available in agro-dealer shops. The low end of season 
balances for legumes reveal that there was possibly unmet demand in some areas. 
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Table 5.7  Mean Seed Stock Levels and Movements in 2012/13 (kilograms per supplier) 
 
Stock 
Distributor
/ Importer 
ADMARC / 
SFFRFM 
Independe
nt Agro-
Dealers 
Other 
Suppliers* 
Total 
OPV Maize Seed 
Stocks - end of 2011/12 season 
Stocks - acquisition in 2012/13 
Stocks - sold in 2012/13 
Stocks - end of 2012/13 season 
 
39  
9,761  
8,249  
 447 
 
-    
 56  
 54  
 2 
 
52  
2,564  
2,082  
 353 
 
-    
660  
510  
 150 
 
37  
2,843  
2,349  
 282 
Hybrid Maize Seed 
Stocks - end of 2011/12 season 
Stocks - acquisition in 2012/13 
Stocks - sold in 2012/13 
Stocks - end of 2012/13 season 
 
79  
1,271  
1,009  
 230 
 
81  
478  
183  
 208 
 
115  
 7,491  
 5,987  
 1,253 
 
168  
 5,307  
 4,290  
 1,118 
 
105  
 5,136  
 4,063  
 897 
Bean Seed 
Stocks - end of 2011/12 season 
Stocks - acquisition in 2012/13 
Stocks - sold in 2012/13 
Stocks - end of 2012/13 season 
 
3  
2,233  
2,173  
 7 
 
-    
 -    
 -    
 -    
 
0.03 
 461  
 444  
 16 
 
-    
51 
51 
 -    
 
0.4 
 566  
 547  
 11 
Groundnut Seed 
Stocks - end of 2011/12 season 
Stocks - acquisition in 2012/13 
Stocks - sold in 2012/13 
Stocks - end of 2012/13 season 
 
-    
 144  
 140  
0.3 
 
-    
 3  
 3  
 -    
 
-    
 1,173  
 1,154  
 9 
 
-    
 540  
 540  
 -    
 
-    
 772  
 759  
 6 
Pigeon Peas Seed 
Stocks - end of 2011/12 season 
Stocks - acquisition in 2012/13 
Stocks - sold in 2012/13 
Stocks - end of 2012/13 season 
 
-    
 -    
 -    
 -    
 
-    
 -    
 -    
 -    
 
-    
 157  
 151  
 3 
 
-    
 119  
 119  
 -    
 
-    
103  
 99  
 2 
Cow Pea Seed 
Stocks - end of 2011/12 season 
Stocks - acquisition in 2012/13 
Stocks - sold in 2012/13 
Stocks - end of 2012/13 season 
 
- 
 34  
 34  
 -    
 
-    
 -    
 -    
-    
 
-    
 60  
 56  
 1 
 
-    
25 
25 
 -    
 
-    
 42  
 40  
 1 
Soya Bean Seed 
Stocks - end of 2011/12 season 
Stocks - acquisition in 2012/13 
Stocks - sold in 2012/13 
Stocks - end of 2012/13 season 
 
-    
 632 
 621  
 9 
 
-    
3  
3  
 -    
 
1  
 502  
 495  
 7 
 
-    
 152  
 149  
 3 
 
0  
398  
392  
 6 
Note: * Co-operatives and general wholesalers. 
 
5.3.2 Fertilizer Stocks 
Table 5.8 presents the average stock levels and sales per supplier of all fertilizers by type of retailer.  
There were substantial carryover stocks of fertilizers from the 2011/12 agricultural season, 
particularly in distributor outlets, averaging 22.9 tonnes in the 2012/13 season, and again at the end 
of the season.  Most of the new fertilizer stocks were found in ADMARC and SFFRFM outlets, which 
is expected as most of the stocks are subsidized fertilisers due to the exclusion of the private sector 
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from in retailing subsidized fertilisers. The mean stocks of fertilizers were lowest among the 
independent agro-dealers, averaging 9.3 tonnes per agro-dealer. 
 
Table 5.8  Mean Fertilizer Stock Flows per supplier in 2012/13 (tonnes) 
 
Stock 
Distributor/ 
Importer 
ADMARC 
/ SFFRFM 
Independent 
Agro-Dealers 
Other 
Suppliers* 
Total 
Stocks - end of 2011/12 season 
Stocks - acquisition in 2012/13 
Stocks - sold in 2012/13 
Stocks - end of 2012/13 season 
22.9  
 117.4  
 108.3  
 29.0 
1.7  
 205.7  
 204.0  
 2.8 
0.1  
 9.3  
 8.9  
 0.6 
1.9  
 15.6  
 16.1  
 1.4 
3.3  
 65.1  
 63.4  
 4.6 
Note: * Co-operatives and general wholesalers. 
 
5.4 Subsidized Seed and Fertiliser Sales 
5.4.1 Subsidized Seed Sales 
Overall, 83% of the input suppliers interviewed in the study participated in the sale of subsidized 
seeds in the 2012/13 agricultural season. Table 5.9 shows the participation in subsidized seed sales 
by type by supplier.  Proportionately, there is lower participation in subsidized seed sales in 
ADMARC/SFFRFM market outlets with only 32% indicating that they sold subsidized seeds in the 
2012/13 season. The highest participation was among agro-dealers (97%), followed by distributor 
outlets (95%). In terms of the reported incidence of farmers that brought coupons but also bought 
additional seeds on cash basis, very few suppliers reported that farmers were also buying with cash 
in addition to coupon purchases. 
 
Table 5.9  Subsidized Seed Sales by Supplier Group (%) 
 
Indicators 
Distributor 
/ Importer 
ADMARC 
/ SFFRFM 
Independent 
Agro-Dealers 
Other 
Suppliers* 
Participated in subsidized seed sales (%) 
% of farmers also with cash purchase 
% of seed coupons submitted by January 
% of seed coupons reimbursed  
N 
95 
7 
98 
- 
55 
32 
0.4 
93 
- 
96 
97 
7 
94 
11 
279 
81 
18 
96 
- 
16 
Note: * Co-operatives and general wholesalers. 
 
Most suppliers had submitted subsidized seed coupons received from farmers to the head offices or 
to the respective seed companies by January 2013. Among independent agro-dealers only 11% of 
the submitted seed coupons were reported to have been reimbursed.  
Table 5.10 shows the relative distribution of supplier groups’ participation in sale of seeds using 
coupons.  ADMARC and SFFRFM mainly sold hybrid maize seed, hardly any groundnuts and no bean, 
pigeon pea or cow pea seed. Agro-dealers show diversity in the seeds that they sold using coupons, 
from 16% in cow pea seed to 82% in hybrid maize. Distributors showed similar diversity, but with a 
lower proportion selling legume seeds. 
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Table 5.10  Suppliers Selling Seeds using Coupons by Supplier Group (%) 
 
Seed Type 
Distributor / 
Importer 
ADMARC / 
SFFRFM 
Independent 
Agro-Dealers 
Other 
Suppliers* 
Total 
OPV maize seed  
Hybrid maize seed 
Bean seed 
Groundnut seed 
Pigeon pea seed 
Cow pea seed 
Soya seed 
N 
73.1 
40.4 
69.2 
15.4 
0.0 
3.8 
44.2 
52 
3.2 
96.8 
0.0 
3.2 
0.0 
0.0 
3.2 
31 
57.4 
82.4 
41.2 
65.8 
21.0 
15.8 
46.0 
272 
23.1 
100.0 
15.4 
30.8 
15.4 
7.7 
15.4 
13 
53.8 
78.3 
40.8 
52.2 
16.0 
12.5 
41.0 
368 
Note: * Co-operatives and general wholesalers. 
 
Subsidized seed sales were a significant proportion of seed sales among retailers in the survey as 
shown in Table 5.11. Among distributor outlets, the lowest proportion of seed sales is in hybrid 
seeds averaging 67%, but all cow peas sales were subsidized sales. For ADMARC and SFFRFM, except 
for hybrid maize seed, all seed sales were subsidized sales. Similarly, most of the sales and almost all 
seed sales among other retailers were subsidized sales. Across the retailers, the lowest share of 
subsidized sales is in hybrid seed sales.  
 
Table 5.11  Share of Subsidized Seed Sales in total (subsidy and commercial) sales(%) 
 
Seed Type 
Distributor / 
Importer 
ADMARC / 
SFFRFM 
Independent 
Agro-Dealers 
Other 
Suppliers* 
Total 
OPV maize seed  
Hybrid maize seed 
Bean seed 
Groundnut seed 
Pigeon pea seed 
Cow pea seed 
Soya seed 
84.3 
68.7 
97.1 
88.3 
- 
100.0 
94.3 
100.0 
88.2 
- 
100.0 
- 
- 
100.0 
93.4 
81.8 
97.8 
97.8 
98.9 
99.8 
97.7 
100.0 
75.4 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
91.8 
81.2 
97.7 
97.5 
99.0 
99.8 
97.3 
Note: * Co-operatives and general wholesalers. 
 
Table 5.12presents the maximum number of seed varieties sold in the subsidy programme in 
2012/13 season.  There was diversity among the private sector retailers, particularly for hybrid maize 
seeds where up to 11 hybrid seed varieties were sold by some retailers compared to only 3 in 
ADMARC and SFFRFM outlets. There was low diversity of varieties sold on legume and OPV maize 
seeds. Although there are a number of OPV maize varieties, the limited diversity suggests that 
farmers do have limited choices over the variety of seeds available. 
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Table 5.12 Maximum Number of Seed Varieties under Subsidized Sales (%) 
 
Seed Type 
Distributor / 
Importer 
ADMARC / 
SFFRFM 
Independent 
Agro-Dealers 
Other 
Suppliers* 
Total 
OPV maize seed  
Hybrid maize seed 
Bean seed 
Groundnut seed 
Pigeon pea seed 
Cow pea seed 
Soya seed 
4 
10 
2 
1 
- 
1 
2 
1 
3 
- 
1 
- 
- 
1 
4 
11 
2 
2 
2 
1 
2 
2 
8 
1 
2 
1 
1 
1 
4 
11 
2 
2 
2 
1 
2 
Note: * Co-operatives and general wholesalers. 
 
The choices available to smallholder farmers are further revealed from the data on the most popular 
variety sold and the most wanted variety by the farmers (Table 5.13).  The most popular OPV maize 
seed in terms of sales is ZM 623. This is the first most popular variety among 55% of retailers and 
was also mentioned as the second most popular variety by 35% of retailers that mentioned two seed 
varieties. ZM 621 is the second most popular. With respect to hybrid maize seed, the most popular 
variety is SC 403, listed as most popular among 27% of retailers, followed by DKC 8053, MH 26 and 
PAN 53.  
 
Table 5.13  Most Popular Maize Varieties under Subsidized Sales (%) 
OPV maize seed Hybrid maize seed  
Variety 1 %  Variety 2 % Variety 1 %  Variety 2 % 
ZM 623 
ZM 621 
ZM 521 
ZM 523 
ZM 721 
Other (9) 
 
 
 
 
 
N 
54.5 
17.7 
9.1 
7.1 
3.5 
8.1 
 
 
 
 
 
198 
 ZM 623 
ZM 621 
ZM 523 
ZM 721 
ZM 521 
Other (12) 
 
34.8 
21.4 
18.0 
9.0 
3.4 
13.4 
 
 
 
 
 
89 
SC 403 
DKC 8053 
MH 26 
PAN 53 
SC 627 
DKC 9089 
SC 719 
PAN 67 
PAN 4M19 
Other (16) 
 
26.7 
13.5 
11.8 
10.4 
8.3 
8.0 
6.3 
5.9 
1.4 
7.7 
 
288 
 SC 627 
DKC 8053 
SC 403 
PAN 67 
DKC 9089 
PAN 53 
PAN 4M19 
SC 719 
FUMBA 
Other (13) 
25.8 
19.4 
10.6 
9.7 
7.8 
7.4 
4.6 
4.6 
1.8 
8.3 
 
217 
 
Table5.14 presents the structure of the seed market in terms of control of the market among seed 
producers. Demeter controls the market share in OPV maize accounting for 62% of the most popular 
varieties sold, followed by Funwe which accounts for 20% of most popular variety. This implies a 
two-firm concentration ratio of 82%. Similarly, there is high level of concentration in hybrid maize 
seeds, with Seed Co and Monsanto accounting for 42% and 25% of the most popular varieties, 
respectively. The three-firm concentration ratio is 87%. This market dominance suggests limited 
choices available to smallholder farmers.  In fact, the number of seed breeders supplying to the 
subsidy programme increased marginally from 12 in 2011/12 to 15 in 2012/12 (Chirwa and Dorward, 
2013b); (Logistics Unit, 2013) 
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Table 5.14 Most Popular Maize Varieties under Subsidized Sales by Seed Company (%) 
OPV maize seed Hybrid maize seed  
Company First (%) Second (%) Company First (%) Second (%) 
Pannar 
Seed Co 
Seed Tech 
Demeter 
Funwe 
Nasfam 
CPM Agri 
Panthochi 
Premium 
 
N 
- 
7.1 
1.5 
62.1 
20.2 
5.6 
0.5 
2.0 
1.0 
 
198 
2.2 
1.1 
3.3 
65.6 
15.6 
3.3 
- 
5.6 
3.3 
 
90 
Pannar 
Monsanto 
Seed Co 
Seed Tech 
Demeter 
Funwe 
CPM Agri 
Other 
18.5 
25.4 
41.8 
3.1 
0.7 
10.1 
0.4 
- 
 
 
288 
23.0 
30.0 
43.8 
1.8 
0.9 
- 
- 
0.5 
 
 
217 
 
 
The problem of stock outs on subsidized seeds is also presented by type of retailer in Figure 3 below.  
Stock outs were mainly reported by private sector retailers.  However, as noted above, ADMARC and 
SFFRFM did not have a lot of stocks of seeds in the 2012/13 season, with agro-dealers with the bulk 
of the seed stocks. 
 
Figure 5.1  Incidence of Stock-Outs in Subsidized Seeds in 2012/13 
(% suppliers by type) 
 
 
The seeds were mostly obtained without a top-up, with a few exceptions. Top-ups were only paid by 
farmers for maize seeds bought at MK30 for hybrid maize seed at one ADMARC / SFFRFM outlet and 
at MK30 for OPV maize seeds at 6 agro-dealer outlets and MK20 – MK75 for hybrid maize seeds at 6 
agro-dealer outlets. 
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5.4.2 Subsidized Fertiliser Sales 
As in previous few years, the private sector did not participate in the retail of subsidized fertilizer 
sales in 2012/13. Survey data confirmed that only ADMARC and SFFRFM market outlets were dealing 
with subsidized fertiliser sales. The dominant subsidized fertilizer types sold were 
23:21:0+4S/Chitowe (Basal) and UREA that was used for top dressing. On average 97,683Kgs and 
104,020Kgs of basal and top dressing fertilizers were sold, respectively per outlet (Table 5.15). About 
60 and 57% of the suppliers experienced some stock out of Chitowe and Urea fertilisers, with high 
variability across districts.  
 
Table  5.15  Mean Volume of Fertilizer Sold per supplier and Incidents of Stock Outs in 2012/13 
 
District 
 
N 
23:21:0+4S/ 
(basal)  (Kg) 
UREA (Top 
Dress)  (Kg) 
Experienced Basal 
stock-out (%) 
Experienced Urea 
Stock- out (%) 
Karonga 
Mzimba 
Kasungu 
Lilongwe 
Dedza 
Mangochi 
Zomba 
Blantyre 
Thyolo 
Phalombe 
 
Total 
14 
10 
9 
13 
1 
11 
17 
5 
10 
5 
 
95 
113,046  
 35,565  
 93,700  
 128,762  
 140,000  
 83,014  
 100,185  
 88,350  
 112,675  
 99,910  
 
 97,683 
110,946  
 37,735  
 97,106  
 137,765  
 160,000  
 95,905  
 109,553  
 78,530  
 131,840  
 99,600  
 
 104,020 
28.6 
80.0 
55.6 
84.6 
100.0 
45.5 
82.4 
20.0 
40.0 
80.0 
 
60.0 
42.9 
70.0 
44.4 
76.9 
100.0 
45.5 
64.7 
40.0 
40.0 
80.0 
 
56.8 
 
 
5.5 Commercial Seed and Fertiliser Sales 
5.5.1 Commercial Seed Sales 
We noted above that most of the seed sales were based on seed coupon redemptions by farmers.  
Very few suppliers sold seed for cash in the 2012/13 agricultural season. On average, only 18% and 
46% of retailers covered in this study sold OPV and hybrid maize seeds for cash, and almost no 
retailers sold cow pea and soya bean seed for cash. Figure 6 shows the proportion of suppliers in the 
sample that sold seeds for cash. The highest proportion of retailers reporting cash seed sales is 
among ‘other suppliers’ with respect to hybrid maize seed, in which 87% reported cash sales. Among 
distributor outlets, 68% and 38% reported selling OPV maize and hybrid maize seed for cash, 
respectively. For agro dealers, a higher proportion reported selling hybrid maize seed for cash (60%) 
and 27% for OPV maize seed. 
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Figure 5.2 Proportion Selling Commercial Seeds (%) 
 
 
Table 5.16 shows the average prices at which various types of seeds were selling in the 2012/13 
season. On average, OPV maize seeds were selling at MK362 per kilogram, but the average price 
ranges from MK347 in Zomba to MK406 in Kasungu. Hybrid maize seeds were selling at an average 
price of MK576 per kilogram, with an average price range from MK536 in Karonga to MK632 in 
Mangochi. Bean, Groundnuts and Pigeon pea seeds were selling at MK614, MK629 and MK615 per 
kilogram, respectively.  Soya bean seeds were selling at an average price of MK495 per kilogram with 
a range of MK471 in Karonga to MK529 in Mangochi. 
 
Table  5.16 Average Prices of Seeds by District (MK per kilogram) 
 
District 
OPV maize 
seed 
Hybrid 
maize 
seed 
Bean 
seed 
Ground-
nut seed 
 
Pigeon pea 
seed 
 
Cow pea 
seed 
 
Soya 
seed 
 
Karonga 
Mzimba 
Kasungu 
Lilongwe 
Dedza 
Mangochi 
Zomba 
Blantyre 
Thyolo 
Phalombe 
 
All 
355 
350 
406 
350 
348 
354 
347 
351 
388 
378 
 
362 
536 
579 
572 
589 
588 
632 
564 
572 
566 
578 
 
576 
575 
700 
700 
493 
- 
625 
613 
625 
581 
625 
 
614 
617 
708 
650 
582 
600 
625 
613 
613 
- 
- 
 
629 
- 
- 
613 
- 
- 
625 
- 
600 
- 
- 
 
615 
300 
- 
625 
- 
- 
625 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 
517 
471 
517 
467 
404 
- 
529 
- 
- 
497 
- 
 
495 
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5.5.2 Commercial Fertiliser Sales 
Table 5.17 depicts the amount of fertiliser sold commercially by various suppliers. Evident in the 
data is the highest amounts of fertilizer sold commercially by distributor/importers especially for all 
fertilizer types. ADMARC/SFFRFM registered their highest sales for CAN fertilizer while Independent 
Agro-dealers registered the lowest cash sales, of D Compound fertilizer. On average more 
23:21:0+4fertiliser was sold commercially followed by Urea then CAN. 
 
Table 5.17 Mean Volume of Commercial Fertilizer Sales in 2012/13 (kilograms) 
 
Fertilizer Type 
Distributor/ 
Importer 
ADMARC 
/ SFFRFM 
Independent 
Agro-Dealers 
Other 
Suppliers* 
Total 
23:21:0+4S/Chitowe (Basal) 
CAN 
UREA (Top Dress) 
D Compound 
N 
45,905  
 19,545  
 34,710  
 4,195 
55 
1,352  
 3,184  
 911  
 512 
96 
4,119  
 1,266  
 2,813  
 15 
279 
5,622  
 794  
 4,753  
 - 
16    
8,730  
 3,916  
 6,407  
 637 
446 
 
 
Table 5.18 below shows the proportion of suppliers that experienced fertilizer stock-outs by district 
and the average longest period of stock-outs. We find that an average of 40, 31, 34 and 21 percent 
reported stock-outs of basal, CAN, Urea and D Compound respectively. The longest stock-out days 
were reported in Blantyre of Basal/Chitowe and Urea for 60 days each and in Thyolo for 56 days of 
Basal/Chitowe fertilizer.  However, on average the longest stock-out days ranged from 17 to 24 days. 
There is no consistent pattern across districts with respect to months with longest period of stock-
outs in fertilizers for commercial sales in 2012/13. On average though longest stock outs were 
registered in May (CAN fertilizer), June (Urea fertilizer) and July (basal/Chitowe and D Compound 
fertilizer). However, these are less critical months of low demand. Most commercial sales were 
reported by suppliers for the months of June (Urea and CAN), August (basal/chitowe fertilizer) and in 
September (D Compound). 
 
Table  5.18  Commercial Fertiliser Stock Out in 2012/13 
 
District 
23:21:0+4S/Chitowe 
(Basal) 
CAN 
 
UREA (Top Dress) 
 
D Compound 
Stock-
out (%) 
Mean 
Longest 
stock-out 
days 
Stock-
out (%) 
Mean 
Longest 
stock-
out days 
Stock-
out (%) 
Mean 
Longest 
stock-
out days 
Stock-
out (%) 
Mean 
Longest 
stock-
out days 
Karonga 
Mzimba 
Kasungu 
Lilongwe 
Dedza 
Mangochi 
Zomba 
Blantyre 
Thyolo 
Phalombe 
 
All 
36.4 
40.0 
25.0 
54.5 
71.4 
23.1 
47.4 
33.3 
21.4 
0.0 
 
40.5 
19 
7 
21 
17 
25 
25 
31 
60 
38 
- 
 
23 
0.0 
44.4 
16.7 
38.1 
50.0 
10.0 
35.3 
0.0 
25.0 
0.0 
 
30.5 
19 
7 
21 
17 
25 
25 
31 
60 
38 
- 
 
23 
20.0 
53.8 
29.4 
39.1 
40.0 
27.3 
33.3 
16.7 
28.6 
0.0 
 
33.6 
19 
8 
20 
13 
15 
22 
26 
60 
14 
- 
 
17 
0.0 
50.0 
22.2 
0.0 
0.0 
33.3 
36.4 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
 
21.3 
- 
26 
16 
- 
- 
45 
18 
- 
- 
- 
 
24 
 
 31 
 
Table 5.19 shows average prices of fertilizers per 50kg bag across the districts for different types of 
fertilisers. Overall, basal fertiliser was the most expensive at MK14 241 per 50 kg and CAN had the 
lowest average price of MK11 529 per 50 kg bag. There are district level variations but these are not 
substantial. For basal fertiliser, the average prices range from MK 13 200 per 50kg bag in Phalombe 
to MK15 841 per 50kg bag in Karonga. For urea, Thyolo had lowest average prices of MK13 146 per 
50 kg while Karonga also turns up to have the highest price of MK15 435 per 50 kg bag. About 68 
percent, 65 percent and 71 percent of the suppliers reported a price change of basal/chitowe and D 
Compound; CAN and Urea, respectively.  There were slight declines in the average prices of basal, 
CAN and D Compound, but a slight increase in the price of Urea. 
 
Table  5.19  Average Fertilizer Prices by District in 2012/13 (MK/50kg) 
 
District 
23:21:0+4S/ 
(basal)   
CAN  UREA  
(Top Dress) 
D Compound 
Karonga 
Mzimba 
Kasungu 
Lilongwe 
Dedza 
Mangochi 
Zomba 
Blantyre 
Thyolo 
Phalombe 
 
All 
15,841  
 14,777  
 14,154  
 13,756  
 13,171  
 14,362  
 14,162  
 14,292  
 14,386  
 13,200  
 
 14,241 
11,400  
 11,067  
 11,598  
 11,168  
 10,937  
 12,620  
 11,647  
 14,267  
 11,460  
 9,500  
 
 11,529 
15,435  
 14,189  
 14,074  
 13,771  
 12,798  
 14,166  
 13,635  
 14,342  
 13,146  
 13,800  
 
 13,850 
14,500  
 14,160  
 14,943  
 13,324  
 14,740  
 15,258  
 13,936  
 14,700  
 13,160  
 12,500  
 
 14,211 
Old Price 13,429 11,101 13,217 13,335 
 
Figure 5.3 shows the commercial price of fertilizer across types of supplier during the 2012/13 
farming season. In general average prices are above MK10 000, with CAN having the lowest average 
prices across the suppliers. Except for D Compound and other fertilisers, the lowest prices of basal, 
urea and CAN were found at ADMARC/SFFRFM outlets, followed by distributor outlets. Prices of 
fertilizer changed markedly during the 2012/13 farming season.  
 
 
Figure 5.3 Price of Commercial Fertilizer per 50kg by Supplier in 2012/13 
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5.6 Performance of the Market System 
5.6.1 Nature of Competition in the Input Supply System 
The average catchment area of the input markets is 8.3 kilometre radius, with farmers reportedly 
travelled average distances of 13 kilometres to distributor outlets and within 7 kilometres of 
ADMARC/SFFRFM and independent agro-dealer shops. Figure 5.4 shows the number of competitors 
that input suppliers report face in their catchment area. From 2012 to 2013 there appears to be a 
general increase in the number of competitors that various suppliers are facing in both seeds and 
fertiliser markets, although the increases in the number of competitors are marginal. Consistent with 
limited fertiliser sales by agro-dealers, we also observe that seed retailers appear to face more 
competition than fertilizer retailers. 
 
 
Figure 5.4  Number of Competitors in Seeds and Fertiliser Markets, 2011/12 - 2012/13 
 
With respect to suppliers’ perceptions of the type of competition they face, there are also variations 
in seed and fertiliser markets (Table 5.20). In the seed market, the main competitors are agro-
dealers who are providing competition to all other suppliers and fellow agro-dealers. The parastatals 
are not the main competitors in the seed market. The participation of the private sector in the 
retailing of subsidized seeds may have helped in the development of the private sector although 
there are also questions about the sustainability of their businesses in the absence of the subsidy. As 
regards the fertiliser market, where the private sector has largely been excluded from the retail of 
subsidised fertilisers, ADMARC and SFFRFM remain important competitors to the private sector. 
However, distributors tend to face completion mainly from other distributors. This may be due to 
the fact that most of the distributor shops tend to locate at the same trading centres. ADMARC and 
SFFRFM tend to compete with each other, while for agro-dealers the main competition comes from 
distributor outlets. It may also relate to ADMARC/SFFRFM lower involvement in cash sales of 
fertiliser and to their limited and later opening in the season (see table 5.3). 
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Table 5.20  Nature of Competition Perceived by Supplier Group (% by column) 
 
Competitors 
Distributor 
/ Importer 
ADMARC 
/ SFFRFM 
Independent 
Agro-Dealers 
Other 
Suppliers* 
Seeds Market 
ADMARC/SFFRFM 
Distributors 
Cooperatives 
Agro-dealers 
N 
 
5.6 
24.1 
1.9 
68.5 
54 
 
6.3 
15.6 
- 
78.1 
32 
 
2.0 
14.5 
1.2 
82.4 
255 
 
6.7 
20.0 
- 
73.3 
15 
Fertiliser Market 
ADMARC/SFFRFM 
Distributors 
Cooperatives 
Agro-dealers 
Supermarkets 
N 
 
35.3 
56.9 
2.0 
5.9 
- 
51 
 
55.6 
37.0 
3.7 
3.7 
- 
54 
 
32.8 
41.8 
1.5 
22.4 
1.5 
67 
 
25.0 
50.0 
25.0 
- 
- 
4 
Note: * Co-operatives and general wholesalers. 
 
Suppliers were also asked about the growth of the business in terms of the number of sales outlets 
(opening or closing sales outlets). Figure 5.5 shows a mixed picture, with only 43% of distributors 
indicating expansion of sales outlets compared with 63% of other suppliers. Nonetheless, in each 
category of suppliers, the proportion that indicated increase in the number of sales outlets is higher 
than that with a decrease so that the net effect is an increase in input markets outlets between 
2010/11 and 2012/13,particularly in the private sector. Most importantly, the increase in the sales 
outlets for agro-dealers is encouraging as they are servicing multiple markets and tend to reach 
farmers within more convenient distances, as observed earlier. 
 
 
Figure 5.5  Growth of Business in terms of Number of Sales Outlets, 2010/11 - 2012/13 
 
 
42.6
31.6
39.8
62.5
20.4
24.2
18.6
12.5
37.0
44.2
41.5
25.0
0.0
10.0
20.0
30.0
40.0
50.0
60.0
70.0
Distributors ADMARC/SFFRFM Agro-Dealers Other Suppliers
Expand Contract No Change
Pe
rc
en
t
 34 
 
Among the distributors, 48% and 43% of those that indicated an increase in sales outlets attributed 
the change to increased demand for seeds and fertilisers and access to more capital for investments, 
respectively.  For ADMARC and SFFRFM the increases were attributed to increase in demand for 
both seeds and fertilizers (47%) and another 47% attributed the change to increase in demand for 
fertilisers only. Among the agro-dealers, 34% attributed the increase in sales outlets to increased 
demand for seeds only while 24% pointed to more access to capital and another 24% pointed to the 
subsidy programme as having promoted sales. Overall, only 15% of retailers that indicated 
contraction of sales outlets blamed it on the displacement effects of the input subsidy programme. 
For agro-dealers, increased or high competition was the main reason provided for contraction of 
sales outlets (47%), followed by reduced demand for seeds only (30%).  
5.6.2 Market Performance Assessment 
In the 2012/13 agricultural season, one of the new features introduced to improve the transparency 
in the supply of inputs to farmers was the introduction of public beneficiary lists. In the survey, we 
asked retailers whether there was a beneficiary list publicly available at the retail outlet. About 92% 
of ADMARC/SFFRFM outlets reported that the beneficiary list was publicly available and 95% 
revealed that the list improved the overall conduct of business at the outlet. However, the 
proportion of outlets among the private sector that indicated that the list of beneficiaries publicly 
was available was marginal (less than 10%), no doubt partly due to the exclusion of the private 
sector in the retail of subsidized fertilisers.  
We also reviewed the problems of queues and availability of preferred varieties at the sales outlets 
in the 2012/13 agricultural season.  Table 5.21 shows that a higher proportion of independent agro-
dealers (66%) reported long queues of farmers wanting to buy inputs; this was followed by 
ADMARC/SFFRFM with 52% of sales outlets reporting this problem. At district level, Kasungu had 
lowest proportion of markets (24%) reporting long queues while Phalombe reported the highest 
incidence (88%). There seem to have been major problems in the seeds varieties that were available 
to the farmers when they needed them, regardless of the type of input supplier. More than 75% of 
input suppliers revealed that they had some days that they had stocks of seeds but were unable to 
supply the specific type that a farmer wanted. The distribution of seed types partly depends on the 
marketing strategies of seed producers.  The district level analysis revealed that most of the districts 
in the southern region had lower incidence of preferred variety stock outs (68%) compared to the 
central region (89%) and the northern region (88%). 
 
Table 5.21  Problems of Queues and Preferred Varieties by Supplier Category 
 
Indicators 
Distributor 
/ Importer 
ADMARC 
/ SFFRFM 
Independent 
Agro-Dealers 
Other 
Suppliers* 
Some days with long queues of farmers 
Some days without preferred seeds 
Some days without preferred fertiliser 
41.8 
85.2 
39.6 
52.1 
75.0 
45.3 
66.1 
79.1 
55.8 
50.0 
75.0 
20.0 
Note: * Co-operatives and general wholesalers. 
 
With respect to fertilizers, we also note the mismatch between available stocks and the preferred 
types of fertiliser, more so among agro-dealers and ADMARC/SFFRFM. The lowest incidence of 
outlets reporting such problems was observed in Karonga (28%) and the highest incidence was 
observed in Dedza (88%). On average, 32%, 66% and 40% of retail suppliers reported fertiliser type 
mismatch with demand in the northern, central and southern regions, respectively. 
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5.6.3 Incidence of Fake Coupons 
Most of the suppliers indicated that they had no problems identifying fake coupons. Overall, only 
3.7% of retail outlets reported having problems identifying fake coupons, and mainly due to lack of 
facilities for identifying security features. Supply outlets were also asked about the incidence of 
presenting fake coupons for seeds in 2012/13 compared to 2011/12, and 67% indicated that there 
were no differences and 31% indicated  less incidence in 2012/13. With respect to fertilizers, 76% 
indicated that there were no differences and 23% indicated fewer incidences of fake coupons in 
2012/13. 
5.7 Assessment of Subsidized Input Supply Systems 
Table 5.22 presents the overall assessment of subsidized inputs supply systems in various seasons 
from 2010/11 to 2012/13.  In the seed system, the ratings are ‘good’ to ‘not good, not bad’  and 
there appear to be slight improvements over time among distributor outlets, and agro-dealers.  For 
ADMARC and SFFRFM outlets, the ratings suggest that the systems are becoming less impressive 
although are still considered ‘not good, not bad’.  The fertiliser supply system was rated poorly in 
2012/13 compared to earlier years among private sector respondents. For ADMARC and SFFRFM, 
however, 2012/13 was considered good, and better than the previous years. 
 
Table5.22  Assessment of Subsidized Input Supply Systems 
 
Competitors 
Distributor 
/ Importer 
ADMARC 
/ SFFRFM 
Independent 
Agro-Dealers 
Other 
Suppliers 
Seeds System 
2010/11 
2011/12 
2012/13 
 
2.4 
2.3 
2.2 
 
2.0 
2.2 
2.9 
 
2.5 
2.4 
2.3 
 
2.4 
2.1 
2.4 
Fertiliser System 
2010/11 
2011/12 
2012/13 
 
2.9 
2.9 
3.8 
 
2.3 
2.4 
1.9 
 
2.7 
2.8 
3.3 
 
2.3 
2.7 
3.8 
Note: Scores are 1= Very Good, 2=Good, 3=Not Good, Not Bad, 4 = Bad, 5=Very Bad 
 
For the seed system, the good ratings among the 246 suppliers in 2012/13 season were mainly 
attributed to early implementation (48%) and efficient delivery of supplies (33%) while the system 
was deemed bad among 106 suppliers due to inadequate supplies (39%) and late implementation 
(27%).  For the fertiliser system, the good ratings among the 105 input suppliers in the 2012/13 
season was attributed to early implementation (37%)2 and publicly available lists of beneficiary lists 
while those that rated the system bad (117 suppliers) attributed this to lack of private sector 
participation (38%) and inadequate supplies (36%). 
Table 5.23 presents the views of the input suppliers on the future of the seed and fertilizer subsidy. 
With respect to seed subsidy, the dominant voice is to improve the timing of the implementation of 
the subsidy with just over 20%indicating that they would wish it was implemented earlier while a 
similar proportion pointed to the need to increase the number of beneficiaries, 16% were of the 
view that the package size should be increased and 17% proposed that the seed package should 
remain the same.  With respect to fertiliser subsidy, 34% (43% among private sector) were of the 
view that the private sector should be allowed to participate retailing subsidized fertilisers while 26% 
were of the view that the number of beneficiaries should be increased. There is less support for 
                                                          
2 This however contrasts with the analysis of timing of fertiliser distribution presented earlier in section 4.  
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allowing the private sector in the retail of subsidized fertilizers coming from ADMARC/SFFRFM 
outlets. 
 
Table 5.23  Views on the Seed and Fertiliser Subsidy – Main Preferences for Change (%) 
 
Indicators 
Seed Subsidy Fertiliser Subsidy 
Parasta
tals 
Private 
Sector 
All Parasta
tals 
Private 
Sector 
All 
Package continue at same scale 
Package should be reduced 
Package should be increased 
Should be better targeted 
Change in number of beneficiaries 
Increase number of beneficiaries 
Decrease number of beneficiaries 
Should be implemented earlier 
Private sector should be able to retail 
Other  
Total 
9.6 
1.1 
14.9 
16.0 
2.1 
16.0 
- 
24.5 
- 
16.0 
100.0 
18.9 
1.4 
16.3 
8.3 
3.4 
21.7 
0.6 
21.4 
1.4 
6.6 
100.0 
16.9 
1.4 
16.0 
9.9 
3.2 
20.5 
0.5 
22.1 
1.1 
8.6 
100.0 
10.4 
1.0 
6.3 
6.3 
3.1 
45.8 
1.0 
17.7 
1.0 
7.3 
100.0 
5.5 
- 
2.0 
8.9 
3.7 
19.8 
0.6 
11.5 
43.1 
4.9 
100.0 
6.5 
0.2 
2.9 
8.3 
3.6 
25.5 
0.7 
12.8 
34.0 
5.4 
100.0 
 
5.8 Assessment of Commercial Input Sales 
One of the debated issues in the subsidy programme is the extent to which the subsidy promotes 
commercial sales by increasing adoption rates or displaces commercial sales by subsidizing 
smallholder farmers that would have purchased inputs at the market prices. We asked retailers to 
qualitatively assess the growth of commercial sales over the past 5 agricultural seasons, as reported 
in Table 5.24.  For commercial seed sales, overall 44% of the supplier outlets reported a decrease in 
commercial sales and 28% reported an increase in commercial sales.  ADMARC and SFFRFM reported 
the highest decrease (72%) followed by distributor outlets (56%) and agro-dealers have the lowest 
decrease (38%) in commercial seed sales. With respect to fertiliser sales, 36% reported an increase 
in commercial sales and 43% reported a decrease in commercial sales. The worst decreases in 
commercial fertilizer sales were reported among distributor outlets (56% of outlets) while the 
highest proportion of outlets experiencing increased sales were among agro-dealers (41% of the 
outlets).There is, therefore, a more mixed picture of how commercial sales have performed over the 
past five years. 
 
Table  5.24  Changes in Commercial Sales in past 5 agricultural seasons 
 
 
Distributor / 
Importer 
ADMARC / 
SFFRFM 
Independent 
Agro-Dealers 
Other 
Suppliers 
All 
Seeds Sales 
Increase 
Decrease 
No Change 
N 
 
38 
56 
6 
50 
 
8 
72 
20 
25 
 
28 
38 
35 
199 
 
38 
44 
19 
16 
 
28 
44 
28 
290 
Fertiliser Sales 
Increase 
Decrease 
No Change 
N 
 
38 
56 
6 
50 
 
26 
49 
26 
35 
 
41 
31 
28 
61 
 
40 
20 
40 
5 
 
36 
43 
21  
151 
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The reasons provided for the changes in commercial seed and fertiliser sales are presented in Table 
5.25. Among retailers that experienced increases in commercial sales, 54% and 20% attributed the 
increase to the business creation effects of the subsidy programme for seeds and fertiliser, 
respectively. However, for fertilizer sales, the main driver was the purchasing power of farmers 
through increased incomes coupled by improved farm produce prices and more retailers’ business 
income. Subsidies are, however, a major factor that was attributed to the decline in commercial 
sales in both the seed and fertiliser market for those outlets that reported declining sales. 
 
Table 5.25Reasons for Changes in Commercial Sales in past 5 seasons (%) 
Indicators Seed sales Fertiliser Sales 
Reasons for Increase 
Higher farmer income, can procure more supplies 
Able to obtain credit from suppliers 
Subsidy programme has created more business 
Farmers had more money to purchase 
Improved farm produce prices 
Other  
N 
 
19.5 
2.4 
53.7 
14.6 
4.9 
4.9 
82 
 
16.4 
- 
20.0 
40.0 
14.6 
9.1 
55 
Reasons for Decrease 
Lack of credit/cash to purchase supplies 
Subsidy programme has discouraged  sale 
High input prices 
Farmers have no money for purchases 
Unable to participate in the subsidy programme 
Other  
N 
 
2.3 
61.7 
14.8 
11.7 
2.3 
7.0 
128 
 
3.1 
52.3 
30.8 
6.2 
1.5 
6.2 
65 
 
 
The data from the household surveys also provide insights in the development of the private sector. 
Figure 5.6 (a) shows that average hybrid and OPV seeds commercial purchases are higher in 2012/13 
compared to the 2008/9 and 2010/11 agricultural seasons. Figure 5.6 (b) also shows that major 
increases in commercial purchases of seeds occurred in private sector outlets. This suggests that 
commercial seed sales have flourished under the subsidy programme. 
 
  
 38 
 
 
Figure 5.6 Mean Seed Purchases by Farmers, 2008/9 - 2012/13 
Source:(Chirwa and Dorward, 2013a; Chirwa and Dorward, 2013b); Household Survey 2012/13 
 
With respect to the fertilizer market, Figure 5.7, however, shows a more complex picture, with large 
increases in reported purchases from private companies between 2006/7 and 2010/11 and then a 
subsequent fall in 2012/13. Cash purchases from traders and ADMAR/SFFRFM show an opposite 
pattern. Overall cash purchases from the private sector therefore appear roughly constant over the 
life of the FISP (although figure 5.7 does not provide any comparison with farmers’ purchases before 
the FISP).  
 
 
Figure 5.7 Mean Commercial Fertilizer Purchases by Farmers, 2006/07 - 2012/13 
Source: Chirwa and Dorward (2013a,b); Household Survey 2012/13 
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6 Access to and use of coupons and inputs 
In this section we report information from the household survey about households’ access to,  
receipt and use of coupons and of subsidised inputs, and compare this information with information 
on coupon and input distribution as reported earlier in section 4. 
6.1 Total coupon distribution 
Total coupon disbursement and inputs sales as reported by the Logistics Unit were described earlier 
in section 4. We now compare these figures with estimates from the household survey.  Figure 6.1 
shows the key patterns of change in households’ fertiliser coupon receipts from biennial surveys 
from 2006/7 while table 6.1 gives more detail on estimates of total coupon receipts from the 
2012/13 household survey.   
 
Figure 6.1  Household fertiliser coupon receipt, 2006/7 to 2012/13 (biennial surveys) 
Note: 2006/7 and 2008/9 23:21:0 and Urea only 
 
The top panel in figure 6.1 shows mean receipts per household and is comparable with figure 4.9 
presented earlier and showing estimated total fertiliser coupon redemption per household. The two 
figures show a broadly similar rising and falling pattern (although comparison with estimates from 
the IHS3 (Dorward and Chirwa, 2013)suggests that the smaller sample in the 2010/11 survey may 
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have led to an overestimate of coupon receipts).  The top panel also shows a declining differential 
between the north and the other two regions. In the second panel the increased proportion of 
households receiving coupons is due largely to an increase in the sharing of coupons between 
households, with a fall in the average coupons per recipient (in the bottom panel), associated with a 
shift in coupon allocations from the North to the South, with increased sharing in the centre and 
south but not in the North. The right hand panels (see data in table 6.2) show that a divergence 
between receipts by male and female headed households in 2006/7 appears to have been largely 
eliminated in subsequent years although there is a small but persistent discrepancy in coupon 
receipts per recipient household.  
 
Table 6.1  Household survey estimates of total coupon receipts 
 
Fertiliser 
Maize 
seed 
Legume 
seed 
Fertiliser coupons 
Average coupons received per hh 
 
2010/11 2008/9 2006/7 
North 0.94 0.46 0.42 1.38 1.46 1.21 
Centre 0.65 0.29 0.15 0.92 0.93 0.96 
South 0.75 0.48 0.37 1.29 1 0.84 
Total 0.73 0.39 0.28 1.13 1.02 0.93 
Total estimate of coupons received (‘000), NSO rural households 
 
North 304 150 137 456 445 307 
Centre 729 325 171 953 947 985 
South 914 581 452 1,278 1,168 1,005 
Total 1,936 1,044 744 2,733 2,540 2,296 
Estimate as % redemptions/ sales, NSO hh 
   
North 77% 77% 82% 105% 73% 52% 
Centre 58% 52% 29% 74% 72% 67% 
South 65% 83% 68% 88% 71% 88% 
Total 63% 68% 52% 86% 71% 72% 
Total estimate of coupons received based on MoAFS farm households 
North 499 246 225 739 697 468 
Centre 1,261 563 296 1,700 1,458 1,197 
South 1,462 929 723 1,931 1,616 1,384 
Total 3,212 1,732 1,235 4,420 3,734 3,043 
Estimate as % redemptions/ sales, MoAFS ff 
   
North 126% 126% 134% 171% 114% 80% 
Centre 99% 89% 49% 132% 111% 82% 
South 103% 132% 109% 132% 98% 121% 
Total 104% 113% 87% 139% 105% 95% 
Sources: 2013household survey, MoAFS Farm Household Register, Census data (EA household populations), 
MVAC data.  
 
Table 6.1 is presented in five panels. The top panel shows the coupons received per rural household 
estimated from the household survey. These estimates are then multiplied by the estimated number 
of rural households or farm families to calculate total coupons received by region and nationally3. A 
                                                          
3 The survey sample enumeration areas in 14 districts, and MoAFS data show a slightly smaller proportion of 
farm families receiving coupons in these districts (as compared with the average across all districts) and this 
may result in under- estimates of coupon receipts by some 4%. IHS3 results in the 2008/9 and 2009/10 
seasons also suggest that the estimates above may be increased by perhaps another 5% to allow for 
coupons going to households living in areas classified by the NSO as ‘urban’ and not rural.  
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difficulty arises as a result of substantial differences between the number of rural households 
recorded by the National Statistical Office and by the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security. 
These differences (with MoAFS estimates 66% higher than those of the NSO) have been noted 
regularly in evaluation reports since the 2006/7 season, and there is an urgent need to resolve them 
– not only for the purpose of the evaluation of the FISP but as part of a wider need to improve the 
accuracy of agricultural and national information.  
The NSO estimate of rural households suggests that a significant number of 2012/13 fertilizer and 
seed coupons did not reach the rural people for whom they were intended – some 30% (these 
estimates are comparable with estimates made using IHS3 data (Dorward and Chirwa, 2013)but a 
little higher than in 2006/7 and 2008/9 surveys).  The Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security farm 
family figure leads to the estimated number of coupons received being a little larger than those 
issued.  This discrepancy, together with unrealistic regional growth rates, anecdotal reports of 
households ‘splitting’ to register for coupons, and strong incentives for households to ‘split’ in order 
to increases eligibility for coupon receipt suggests that the MoAFS figures need to be interpreted 
carefully. NSO figures, the basis of the survey sampling frame, are also more compatible with survey 
estimates. Maize and legume seed coupon estimates show a broadly similarly pattern to that of 
fertiliser.  
The right hand columns of the table show findings from previous survey rounds. The pattern of 
change is consistent with the combined effects of the fall in total fertiliser disbursement and rising 
population discussed earlier (see figure 4.9) - the very high figures in 2010/11 are not consistent with 
this and may be the result of a small and somewhat biased sample that year, despite attempts to 
make adjustments for expected bias.    
6.2 Coupon targeting 
Tables 6.2 and 6.3 provide some information about the distribution of coupons within the rural 
population.  Table 6.2 shows the proportion of households receiving different numbers of fertiliser 
coupons, and the mean number of coupons received by those households receiving coupons, for 
different categorisations of households. A number of points of interest arise from this. 
• 60% of households are estimated to have received one or more fertiliser coupons. As with all 
three previous surveys, community leaders consistently report a lower percentage of 
households as recipients, even after allowing for the potential effects of sharing on differences 
in perceptions of household recipients at village and household level.  
• Many households (42%) are receiving only one coupon (or are sharing two coupons, with a half 
of the inputs each).  As with survey results from previous years, this is less common in the North 
and more common in the South and Centre. There is also greater overall access in the south as 
compared with the centre (with a higher proportion of households receiving a higher average 
number of coupons per recipient household), a pattern in line with the MoAFS farm family 
estimates rather than the NSO rural household estimates.  
• The major conclusion that can be drawn from table 6.2 is that significant proportions of 
households in all the categories identified in table 6.2 receive coupons. Sampling errors mean 
that too much should not be read into small differences between categories or years, 
nevertheless there do appear to be some consistent patterns of variation in receipt of coupons 
across categories: receipt seems to continue to be higher for households in the northern region 
(though this differences has been declining) and as noted above here is much less sharing; 
differences between proportions of male and female  headed households receiving coupons 
seem to be low, but receipts per recipient household are consistently higher for male headed 
households. Elderly household heads appear to do somewhat better than other households, but 
much more striking, and a new and important observation, is the low access among younger 
households with heads aged between 18 and 24. 
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Table 6.2  Fertiliser Coupon receipts per household by region, gender & age of head, and food 
security &subjective welfare status 
  
 
  
2013 
Sample 
size 
2012/13 2010/11  2008/9 2006/7 
Zero >0 &<1 1 >1 
Mean/ 
recipient 
Zero 
Mean/ 
recipient 
Zero 
Mean/ 
recipient 
Zero 
Mean/ 
recipient 
North 360 48% 0% 9% 42%  1.82  24% 1.81 28% 2.03 38% 1.9 
Centre 720 40% 17% 31% 12%  1.08  31% 1.34 35% 1.42 45% 1.7 
South 921 38% 8% 37% 17%  1.21  11% 1.46 33% 1.49 49% 1.7 
National 2001 40% 11% 31% 18%  1.21  21% 1.44 33% 1.52 46% 1.7 
Male headed 1,454  41% 11% 30% 18%  1.22  20% 1.45 34% 1.55 43% 1.8 
Female headed    530  37% 13% 35% 16%  1.18  25% 1.41 32% 1.45 54% 1.6 
Youth head    208  60% 12% 23% 6%  0.93  na na  na na  
N.A. 
Working age head 1,741  42% 11% 31% 16%  1.15  21% 1.43 35% 1.53 
Elderly head    260  27% 12% 34% 27%  1.29  21% 1.53 28% 1.49 
Maize for 0-3 months    163  42% 10% 29% 20%  1.26  40% 1.01 43% 1.32 
Maize for 4-7 months    367  41% 13% 35% 12%  1.10  21% 1.41 30% 1.4 
Maize for 8-10 months    576  36% 13% 36% 16%  1.14  25% 1.34 27% 1.6 
Maize for >10 months    284  33% 14% 29% 24%  1.30  17% 1.3 36% 1.77 
Poorest (Ovutikitsitsa)    535  41% 11% 33% 15%  1.15  29% 1.29 40% 1.31 
Ovutika      745  38% 12% 31% 19%  1.23  19% 1.42 30% 1.5 
Ovutikilako    426  37% 10% 33% 20%  1.25  21% 1.42 30% 1.56 
>=wapakatikati    224  46% 11% 28% 16%  1.22  17% 1.69 36% 1.8 
Notes: The 2010/11 season sample was considerably smaller and from a more restricted set of livelihood zones than the 
other season’s samples. 
             The great majority of households receiving between 0 and 1 coupon received 0.5 coupons, and almost all 
households who reported receiving more than one coupon received 2.  
Source: 2013 household survey 
 
Some of these differences are explored further in table 6.3 which shows mean gender of household 
head, land ownership, asset ownership, food security and subjective welfare by number of coupons 
received per household. There is a general trend for means of variables associated with wealth to be 
fairly constant or rise among households receiving more coupons – a situation also observed in 
previous surveys (and across seasons there has been a consistent exception to this pattern with 
months for which the maize harvest lasts declining with increasing numbers of coupons received).  
An additional aspect of this also observed in the 2008/9 survey is that the largest differences are 
often found between households with 1 coupon and those with more than 1 coupon – there are 
some higher means among households with zero coupons. One may hypothesise from this that the 
redistribution of coupons which leads to households getting one coupon is from poorer households 
and/or to poorer households – and in the second aspect may be more effective in targeting poorer 
household  than the formal distribution process.  No consistent differences in allocation were found 
between livelihood zones or between areas with patrilineal and matrilineal systems (see table A5). 
 
Overall these observations, which are consistent with a number of other studies (for example 
(Holden and Lunduka, 2012; Holden and Lunduka, 2010a) and preliminary analysis of the IHS3 (Tilic, 
Pers. comm) and (Dorward and Chirwa, 2013) suggest limited effectiveness of targeting poorer and 
more vulnerable households - they are not excluded but they are relatively under represented, while 
less poor households are not excluded and appear to be somewhat over represented among 
beneficiaries with more coupons4. This raises important questions about targeting and coupon 
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allocation and distribution processes.  Since 2006/7, targeting criteria have placed more explicit 
emphasis on the provision of coupons to more vulnerable households – emphasising child or female 
headed households, people living with HIV/AIDS, vulnerable people and their guardians or carers, if 
they are resource poor Malawians and owning land. We note that there have been changes and 
improvements over the years, but it is not clear how far this may have been driven by improved local 
targeting and how far by the relative shift of allocations from the north and centre to the south 
where there are more poor people and where the practise of sharing seems to increase the 
proportion of poor people accessing small quantities of subsidised inputs. More analysis is needed 
on this.  We do, however, give considerable attention later, in section 6.3, to the processes of 
beneficiary selection and coupon distribution and redemption.  
 
Table 6.3  Mean Attributes of Households by number of Fertilizer subsidy coupons received per 
household, 2012/13 
  Fertiliser Coupon numbers per hh   
  Zero >0 &<1 1 
More 
than 1 
All 
 Sample size  789 222 621 348 1,980 
% households female headed 24 30 29 24 0.26 
Owned Area in ha 0.90 0.88 0.94 1.16 0.96 
Value durable assets (MK) 34,401   23,242  25,804      55,189  34,052  
Value Livestock assets (MK) 53,110   26,824  45,697    179,997  69,787  
Total Value livestock & durable assets  (MK) 87,511  50,066  71,501    235,185  103,840  
Subjective score of hh food consumption over past 12 
months 
1.4 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.5 
Subjective score on welfare 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.3 2.2 
Month after harvest that maize ran out 6.9 7.3 7.2 7.5 7.2 
Subjective scores on food consumption: 1 = less than adequate, 3 = more than adequate 
Subjective scores on welfare: 1 = Ovutikitsitsa/ukavu; 6= rich, Opezabwinokwambiri/Olemera 
Source: 2013 household survey 
 
In recent years beneficiary registration has also distinguished between male and female 
beneficiaries.  As noted earlier (see table 4.3), females accounted for 54% of registered beneficiaries 
nationally.  Table 6.4 shows the gender of recipients and of beneficiary household heads as reported 
in the household survey.  
 
Table 6.4  Planned and actual fertiliser coupon receipt by household head & recipient gender by 
region 
Region 
Beneficiary list  , % 
beneficiaries 
Actual hh head ,  % 
beneficiaries 
Actual recipient , % 
coupons 
Male Female Male Female Male Female 
North 33% 57% 76% 24% 71% 29% 
Centre 40% 59% 75% 25% 59% 41% 
South 50% 48% 69% 31% 47% 53% 
TOTAL 44% 54% 72% 28% 54% 46% 
Source: 2013 household survey 
 
Table 6.4 shows a similar pattern to that reported for 2010/11, with receipts by females lowest in 
the North and highest in the South (the reverse of the pattern of registered beneficiaries as set out 
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in the left hand column and earlier in table 4.3). However, it also shows that there are substantial 
numbers of male headed households where women (not the male head) receive the coupons.  
The outcomes reported above can also be compared with people’s perceptions of which kinds of 
people are most likely to receive coupons. Table 6.5 presents answers to questions where 
respondents were asked to score the extent to which particular types of household were more or 
less likely to gain coupons. With mean scores for most categories of people clustering around 2 (i.e. 
no difference in likelihood of getting coupons) the results show no clear perceptions of particular 
target or beneficiary groups except that there is a general understanding that civil servants and 
teachers are less likely to obtain coupons, and to a lesser extent and only in the Northern region that 
better off households and more productive farmers are also less likely to likely to obtain coupons. 
No strong differences were observed between the perceptions of people in different areas but there 
is a slightly greater tendency for respondents in the North to suggest that likelihoods of getting 
coupons follow targeting guidelines (with poor and female headed and those with orphans being 
more likely to get coupons and more advantaged people having a smaller chance of getting coupons. 
Some households mentioned other categories of households as more or less likely to get coupons: 
elderly households were reported as being both more and less likely to get coupons, in the South 
and Centre traditional leaders and their relatives were mentioned as more likely to get coupons, and 
in the South those who mentioned the disabled generally considered them less likely to get coupons.  
The lack of evidence of clear targeting contrasts with clear perceptions of FISP target groups 
reported in the community survey and FGDs, who generally considered poorer and female headed 
households, those with orphans and the elderly to be intended beneficiaries although perceptions of 
actual beneficiaries reported in FGDs were more varied. 
 
Table 6.5 Perceived likelihood of getting coupons 
  Region 
Total 
  North Central South 
Poor people 1.67 1.98 2.03 1.96 
Female headed households 1.84 2.12 2.09 2.07 
More productive farmers 2.28 2.08 2.05 2.09 
Households with orphans 1.75 2.12 2.04 2.04 
Better off households 2.33 2.14 2.06 2.12 
Civil servants & teachers 2.62 2.58 2.35 2.49 
VDC members 2.01 1.82 1.71 1.79 
Scores: 1 = more likely; 2= no difference; 3 = less likely 
Source: 2013 household survey 
 
A common theme in FGD discussions on targeting was that the FISP has now become an annual 
programme, and the same people are targeted year after year, unless there are deaths or people 
move away. This would explain the large numbers of young households who do not get coupons, as 
reported from household survey data above. Some focus group discussions also expressed 
considerable distrust of local extension agents (sometimes in league with village heads) and in many 
groups there was more trust in local leaders to ensure that coupons went to the members of their 
villages instead of being siphoned off for sale. This seems to contradict earlier experience of 
problems when coupons were allocated and distributed by village heads, particularly in the Central 
Region. There was widespread support for more involvement of villagers themselves to have more 
influence in decision making about coupon allocations and for the links between coupon allocation 
and distribution to be more transparent.   
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6.3 Allocation and distribution processes 
An important innovation in 2008/9 was the introduction of ‘open meetings’ during the registration 
and distribution process, with two objectives: 
a) To ensure that FISP beneficiaries (and non-beneficiaries) are adequately informed about 
the operation of the FISP and have realistic expectations; and 
b) To include households in the targeting process, removing targeting power from TAs and 
village heads and giving it to the community itself. 
A further innovation in 2012/13 was the introduction of publicly available lists of beneficiaries.  
Tables 6.6 to 6.8 report on respondents’ perceptions of these processes. First, table 6.6 shows the 
extent to which open meetings were used in the allocation and distribution of fertiliser coupons, and 
the extent of subsequent redistribution and supplementary allocations. The pattern of reported use 
of open meetings is very similar to that reported in 2008/9, with widespread use of these meetings, 
particularly in the north. Table 6.6 also shows that subsequent redistribution is common in the south 
and centre, but less common in the north(this tallies with reporting in the previous sections of 
regional variation in the extent of ‘sharing’ and receipt of one fertiliser coupon). Supplementary 
allocations were common in the early years of the programme but largely ceased after the 2008/9 
programme. The same question was asked in the community survey with similar responses as 
regards the widespread use of open meetings for coupon allocation and distribution and substantial 
subsequent redistribution of fertiliser coupons. 
Table  6.6. Frequency of coupon allocation and distribution methods by coupon type 
  Open meetings in  Redistr-
ibution 
Suppl-
ementary   allocation distribution 
North 96% 98% 38% 1% 
Centre 65% 78% 61% 2% 
South 70% 77% 66% 17% 
Total 71% 80% 61% 9% 
Source: 2013 household survey 
 
However it appears that the use of open meetings is not necessarily related to wider participation in 
allocation and distribution decisions. In the 2010/11 survey VDC members (particularly in the north) 
and local leaders (Village heads and TAs) were generally reported to be important in allocation and 
distribution in open meetings. In 2012/13 respondents were asked specifically who decided on the 
allocation of fertiliser coupons, and the answers, in table 6.7, show the overwhelming perception 
that Village heads and TAs predominate, while very few respondents considered that villagers had 
much influence through open meetings. Agricultural staff members were also not perceived to be of 
much importance in the allocation process, although in previous years they were considered to be 
more important in the distribution of coupons. Almost no respondents reported specific influence by 
political leaders.  
Table 6.7 Decision makers regarding coupon allocations 
  Village 
head/TA 
VDC Agric. 
Staff 
Villagers in 
open 
meeting 
Political 
leaders 
  
North 67% 21% 0% 6% 0% 
Centre 78% 9% 4% 4% 0% 
South 70% 7% 4% 5% 0% 
Total 73% 10% 3% 5% 0% 
Source: 2013 household survey 
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Respondents in FGDs recognised that traditional leaders and VDC members were predominant in 
making coupon allocations decisions, but mention was also made of agricultural staff and there were 
reports of decisions being made in prior meetings and of bias in invitations to meetings where 
allocations were made.  
Table 6.8 reports by region on the percentage of respondents who were aware of the existence of 
public beneficiary lists and on perceptions and knowledge about lists which were public. The 
majority of respondents considered that there was a list of beneficiaries, but in the north very few 
thought that the list had ever been publically available. Overall around 30% of respondents were 
aware of publically available lists. Of those that were publically available, the majority were available 
at the house of the village head and were available from October or November. About 10% of 
respondents reported that the list had been seen by a member of their household (2% in the north), 
and most of these had seen the name of a household member on the list. (FUM (Farmers Union of 
Malawi), 2013) which reports 51% of beneficiaries reporting that they had seen the list. The 
community survey reported a somewhat higher proportion of lists being publicly available (around 
50% in the Centre and South, but only 20% in the North), mainly in November, with schools and 
health clinics the most common locations for public access. This greater awareness of public 
beneficiary lists, and of their role in promoting accountability, was also evident in some FGDs, as 
evidenced in the quotations below: 
“People were listed on a piece of paper and this paper was available to everyone for inspection since 
it was posted at the village head’s house.”  
“There was a list written by the VDC members.  This list was publicly available.  When the names are 
written, they are called at a meeting.  The VDC members keep this list and people are allowed to see 
it.  This list was published in September, and some of the ladies taking part in the FGD’s saw this list.  
This list served as evidence that the right person who is supposed to receive the coupons managed to 
get them”. Female FGD - Blantyre 
There was, however, considerable variation between FGDs. Thus in Blantyre while the women’s FGD 
in one area indicated that the list was readily available for everyone’s inspection (as reported 
above), the male group alleged that the VDC kept the list and that no one else had access to 
it. 
Table 6.8 Reported respondent awareness of public beneficiary lists 
North Centre South Total 
Respondents reporting a list 95% 72% 77% 77% 
% of reported lists publically available 7% 42% 45% 39% 
% of available lists 
by place 
published 
Village head house 71% 65% 61% 63% 
School/Health Centre 0% 28% 21% 24% 
Agric. Office 12% 0% 3% 2% 
ADMARC/Input Market 9% 3% 9% 6% 
% of available lists 
by month 
published 
October or before 37% 46% 51% 48% 
November 44% 40% 42% 41% 
December 10% 13% 4% 8% 
January 9% 1% 2% 2% 
% of available lists seen by a household member 31% 36% 32% 34% 
% of seen lists with a household member Included? 86% 81% 82% 82% 
Source: 2013 household survey 
 
As regards the value of the list in specifying who actually received fertiliser coupons, table 6.9 shows 
that of those respondents who had seen the list, the majority (57%) considered that ‘nearly all’ those 
on the list would receive coupons for some fertiliser, but only 16% considered that ‘nearly all’ 
households on the beneficiary list would receive coupons for two bags of fertiliser. However 40% of 
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respondents who had seen the list considered that very few households on the list would get 
coupons for two bags of fertiliser, and 21% did not know how many would get coupons for two bags. 
For households not on the list, 38% of respondents did not know how many of these households 
would get fertiliser coupons, while 27% thought that some of them would get coupons for some 
fertiliser. These responses appear to reflect the significant amount of ‘sharing’ of coupon allocations 
in the South and Centre (there were very few respondents in the North who had seen a beneficiary 
list) together with considerable uncertainty as to how the list related to actual coupon receipt. 
Respondents in the community survey appeared to have a clearer view that all or nearly all of those 
on the list received at least one coupon and, in the south and centre, that some (rather than very 
few) of those not on the list received at least one coupon.  There are, however, questions about the 
validity of the list when there is widespread ‘sharing’ of coupons with beneficiaries not on the list.  
Table 6.9 Respondent perceptions on coupon receipt by listed and unlisted households among 
households that saw the list 
Proportion of households receiving coupons   
nearly all some very few don't know 
Listed 
households 
coupons for some  fertiliser 57% 14% 24% 5% 
coupons for two or more bags 16% 22% 40% 21% 
Unlisted hh coupons for some  fertiliser 7% 27% 28% 38% 
Source: 2013 household survey 
 
6.4 Perceptions on total coupons, systems over time and alternative targeting systems 
As the number of coupons distributed and formal allocation and distribution systems have changed 
over the life of the programme, and as the programme has become established, it is useful to 
consider how respondents’ perceptions of the systems have changed. Figure 6.2 shows changes in 
respondents’ perceptions of different aspects of programme implementation and their views of 
alternative targeting criteria. 
 
Figure 6.2 Respondents’ scoring on different programme elements by year 
Scores: 4 = very good; 3=  good; 2 = not good not bad; 1 = bad; 0 = very bad 
Source: 2013 household survey 
 
The left hand panel  of figure 6.2 shows that respondents recognised an improvement in timing of 
coupon and input availability from 2006/7 to 2008/9, but since then it has slowly fallen off though 
still averages between “good” and “not good not bad”.  This matches information presented earlier 
in section 4.1 on fertiliser procurement and distribution and in section 4.3 on coupon distribution. 
There is then little change in perception on distribution methods or allocation criteria (although 
information was not gathered on the latter in 2012/13), which is compatible with observations in 
section 6.2 and 6.3 that there has been little change in the effectiveness or processes of targeting 
and coupon allocation despite the introduction of open meetings and public beneficiary lists 
designed to improve them. FGDs, however, expressed a generally more positive view of the process 
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in 2012/13 (although there were some exceptions). There is, however, a clear downward trend in 
the scoring on the number of coupons distributed. In recent years (though not in earlier ones) this 
matches the data presented earlier on both fertiliser distribution and fertiliser coupon receipt, 
reflecting a decline in total fertiliser sales since 2007/8 and rising rural population.  There was 
widespread concern expressed in FGDs that the number of people was increasing but the number of 
coupons was remaining the same, and that access to coupons was therefore declining,  
As regards respondents’ perceptions of different targeting criteria and systems, it is clear that the 
majority do not favour targeting more productive farmers to the exclusion of other. The other two 
systems they were asked to comment on are ‘targeting the poor’ (more effectively than at present 
and with two fertiliser coupons, 100kg of fertiliser per beneficiary) and a universal system with half 
the amount to all households (a system which would extend the current ‘sharing’ to all households, 
to the detriment of those generally better off households getting two coupons and bags, and the 
benefit of mainly poorer households currently getting none). There are similar scorings for these two 
alternatives (both of them better than scores achieved for the current distribution system), with 
some evidence that the latter is gaining in favour. The impression that maintaining or increasing the 
number of coupons is more important than maintaining the quantity per recipient also seemed to be 
gaining ground in the FGDs, though there was still dislike of formalising a system where people only 
got two 25kg bags (and there appeared to be some regional differences here, with a greater 
tendency in the central region to favour raising of the redemption price or the introduction of a 
general price subsidy). These options and their relative strengths and weaknesses are discussed in 
some detail in Dorward and Chirwa (2012c). In particular it is not clear how better targeting of the 
poor can be achieved.  
6.5 Access to coupons and timing 
Due to its sensitivity, information on purchases of coupons is unlikely to be reliable. Around 1% of 
fertiliser coupons were reported as being obtained with some payment (lower than reported in 
previous surveys). Reported sources of such coupons included TAs and Village heads, agricultural 
staff, and traders in approximately equal proportions. Reported prices varied dramatically, with 
means of around MK2,000 for fertiliser coupons but lower medians (of 1000 and 600 MK/coupon 
respectively for 23:21:0 and Urea coupons) and a mean of a little over MK1300 and a median of 
MK1000 for maize seed coupons. In the community survey highest prices for fertiliser coupons were 
reported at MK1000 in the North, MK3000 in the South, between MK5000 and MK8000 in the 
Centre and around MK1000 for maize seed coupons. 
An important aspect of access to coupons is the timing of their distribution. As reported earlier, 
timing of coupon distribution was considered to have improved over the life of the programme but 
was delayed somewhat this year. Specific information on the time of coupon receipt was collected 
from survey respondents and in the community survey. Community survey respondents reported a 
large proportion of communities receiving the first distribution of coupons in the first and second 
halves of November in the North and South, and in the second half of November and first half of 
December in the Centre. FGDs provided similar information, with concern expressed about late 
delivery of 23:21:0. In the household survey 88% and 75% of fertiliser coupons were reported to be 
received by the end of November in the South and Centre respectively, and 100% by the end of 
December in the North. These timings are later than in 2010/11 in the South and Centre but still 
considerably earlier than reported in previous surveys (equivalent figures were99% and 83% and 
98% in 2010/11, 69%, 65% and 68% in 2008/9  and 54%, 49% and 45% in 2006/7). 
6.6 Coupon use and redemption 
The vast majority (95%) of fertiliser coupons are reportedly used to buy fertilisers. The balance was, 
sold (2% in the Centre) or not used (7% in the Centre and 3% in the South, 4% overall). Respondents 
also used a very high proportion of maize seed coupons to buy seed (98%), the balance being largely 
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‘not used’.  For legume seed coupons, however, 94% were used to buy inputs (considerably higher 
than 81% in 2010/11), the balance being largely unused (17% in the North 5% in the Centre and 4% 
in the South)5.  
The dominant reason given for not using the coupon to buy inputs was lack of stock at selling points 
(71% for fertilisers, 36% for maize seed and 76% for legume seed) but the importance of this varied 
between coupons (as the proportion of coupons not redeemed varied between coupon types and 
regions, as noted above). Thus for fertiliser coupons, 3.5%  of all coupons were not used because of 
lack of inputs at stockists, and equivalent figures for maize seed and legume seed were 1% and 5%. 
There was virtually no difference between male and female beneficiaries’ use of coupons for buying 
inputs. In some FGDs it was reported that some beneficiaries did not use coupons because of late 
availability of coupons or inputs.  
Teasing out the proportion of coupons not used for different reasons, there was small tendency for 
female beneficiaries to more often report lack of money as a reason for not redeeming inputs (this 
accounted for 13%, 0% and 7% respectively of maize seed, legume seed and fertiliser coupons 
received by female beneficiaries against 0%, 0% and 2% of maize seed, legume seed and fertiliser 
coupons respectively received by male beneficiaries). It is, however, difficult to separate how far this 
may be due to gender differences and how far it may be due to regional differences in poverty 
incidence given that the proportion of coupons received by female beneficiaries was much higher in 
the south, where poverty incidence is highest.  
FGDs reported very few cases of coupon purchases and sales. Community survey respondents 
reported that selling of coupons was generally rare. Recent analysis by Holden and Lunduka (2013) 
of farmers’ valuation of fertilisers also suggests that coupon sales are very rare.  
Coupon redemption is affected by costs of redemption (in terms of input prices, side payments, time 
spent waiting and travelling, and other travelling costs) and by the ability and willingness of 
beneficiaries to incur those costs.  
In the household survey, 9% of fertiliser coupons were reported to require payment of ‘tips’ for 
redemption above the official 500MK redemption price (this compares with 9%, 14% and 20% 
reported in 2010/11, 2008/9 and 2006/7 respectively).  Reported extra payments ranged from 30MK 
to over 4,500MK, with a median of MK1,050 (a total cost of just over 1,500MK for redemption and 
‘tip’). The incidence of extra payments was lower in the North It is difficult to determine extra 
payments made for hybrid seed, as extra payments were required for some hybrid varieties.  Mean 
payment was MK111 per coupon, and was similar for male and female beneficiaries. Payments per 
hybrid seed coupon were lowest in the Centre and highest in the South. It is difficult to interpret 
these comparisons without detailed calculations on the proportion of different varieties purchased.  
Community survey respondents suggested a greater occurrence of the need for farmers to pay ‘tips’ 
in the Centre, with their ‘often’ being required in nearly  50% of communities in  the Centre, and in 
30% of communities in the North, but in only 10% in the South. Overall a median tip of MK1500 per 
bag was reported. Focus group discussions suggested that the payment of bribes to redeem inputs 
was less common this year. Where it occurred it was however related to problems of queuing and to 
some paying ‘tips’ to get to the front of the queue. There were also occasional reports of 
beneficiaries being required to take seed types they did not want if they were to buy an input in 
scarce supply.  
Table 6.9 presents summary data on reported distances to buy inputs, time spent buying inputs, and 
costs for transport and miscellaneous expenses. Community survey results are similar. As with 
previous surveys, this does not show major differences between regions.  The greater distances to 
                                                          
5 As will be explored later, use of a coupon to buy inputs does not mean that the inputs are necessarily used 
for crop production by the beneficiary. 
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markets and larger differences in distances to ADMARC and private selling points tend to be in less 
populous areas and are thus masked in aggregation at national and regional levels. Distances to 
actually redeem coupons were greater where inputs were not stocked in the nearest outlet. 
Distances to the nearest private sector outlet were somewhat greater than distances to 
ADMARC/SFFRFM, except in the northern region.  The lower time travelling and waiting for inputs in 
the North may be because of fewer stock outs (see table 6.10) and less queuing (consistent with 
lower payment of tips), so that lower waiting times outweighed any greater distances – although 
table 13 does not show longer distances in the north this is indicated as something of an issue in 
table 6.16. This was also reported in previous surveys.  FGDs in almost all areas also reported well 
organised systems of different days for different villages to receive their inputs at markets – 
however it was also noted that if there were stockouts then this could severe disruption to the 
system and lead to beneficiaries being unable to get inputs from other outlets. Adverse effects could 
be particularly severe for vulnerable people who sent representatives to collect their inputs as these 
representatives faced difficulties in having the coupons validated outside of the system.  
Table 6.9 Reported distances to buy inputs, time spent buying inputs, and costs for transport and 
miscellaneous expenses. 
 
Hours travel & 
waiting 
Transport & misc. 
expenses 
Distance to nearest 
ADMARC/SFFRFM  
(km) 
Distance to nearest 
private selling point 
(km) 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
2012/13 
North 7 6 530 500 6 5 6 5 
Centre 17 10 568 300 6 5 8 7 
South 10 7 394 200 6 5 8 5 
Male 13 8 527 300 6 5 8 6 
Female 11 7 378 200 6 5 8 6 
Total 13 8 486 260 6 5 8 6 
National: 2010/11 23 12 270 200 5 4 8 6 
2008/9: National 17 9 304 200 9 5 14 8 
2006/7: National 13 7 247 150 7 5 7 5 
Source: 2013 household survey 
 
Almost all redeemed coupons were used to obtain the input specified by the coupon, although there 
were occasional reports of fertiliser coupons being used to obtain seed and vice versa, and of urea 
coupons being used to obtain 23:21. There were no reports of ‘cross redemption’ between maize 
and legume seed coupons. Table 6.10 shows the shares of maize and legume varieties obtained in 
each region and by male and female beneficiaries – showing a pattern of heavy hybrid maize seed 
sales and low legume seed sales consistent with that reported earlier under implementation and in 
supplier survey.  
As regards the balance between hybrid and OPV seed sales there is little variation between male and 
female beneficiaries purchases reported (unlike the preponderance of hybrid seed purchases by 
female beneficiaries in 2010/11) and between regions (again there was more variation reported in 
2010/11, with more hybrid seed purchases in the Centre and South). Reasons for the discrepancy 
between survey estimates and Logistics Unit sales reports on maize variety seed sales are not clear, 
but Logistics Unit reports also show consistency in the balance of variety sales across regions – but 
considerable variation between districts, with Chikwawa and Nsanje reporting very low hybrid sales 
as compared with OPV, and a similar but not as extreme nor universal tendency among lakeshore 
and other lower lying districts.  Similar but much less pronounced variation between districts and 
zones is found in survey estimates.  
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Table 6.10  Seed redemption variety shares, % total maize and legume seed redemptions 
  Beneficiary Region 
Total 
% sales 
reported    Male Female North Centre South 
Maize seed redemptions   
Hybrid  89% 85% 84% 84% 90% 87% 78% 
OPV 11% 15% 16% 16% 10% 13% 22% 
Legume seed redemptions   
Soya  19% 10% 35% 26% 6% 15% 8% 
G/Nuts  60% 71% 45% 47% 76% 65% 65% 
Beans  18% 15% 20% 26% 13% 17% 23% 
Cowpeas 1% 1% 0% 2% 1% 1% 1% 
Pigeon pea 2% 2% 0% 0% 4% 2% 2% 
Source: 2013 household survey; 2012/13 Logistics unit Report 
 
The estimated balance between legume seed types' sales is very consistent with sales reported by 
the Logistics Unit. The Logistics Unit does not report legume seed redemptions by district, but survey 
estimates show wide variation between districts in the balance among different legumes purchased. 
Pigeon pea purchases are, as one might expect, only found in the South. Other variation may be due 
to variation between regions in preferences and/or availability of different seed types. Beneficiary 
preferences for inputs are discussed later, but It appears that the lower soya seed purchases in the 
south are the result of preferences, as hardly any beneficiaries in the south indicated that they did 
not get but would have wanted soya: in fact in the South although only a small proportion of legume 
seed beneficiaries got soya (6%), a substantial proportion (29%) of these wanted other legume seed: 
groundnuts (18%), beans (6%) or pigeon peas (5%). In the Centre 26% of legume seed beneficiaries 
got soya seed and all wanted it while in the North 35% of legume seed beneficiaries got soya and of 
these 13% would rather have had groundnuts.  In all regions most beneficiaries who wanted 
groundnuts got them. Despite the low proportion of cowpea seed purchases there appears to be 
very little unsatisfied demand. As noted above, there were some beneficiaries in the South who 
would rather have had pigeon peas than soya seed. There were also others who would rather have 
had groundnuts than pigeon peas 
The large majority of cases where beneficiaries could not get what they wanted were due to 
unavailability of the desired seed type. Community survey respondents reported on the frequency of 
stock-outs for different inputs, and these are summarised in table 6.11.  The reported overall 
situation is better than reported in 2010/11  as regards fertilisers and generally a little worse for 
seeds (except for groundnuts seed where there as a marked improvement).. 
 
Table 6.11. Mean scores on frequency of stock outs  by input by region 
  Fertiliser Seed 
  23:21 Urea Hybrid OPV Beans Gnuts Soya 
North 1.76 1.58 1.56 1.38 3.00 1.61 1.68 
Centre 1.83 1.67 1.49 1.58 1.59 1.41 1.33 
South 1.71 1.59 1.46 1.18 1.41 1.53 1.35 
All 2012/13 1.77 1.63 1.49 1.37 1.52 1.48 1.38 
All 2010/11 2.19 1.85 1.16 1.19 1.54 1.68 1.34 
All 2008/9 1.84 1.66 1.23 1.71 2.52 2.32 NA 
Mean scores: 1 mostly available; 2 some stock outs; 3 frequent stockouts 
 Source: Community survey 
 
 52 
 
Focus group discussions also noted shortages, fertiliser being specifically mentioned.  
Table 6.12 shows how far inputs redeemed by beneficiaries were the inputs that they wanted. This 
does not include information from those who did not redeem particular coupons. On the whole 
beneficiaries got the fertilisers they wanted (99% overall). Of those who got hybrid seed, 87% got 
the hybrid variety they wanted, 10% wanted a different hybrid variety, while hardly any wanted 
OPVs. However, only 72% of those who got OPV seed wanted it, almost all wanting hybrid seed 
instead. This pattern of maize seed supply and preferences was common across all three regions and 
across male and female beneficiaries. As regards legume seed, almost all of the beneficiaries who 
got groundnuts seed got it from choice, even though it accounted for 65% of reported legume seed 
redemptions (as noted earlier) – indeed in the South and to a lesser extent the North there were 
some beneficiaries who received soya seed (and to a lesser extent pigeon peas and beans seed) who 
would have preferred groundnut seed.   
Some FGD groups reported varied experience as regards getting the inputs that they wanted, with 
some commenting that if they were already late or becoming late with planting then they had to 
take whatever was available.  
 
Table 6.12 Beneficiaries’ receipt of preferred seed varieties 
 Wanted Input wanted but not available 
Input received 23:21:0 Urea Hybrid OPV Soya G/Nuts Beans 
23:21:0+S  98%  2%      
Urea 100%  
Hybrid seed 87%   10%* 1%    
OPV seed 72%   27%     
Soya seed 88%      9% 2% 
G/Nuts seed 97%     1% 2%*  
Beans seed 91%     1% 2% 6%* 
Pigeon pea 77%     13% 9% 
Notes:    * indicates that beneficiaries wanted a different variety to that supplied  
 To improve clarity of presentation all zero cell entries have been removed and are left blank. Almost 
all cells are zero for cowpeas and pigeon peas, so these columns are omitted.  
Source: 2013 household survey 
 
Table 6.13 compares the maize varieties farmers reported that they had received, and those that 
they prefer. There are difficulties with the different names used by farmers to describe varieties, but 
clearly there is some correspondence between these, with two hybrid varieties consistently in the 
top two rankings.  
Except in the north, a much lower proportion of outlets were reported in the community survey to 
suffer from frequent major queues (and much lower than in 2008/9 and 2006/7). An important point 
about queues is that their impact is greatest on poor people, as for some the additional payments to 
overcome the queues and limited time available made it impossible to redeem coupons.  FGDs 
suggested that in some cases the use of beneficiary lists exacerbated redemption difficulties as they 
reduced the ease with which beneficiaries could redeem inputs from other markets when the 
markets they were registered at had no inputs.  
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Table 6.13 Top 5 Maize variety redemption purchases and preferences, % households 
 Rankings by different household types 
Bought All 
% Total 
share  
Poor 
Hh 
Male  Hh 
heads 
Female Hh 
heads 
North  Centre  South  
SC 403 (KANYANI) 1 40% 1 1 1 1 1 1 
SC 627 (MKANGO) 2 17% 2 2 2 3 2 2 
DKC 8053 3 5% 3 3 8 4 6 3 
DK 4 3% 6 4 
 
9 3 
 
ZM 623 5 3% 4 6 3 10 7 4 
ZM 521 15 1% 
  
10 8 
 
8 
Preferred         
SC 403 (KANYANI) 1 51% 1 1 1 1 1 1 
SC 627 (MKANGO) 2 12% 2 2 2 2 2 2 
DKC 8053 3 5% 3 3 3 6 4 3 
MH 18 4 3% 5 4 5 10 
 
4 
ZM 623 5 2% 6 7 10 4 
 
6 
Source: 2013 household survey 
 
We now consider how households who received coupons found the cash needed to redeem them. 
Table 6.14 summarises reports by recipients of coupons in the household survey, though problems 
of fungibility often make it difficult to identify precisely how particular cash expenditures are 
financed. The table shows that most households used general savings, and ganyu was also 
important. Investigation of differences by household characteristics shows variation in the relative 
importance of different sources, with female headed  households relying a little more  on gifts, and 
falling dependence on savings and rising reliance on gifts and ganyu for  more food insecure and 
lower welfare households.  This is similar to information reported for 2008/9. An apparent trend of 
increasing reliance on ganyu over the last six years could be explained by rising real wage rates or 
increasing poverty, or a changing combination of the two over time. Very few respondents report 
use of income from public works programmes.  
Focus group discussions reported similar ways in which people accessed cash to redeem their 
coupons – with ganyu reportedly more common among men and poorer people, and selling of 
assets more common among women.  
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Table 6.14 Primary sources of cash for input purchase by region, gender of head, and subjective 
welfare & food security status (% coupon recipient households) 
  savings loan gift PWP ganyu other 
North 85% 0% 4% 0% 10% 0% 
Centre 72% 3% 3% 0% 18% 3% 
South 49% 2% 6% 1% 27% 15% 
National 63% 2% 5% 0% 22% 9% 
Female headed 55% 1% 13% 0% 18% 12% 
Male headed 66% 2% 2% 0% 23% 7% 
Poorest 
(Ovutikitsitsa) 
57% 3% 5% 0% 28% 7% 
Ovutika 61% 2% 6% 1% 23% 8% 
Ovutikilako 67% 1% 3% 0% 16% 14% 
>=Wapakatikati 77% 1% 3% 1% 12% 6% 
Maize for 0-3 
months 
46% 1% 12% 0% 37% 5% 
Maize for 4-6 
months 
55% 3% 4% 0% 31% 6% 
Maize for 7-9 
months 
59% 2% 5% 0% 23% 10% 
Maize for >9 
months 
74% 2% 3% 2% 12% 7% 
Total 2010/11 72% 1% 4% 0% 15% 8% 
Total 2008/9 77% 2% 4% 1% 11% 5% 
Source: 2013 household survey 
 
 
Finally, we examine problems that beneficiaries may face when redeeming coupons at markets, and 
their perceptions of the roles of different stakeholders or players at markets. Table 6.15 shows the 
proportion of respondents reporting problems experienced and considered serious by market and 
coupon type, whereas able 6.16 shows the same but only for fertiliser redemption and by region. In 
both tables the list of problems is arranged in order of declining importance of problems identified 
with fertiliser redemption in all markets. The tables suggest that: 
• As expected there are considerably more problems with fertiliser coupon redemption than with 
seed redemption (and some of the problems with seed redemption at parastatal markets are 
likely to be associated with the simultaneous sales of fertilisers and with the problems and 
pressures that causes); 
• Long queues are considered a problem by almost 50% of respondents who redeemed their 
fertiliser coupons at either ADMARC or SFFRFM, with the incidence lowest in the South and 
more serious in the North and Centre (as also reported in the community survey); 
• Many of the problems are inter-related – for example input shortages are likely to lead to long 
queues and these then  increase the need for facilities at the markets and the opportunities and 
tendencies for poor and/or corrupt services, and they may also lead to beneficiaries having to go 
to other markets, where appropriate lists and systems for protecting the vulnerable are not in 
place; 
• The Central Region shows a markedly higher level of complaints and concern about problems – 
as noted these may be inter-related, but this appears to be an issue that needs particular 
attention (a greater perceived incidence of problems of stockouts in the Centre was also 
reported in the Community Survey) ; 
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• For maize seed sales the problems seem to be more prevalent with parastatals than with retail 
chains and agrodealers, but the parastatal problems may be associated with the pressures and 
challenges of fertiliser redemption, and the private sector outlets are not immune from reported 
problem; 
• All the problems listed are serious – the two with lowest frequency of reporting are extremely 
serious when they occur, and may have been under-reported where beneficiaries are female but 
the survey respondent is male - although there are very limited  discrepancies  between the 
incidence of gender related problems (gender violence, sexual demands, and separate toilets) 
between responses by male and female households (in fact for all three issues a higher incidence 
was reported by male headed households than by female headed households). 
 
 
Table 6.15 % respondents identifying serious problems during coupon redemption at market 
outlets by coupon and market type 
Fertiliser vouchers Maize seed 
ADMARC SFFRM Parastatal Chain Agrodealer 
Long queues 47% 47% 31% 16% 7% 
Queue jumping 37% 42% 24% 10% 5% 
Long distance 35% 25% 32% 18% 12% 
Vendors 33% 25% 22% 4% 2% 
Input shortages 32% 27% 17% 4% 10% 
Slow service 28% 30% 13% 3% 3% 
Scrambling/fighting 26% 13% 19% 6% 2% 
Late /early hours 24% 20% 12% 7% 2% 
Demands for ‘tips’ 22% 8% 9% 10% 2% 
Rude staff 20% 12% 9% 3% 1% 
No toilets 18% 23% 15% 3% 6% 
No drinking water  18% 21% 16% 7% 6% 
No M/F toilets 16% 24% 15% 0% 5% 
Abusive language 11% 3% 3% 6% 1% 
Gender violence 8% 0% 2% 3% 0% 
Sexual demands 3% 1% 1% 6% 0% 
Average 23% 20% 15% 7% 4% 
Source: 2013 household survey 
 
FGDs shared similar concerns about coupon redemption, and considered coupon redemption to be 
more problematic than coupon receipt. Two sets of people appeared to stand out as the most 
helpful:  market committees and the village heads. On the other hand, market clerks and vendors 
were singled out as trouble makers in some markets, not all. In a male FGD in Dedza, participants 
indicated that clerks were very slow, especially if they knew that there were vendors or politicians 
around that wanted to get the commodities illegally. In Lilongwe the problem with vendors was said 
to be high, jumping queues with no respect. In Dedza it was also reported that vendors connived 
with clerks to buy the fertilizer and later resell it for K14,000.00. In Phalombe vendors were 
described as ‘rude and tough”. FGDs in Ntcheu, Kasungu, Mangochi reported late opening and early 
closing of the ADMARC markets as one of the challenges in redeeming coupons. 
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Table 6.16 % respondents identifying serious problems during fertiliser coupon redemption at 
market outlets  by region 
North Centre South All  
Long queues 51% 66% 29% 47% 
Queue jumping 29% 57% 19% 37% 
Long distance 41% 40% 28% 34% 
Vendors 16% 55% 16% 33% 
Input shortages 23% 44% 21% 31% 
Slow service 7% 45% 16% 28% 
Scrambling/fighting 14% 41% 13% 25% 
Late /early hours 9% 40% 11% 23% 
Demands for ‘tips’ 4% 38% 9% 21% 
Rude staff 5% 36% 7% 19% 
No toilets 8% 26% 14% 18% 
No drinking water  14% 24% 13% 18% 
No M/F toilets 4% 24% 12% 17% 
Abusive language 6% 20% 3% 10% 
Gender violence 0% 15% 2% 7% 
Sexual demands 0% 5% 1% 3% 
Average 14% 36% 13% 23% 
Source: 2013 household survey 
Respondents’ perceptions of the roles of different stakeholders for redemption of fertiliser coupons 
are presented by region in table 6.17 and by market outlets in table 6.18. Consistent with the 
discussion of serious problems above, vendors are more prevalent and more problematic in the 
Central Region and in ADMARC. In general there is generally a greater perception of stakeholders’ 
presence at markets in the Central Region. The high reports of market clerks as ‘not normally 
present’ does, however, pose questions about respondents’ understanding of the question.  
 
Table 6.17 % respondents by perceptions of presence and role of stakeholders in fertiliser coupon 
redemption by region 
 
Not normally present Normally present & helpful Normally present & problem 
North Centre South All North Centre South All North Centre South All 
Vendors 80% 33% 81% 60% 7% 1% 1% 2% 7% 54% 11% 29% 
Police  55% 38% 45% 43% 42% 50% 52% 50% 1% 3% 0% 2% 
VDC members 29% 24% 30% 27% 67% 63% 59% 62% 2% 6% 1% 3% 
Market committee 83% 55% 63% 62% 16% 29% 27% 27% 1% 8% 0% 3% 
Village head 26% 17% 7% 13% 73% 70% 82% 76% 0% 4% 1% 2% 
Market Clerk 76% 46% 54% 53% 19% 37% 36% 35% 3% 11% 0% 5% 
Other Market officials 94% 55% 72% 67% 6% 25% 19% 21% 0% 11% 0% 5% 
Politician 95% 89% 89% 90% 3% 4% 6% 5% 0% 2% 1% 1% 
Agricultural Officials 64% 62% 52% 57% 34% 17% 37% 28% 1% 3% 0% 2% 
Note: The frequency of ‘normally present and inactive’ (the balance) is not shown. 
Source: 2013 household survey 
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Table 6.18 % respondents by perceptions of presence and role of stakeholders in fertiliser coupon 
redemption by market outlet 
ADMARC SFFRFM 
Not 
normally 
present 
Normally present Not 
normally 
present 
Normally present 
Helpful Problem Helpful Problem 
Vendors 59% 2% 29% 75% 0% 21% 
Police  43% 50% 2% 48% 49% 0% 
VDC members 27% 61% 3% 29% 57% 1% 
Market committee 57% 24% 3% 50% 34% 0% 
Village head 13% 75% 2% 12% 81% 0% 
Market Clerk 49% 32% 5% 48% 33% 0% 
Other Market officials 60% 19% 5% 62% 18% 0% 
Politician 85% 5% 1% 90% 6% 0% 
Agricultural Officials 57% 28% 2% 58% 28% 1% 
Note: The frequency of ‘normally present and inactive’ (the balance) is not shown. 
Source: 2013 household survey 
6.7 Input purchases and use 
Of the inputs obtained with coupons, the majority were reported as used on the respondents’ plots. 
This applied to almost all fertilisers and hybrid maize seed. Figures were slightly lower for OPV and 
legume seed (see table 6.19) with some being kept over for the following year and some legume 
seed being eaten. Sales are probably under reported. FGDs also reported almost universal use of 
coupons to buy inputs for use on people’s fields. Isolated incidences of coupon sales were reported 
in Kasungu, Nkhotakota and Mangochi FDGs due to lack of inputs to buy and some sales by ‘poor 
people’. 
Table 6.19 Subsidised input use by type of input redeemed 
 
Fertiliser 
Maize seed Legume seed 
 
Hybrid OPV Soya G/Nuts Beans Cowpeas 
Pigeon 
pea 
Own garden 97% 96% 89% 89% 89% 83% 100% 92% 
Shared with others 2% 1% 2% 1% 1% 1% 0% 0% 
Sold 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 0% 0% 
Kept for next crop 0% 2% 9% 4% 2% 1% 0% 0% 
Other (eaten) 0% 0% 0% 4% 3% 3% 0% 0% 
 
Table 6.20 shows use of fertilisers and maize seed by crop and variety. This is of interest as it shows 
that the majority of the subsidised fertiliser was reportedly used on hybrid maize, with none used on 
burley tobacco. The application of hybrid seed to composite/OPV maize seed plots suggests that 
there may be some mixing of seed (also suggested by information on reported cropping patterns) 
but perhaps also some difficulties in clearly separating between OPV and hybrid varieties.  
Table 6.20 Subsidised fertiliser and maize seed use by crop 
Crop Fertiliser Hybrid 
maize seed 
OPV maize 
seeds 
Local maize 29% 45% 63% 
Composite/OPV maize 9% 23% 37% 
Hybrid maize 62% 32% 0% 
Burley tobacco 0% 0% 0% 
Source: 2013 household survey 
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6.8 Technical advice 
Proper use of subsidised seed and fertiliser is an important determinant of the impact of the FISP. 
Table 6.21 compares reported receipt of advice from field assistants by survey respondents 
categorised in different ways. The percentage of respondents reporting receipt of advice in the 
2012/13 season (11%) is a little lower than reported in 2010/11 and 2008/9 (13%), figures which 
were again lower than in 2006/2007 (22%). Since greater access to extension advice should enable 
people to use their inputs more efficiently, to greater benefit for all, increasing the coverage of 
extension advice to subsidy recipients should be given more attention. The need for and benefits of 
this are reinforced by the generally good scoring of advice by those who do receive it. Mean scores 
of the usefulness of advice are generally good (and similar to 2010/11 and 2008/9 which were higher 
than in 2006/2007).  
There is important variation in receipt of advice by different types of household, with female headed 
and lower welfare households receiving less advice.  Differences in perceptions of the quality of 
advice are mixed. There is weak evidence of recipients of coupons appearing to receive a little more 
advice than non-beneficiaries.  
 
Table 6.21 Receipt and quality of technical advice from Field Assistants by coupon recipient by 
region, gender & age of head,  and subjective welfare & food security status 
  All households Fertiliser coupon recipients 
  New varieties Fertilisers New varieties Fertilisers 
  
% hh 
with 
advice 
Scoring 
of 
advice 
% hh 
with 
advice 
Scoring 
of 
advice 
% hh 
with 
advice 
Scoring 
of advice 
% hh 
with 
advice 
Scoring 
of advice 
North 17% 3.2 14% 3.4 23% 3.3 19% 3.3 
Centre 8% 3.0 8% 3.1 9% 3.2 11% 3.2 
South 11% 3.6 11% 3.6 12% 3.6 11% 3.7 
National 11% 3.3 10% 3.4 12% 3.4 12% 3.5 
Female headed 9% 3.4 8% 3.4 10% 3.5 9% 3.4 
Male headed 11% 3.3 11% 3.4 13% 3.4 13% 3.5 
Poorest (Ovutikitsitsa) 8% 3.2 7% 3.3 10% 3.3 9% 3.4 
Ovutika 9% 3.5 9% 3.6 11% 3.7 10% 3.7 
Ovutikilako 15% 3.3 13% 3.5 14% 3.3 15% 3.4 
>=wapakatikati 13% 3.1 13% 3.2 17% 3.1 18% 3.1 
Maize for 0-3 months 8% 3.7 11% 3.3 16% 3.8 14% 3.8 
Maize for 4-6 months 7% 3.3 5% 3.3 9% 3.2 5% 3.2 
Maize for 7-9 months 13% 3.4 12% 3.5 12% 3.9 13% 3.8  
Maize for >10 months 9% 3.5 8% 3.7 9% 3.5 9% 3.7  
National 20010/11 14% 3.3 14% 3.3 15% 3.4 15% 3.3 
National 2008/9 14% 3.2 14% 3.3 17% 3.3 17% 3.3 
Scores:  1= useless; 2= not very useful; 3= average; 4=useful. 
Source: 2013 household survey 
6.9 Input preferences 
Specific attention was given in FGDs to asking if respondents had any preferences for other inputs 
apart from maize and legume seed and 23:21:0 and urea for maize. The vast majority of groups were 
satisfied with the types of input provided although there were requests for more legume seed 
(especially groundnut seed and to a lesser extent soya and bean seed).  In a small number of groups 
there were requests for rice (in Karonga), tobacco and cotton inputs (in Ntcheu) and for vegetable 
seeds. There were no specific requests for other inputs by FGDs in Chikwawa. 
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6.10 Implementation conclusions 
This section of the report has presented a review of information on households’ access to and use of 
coupons and subsidised inputs in 2012/13. The main points to note are: 
• Overall estimates of fertiliser receipt are a little under 70% of MoAFS distribution reports if 
the NSO rural household population is used or over 100% if MoAFS farm family numbers are 
used to multiply average receipt of 0.73 coupons per household. This discrepancy is a major 
issue for the implementation and evaluation of the FISP, and indeed for national statistics, 
and its resolution should be a matter of urgent prioritisation.  
• As indicated by MoAFS targets and distribution figures, over the life of the FISP there has 
been a shift in allocations from north to south, and this is associated with increasing sharing 
or splitting of coupons and coupon packs, with many beneficiaries only receiving one rather 
than two fertiliser coupons.  
• As reported in previous surveys and other studies, beneficiary targeting does not seem to 
particularly favour the poor or the better off, though there is some bias to the latter. 
Differentials between different types of household may arise as regards the likelihood of 
receiving any coupons and the number of coupons received.  Thus for example female 
headed and male headed households have roughly equal chances of subsidy receipt,  but 
female headed beneficiaries receive on average fewer coupons. Such differentials appear to 
reflect different groups’ initial identification as beneficiaries and then, if a beneficiary, on 
their ability to hold onto their allocation rather than share it, or, if a non-beneficiary, their 
ability to benefit from sharing of others’ coupons. A new finding is the relative under- 
representation of youth headed households among beneficiaries, with lower coupons 
received per beneficiary. As in 2010/11, female beneficiaries are well represented within 
male headed households in the south, but are poorly represented in the centre and, 
particularly in the north.  Further attention needs to be given to major improvements made 
in targeting objectives and systems – for example can information about certain household 
characteristics that could be used in targeting be collected recorded at registration and 
subsequently used in targeting? 
• As in 201/11, open meetings are widely used in allocating and distributing coupons, however 
new analysis suggests that such meetings are primarily concerned with the announcement 
of already decided allocations rather than actual collective and participative allocation of 
coupons.  
• Implementation of the initiative to make beneficiary lists public has been patchy, with 
publication reported by some 30% of respondents. In these cases it appears that there was 
limited understanding of the potential role of such lists in promoting accountability.  
• New information is presented on stock outs, demands for tips, and other problems faced by 
beneficiaries when redeeming their coupons for inputs, and it appears that reports of 
problems are generally much higher in the central region. This raises questions about 
possible underlying causes for the apparent discrepancies between regions. Is this due to 
different standards and expectations among respondents, to differences in management by 
agricultural or ADMARC staff, or to differences in social relations, norms and behaviour 
among village leaders, for example? We may then ask if and how good practice and norms 
can be better shared within and across regions – it is clear from the innovations introduced 
over time in the programme that this does already happen (with, for example, in some areas 
the involvement of accountable local committees in sensitisation, beneficiary registration 
and coupon distribution; the establishment of distribution centre liaison committees; the 
scheduling of particular days for input sales to different villages (widely introduced in 
2012/13); and separate queues for men and women waiting to redeem coupons).  
• The majority of beneficiaries obtained the inputs that they wanted, and despite shortages of 
different types of legume seed this also applied to legume seed, where the majority of 
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respondents appeared to demand and get groundnuts, with regional variations in the 
demand for soya seed and pigeon peas.  
• The vast majority of coupons are reported to be used on beneficiaries own crops.   
• Finally, as regards extension advice, a relatively low proportion (11 to 12%) of both 
beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries report the receipt Extension advice on maize seed 
varieties and fertiliser use, but there is generally good appreciation of the quality of 
extension advice received.  
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7 Direct impacts 
7.1 Incremental production 
The major pathway by which the FISP generates benefits is through increased production of maize 
and legumes as a result of increased use of subsidised certified seeds and inorganic fertiliser inputs. 
Previous sections have considered the distribution of these inputs. We therefore begin our 
examination of direct impacts of the programme by considering the productivity of these inputs. 
Previous work in evaluations and in other studies have faced a number of difficulties in analysing 
maize crop yield data from surveys (Dorward and Chirwa, 2010b; School of Oriental and African 
Studies et al., 2008). This has suffered from inconsistent results and problems of data quality and of 
multi-collinearity between different crop management variables (such as variety, fertiliser use, plant 
density, weeding, and time of planting). Information from research station trials, on the other hand, 
generally fails to adequately represent returns under smallholder conditions. The limited supply of 
legume seed in the early years of the programme has also meant that little attention has been paid 
to legume yields and the productivity of legume seed – and there are even greater difficulties in 
determining legume yields and productivity as a result of widespread intercropping of legumes.   
Four new approaches were pursued as regards improving estimates of agronomic returns to 
incremental maize seed and fertiliser use as a result of FISP: 
• Information was sought from nationwide on-farm trials conducted under ASWAP 
• Yield responses were estimated from crop production data collected under the IHS3 
• An attempt was made to gather new data using crop cutting methods on yield sub plots in 
farmers’ fields administered by resident enumerators in two areas in Lilongwe and Zomba 
• Crop simulation modelling was commissioned to investigate the potential for this approach 
in estimating likely yield responses under smallholder conditions and crop management 
regimes  
Data on yields were also gathered for some legumes using crop cutting methods. In this section we 
briefly summarise the main findings from each of the approaches listed above.  
7.1.1 On Farm trial Maize yield data 
 A report and data were kindly supplied by Dr W Makumba of Chitedze Research Station regarding 
nationwide on-farm baby and mother trials investigating maize yields with different rates of 
inorganic fertiliser and legume inter-crops.  (Makumba et al., 2012) reports Nutrient Utilisation 
Efficiency (NUE) for nitrogen on hybrid maize plots ranging from 13.2 to 21.7 kg yield per kg nutrient 
on farmer try-out trials in different districts in 2010/11.On average 16.8 kg yield per kg nutrient was  
realised with relatively high rates of fertiliser use (around 90 kg/ha N and 250 kg of fertiliser per ha).  
NUE should be higher for the lower rates of fertiliser application reported by farmers using 
subsidised fertiliser in the 2013 household survey (around 20kg/ha N or 60kg fertiliser per ha for 
those only applying subsidised fertiliser and 40kg/ha N or 120 kg/ha fertiliser for those applying both 
subsidised and unsubsidised fertiliser). Attempts to estimate NUE using raw data from 2011/12 
farmer try-outs6faced problems of multi-collinearity between nitrogen application rates and plant 
density is a possible explanation for unreasonably high NUE estimates obtained.   
7.1.2 Analysis of IHS3 maize yield data 
The IHS3 data set (obtained from http://go.worldbank.org/6A7GUDQ1Q0) was used to compile a file 
containing reported yields and a range of potential yield determinants from 12,586 IHS3 plots. 
                                                          
6 We are grateful to Dr W Makumba for making this data available. 
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Variables on per ha yield and input use were constructed using the GPS area estimates. Variables 
included yield per ha, nitrogen and phosphate application per ha, variety (local or hybrid, with very 
small numbers of OPV and recycled hybrid reported), planting date, seed rate, time of fertiliser 
application, farmer judgement of soil quality (good, fair or poor), pre-harvest labour use per ha, 
region, pure or mixed stand, and number of years land left fallow. Records were cleaned with outlier 
observations set to ‘missing’. Various quadratic and interaction variables were constructed and 
regressions were estimated to determine the influence of these variables on yield, with specific 
interest in the response to nitrogen and phosphate fertiliser application. Regression coefficients 
provided very low estimates of Nutrient Use Efficiency and yield responses to N, P and fertiliser7, 
varying from -1.2 to 3 kg yield per kg fertiliser (23:21 and Urea). These very low yield responses were 
inconsistent across different model estimates (using different data subsets) and are also inconsistent 
with farmer beliefs about the efficacy of fertiliser use (expressed by both their desire for subsidised 
fertiliser and by the willingness of many farmer to invest scarce resources in purchases of  
unsubsidised fertiliser) and with large numbers of on farm research trials  (for example  Makumba et 
al. (2012) cited above, sources  cited in School of Oriental and African Studies et al. (2008) and 
Kamanga et al. (2013).  These inconsistencies raise serious doubts about the estimation of yield 
responses using data that relies on farmer estimates and reports of fertiliser application and 
production.  
Dorward and Chirwa (2010b) discuss these concerns with specific reference to yield estimation  in 
the AISP/FISP evaluation surveys  conducted in 2006/7 and 2008/9 and to nitrogen response rates 
calculated from these surveys. Specific issues were raised regarding both production and area 
estimates and reporting by farmers.  
Difficulties with farmer estimates of area are resolved in the IHS3 by the use of accurate GPS 
measurements of plot areas, and in the 2012/13 FISS4 surveys farmers’ plot area estimates were 
augmented by GPS measurements for one randomly selected plot per household. Investigation of 
the relationship between GPS measurement and farmers’ estimates of plot areas showed that 
individual plot (and hence aggregate household) areas estimated by farmers were marginally greater 
than GPS measured areas (by 5% and 8% respectively in the IHS3 and FISS4 surveys) ). This over-
estimation bias is however more pronounced for larger plots, whereas farmers’ estimates for smaller 
plots tend to be less biased, and indeed may be greater than GPS measures for smaller plots. This is 
shown in figure 7.1.  
 
                                                          
7 The draft report presented in September 2013 reported higher but very variable estimates of these 
responses, but unfortunately in preparing the final report an error was discovered in the analysis and 
correction of this had major effects on the results.  
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Figure 7.1 Farmer estimates and GPS measurements of plot areas in the IHS23 and FISS4 surveys 
 
Farmer estimates also tend to be clustered into half or whole number acre measures.  
The precise effects of biased farmer estimates of plot area on estimates of yield and fertiliser yield 
response estimates need further investigation, and are relevant to interpretation of analytical results 
from surveys relying on farmer estimates of areas. These issues are not, however, relevant where 
survey data allow analysis using GPS measures of plot areas. However the presence of both sampling 
error and bias in farmer estimates of plot areas must also raise questions about the presence of 
sampling error and bias in farmer estimates of crop production and fertiliser use.  These issues 
appear to have received little attention in consideration of yield and fertiliser yield response 
estimates in Malawi.  
With regard to plot production estimates, a seminal study that led to a continent-wide shift from 
reliance on crop cutting to reliance on farmer estimates reported that in surveys conducted in five 
different African countries farmer estimates of plots’ production of staple crops were more reliable 
than crop cut estimates from yield sub plots but this ‘depends critically upon the accuracy and 
consistency of the conversion factors connecting the variety of traditional volumetric units used to 
standard units of  weight’ (page 9, Verma et al. (1988). This condition does not appear to hold in 
Malawi. In the IHS3 data on plot maize production around 16% of plots have production reported in 
oxcarts (largely in the central region, which accounted for over 80%of plots with production 
reported in oxcarts), 70% of plots have production reported in 50kg bags, and 6% have production 
reported in kilograms, with 8% reported in other units. Over the sample as a whole around 80% of 
plots have yield reported in shelled maize, and shelling conversions provided in the dataset have 
identical shelling conversion factors for kilograms (a weight measure) and for oxcarts and 50kg bags 
(volume measures). Mean (unweighted) yield estimates differed widely between plots according to 
reported units, in ways that could not be explained by, for example, rates of fertiliser application8. 
These observations suggest that there is no standard and reliable measure of maize production used 
in Malawi, and not only are conversion measures likely to be unreliable, farmers’ basic estimates of 
the most commonly reported unit (shelled maize in 50kg bags) are also likely to be unreliable and 
may well suffer from bias9.  
Furthermore, while Verma et al. (1988) report that on average farmer estimates give reliable 
production measures, they do not appear to report any investigation of how there may be different 
biases above and below the mean (as found above with farmer estimates of plot areas). Such 
differential biases may not matter when estimating aggregate production and (with unbiased area 
measures) average yields, but they may have substantial impacts on yield response estimates. Here, 
for example, a tendency for farmers to over-estimate low production and under-estimate high 
production would lead to an under-estimate of crop yield responses to, for example, fertiliser. Such 
differential bias in farmer estimates is highly plausible10. 
                                                          
8 Yield from plots with production reported in oxcarts, 50 kg bags and kilograms were 2,006, 1,297,  and 712 
kg/ha respectively, while reported nitrogen application rates were 45, 55, and 45 kg N/ha respectively.  
9Dorward and Chirwa (2010b) for example note possible bias from farmers wishing to over or under report 
production (to attract resources or to impress) and farmers may face difficulties in estimating plot production 
if some is harvested green, if harvesting is in stages, and if maize is stored on thecob. They also note that 
farmers who tend to sell maize may under-estimate weights while farmers who tend to buy maize may over-
estimate weights if traders do not use standard measures when buying and selling grain, while farmers that 
neithersell nor buy maize may lack experience with measurements. 
10Some evidence for this is provided by visual inspection of a scatter plot on page 19 of Verma et al. (1988)- 
although the scatterplot is included to demonstrate the wide variance between farmers’ production estimates 
and actual production for individual plots– and by discussion of results from Zimbabwe on page 24. 
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Biases may also be expected in the reporting of fertiliser use. Here some farmers who have received 
subsidised fertilisers but then sold it to others may report use of that fertiliser on their land if they 
are unwilling to disclose fertiliser sales (a plausible situation given threats that sales of subsidised 
fertiliser will be punished in some way). Similarly farmers who buy subsidised fertiliser from other 
farmers may be unwilling to report its use. In the first case a plot reported as having received 
fertiliser will not have had it applied, while in the second case a plot reported as having no fertiliser 
will actually have received it. Both these situations will lead to a downward bias in estimated yield 
response to fertiliser application.  
Taken together, these concerns and the low yield responses from surveys relying on farmer 
production estimates as compared with on farm trial data and farmers’ willingness to invest in 
fertiliser (Holden and Lunduka, 2013) need to be taken seriously. They suggest that acceptance and 
use of low yield response estimates from household surveys need to demonstrate that these 
estimates are not subject to the effects of the potential downward biases discussed above.  We are 
not aware of proper consideration of these issues in studies reporting these estimates.  
This discussion extends and provides a stark demonstration of the concerns raised by Dorward and 
Chirwa (2010b) about attempts to use survey data to estimate NUE. Dorward and Chirwa (2010b) 
raise a further concern that we do not consider here, the way that multi-collinearity in such data 
may render their estimates inherently biased. We therefore look for other data sources to estimate 
smallholder NUE, and this leads us to crop simulation modelling, which we discuss in section 7.1.4. 
7.1.3 Resident enumerator survey maize yield estimates 
A survey of 150 households in Zomba and Lilongwe districts was conducted from November 2012 to 
2013. Data was collected on labour use and employment, and on crop husbandry and yields. 
Information on wage rates is used in section 8, here we briefly present in table 7.1 principle results 
on maize, groundnut and beans yields.  
Maize grain yields, harvested in 50m2 yield sub plots, ranged from 286-6,233 kg/ha with a mean of 
2,803±1,184 kg/ha.  Yields of local maize are higher than the expected on-farm yields of 2,000 or 
1,000 kg/ha for fertilized or non-fertilized local maize, respectively.  Local maize here includes 
recycled seed of improved varieties such as OPV. Plant populations recorded in yield sub plots 
ranged from 18,600 to 84,000 maize plants/ha and this may contribute to variability in maize yield 
responses to inorganic fertilisers11. For sole cropped maize, the recommended planting pattern of 
75cm x 75cm x 3 seeds (ridge spacing x within row spacing x No. of seeds per station) or 75cm x25cm 
x1 seed gives a population of 53,000 plants/ha. Groundnuts and bean yield are also estimated, 
though with smaller sample sizes. Beans were in all plots grown as an intercrop with maize.  
Table 7.1.Crops grown and yields, 2012/2013 growing season, Lilongwe 
Crop  Variety No. of 
plots 
Yield (kg/ha) Plant Population/ha 
Mean  Min  Max  Mean  Min  Max  
Maize  Hybrid 94 2,803 2,86 6,233 4,1447 19,600 84,400 
Local/Rec’d* 46 2,394 599 3,648 46,438 24,000 74,200 
OPV 10 3,036 1,761 4,678 3,9600 28,000 63,800 
All maize 153 2,787 286 6,233 4,2987 18,600 84,000 
Beans   46 384 69 993 - - - 
Groundnut  13 922 220 2,023 50,938 38,600 80,000 
*Local includes recycled OPV maize, hybrid includes some recycled  hybrid 
                                                          
11 Regression analysis did not provide significant and consistent estimates. Verma et al. (1988) report large 
over estimates of plot yields from 25m2yield sub plots when compared with whole plot harvesting.  
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7.1.4 Crop simulation modelling 
Professor Anthony Whitbread and colleagues at the University of Goettingen were commissioned to 
undertake a review of information on maize yield fertiliser responses in Malawi and to develop a 
simulation model of yield responses under smallholder farm conditions and crop management 
regimes. The review confirmed earlier observations (School of Oriental and African Studies et al., 
2008)that there was very limited published information about yield responses under  smallholder 
conditions, and that with the information that is available it is very difficult to separate fertiliser yield 
responses from confounding effects of different varieties, weeding regimes and planting densities. 
The review also confirmed the importance of these management practices as determinants of yield 
response, and these interactions were then investigated with subsequent crop simulation modelling.  
Full results from this modelling are presented in the report of this work (Whitbread et al., 2013). 
Overall the simulations appear to have provided very useful information. Key findings presented 
include the importance of weeding, adequate phosphorous and good plant populations for higher 
nitrogen responses; the interactions between weeding, plant population and rainfall; differences 
between and benefits of hybrid and local varieties under different conditions. These interactions are 
illustrated by four graphs taken from Whitbread et al. (2013) and reproduced in figure 7.2.  
These graphs show that with a particular phosphorous deficient soil type  
• both hybrid and local varieties have very low returns to higher rates of inorganic N fertiliser 
application unless phosphate is added 
• hybrid nevertheless consistently provides higher yields than local, even with low nutrients 
and ‘poor’ management 
• good weeding leads to consistently higher yields 
• high and moderate plant populations (defined as 30,000 and 50,000 plants per ha) gave 
higher yields than low plant populations (defined as 15,000 plants per ha) with higher rates 
of N applications, but low and moderate plant populations gave higher yields with lower 
rates of N application 
• consequently there are low returns to higher rates of nitrogen at low plant populations 
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Figure 7.2 Hybrid and Local Maize Yield responses to Nitrogen under different phosphate, plant 
density and weeding conditions (from Whitbread et al. (2013) 
Not shown in the graphs is the effect of planting time, with delays of a month from 1st of December 
to 1st of January leading to substantial percentage reductions in yield (of 20 to more than 50%).   
The implications of these results for yields and fertiliser and variety responses under smallholder 
management conditions are explored here by applying them to patterns of smallholder maize 
management observed in the 2012/13FISP household survey. This was achieved by first using the set 
of simulation results (with over 44,000 observations from all soil, treatment and rainfall 
combinations) to estimate a statistical model linking crop management to yield12 and then applying 
coefficients from this model with mean crop management variables from the 20012/13survey to 
estimate average yields and yield responses achieved by smallholders in Malawi. The results are 
presented in table 7.2, which shows average crop management parameters observed in 2012/13 for 
maize plots where fertiliser reported as subsidy fertiliser was applied together with predicted 
average yields and crop management yield responses for these plots.  
  
                                                          
12 Full details of this model are available from Andrew Dorward, lead author of this report. A polynomial was 
found to perform better than a log-linear or Cobb Douglas production function, giving an R2 of 0.773 and all 
57 variables (including multiple interactions) were significant at P=0.001 except Phosphate*weeding and 
Rainfall*soil depth. Collinearity was only found between two variables which one would expect to be 
negatively related, planting date and ‘in crop rainfall’, with P=0.001.  
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Table 7.2 Estimated yields and yield responses with 2012/13 smallholder maize management 
    Maize plots with subsidised fertiliser 
  Variety Local Hybrid 
  Management a. Mean b. Mean c. As (a) 
d. Mean 
but high 
plant pop. 
Means 
N  applied (kg/ha) 33.2 39.6 33.2 39.6 
P applied (kg/ha) 8.3 11.4 8.3 11.4 
Plant population  ('000 plants/ha) 20.1 13.9 20.1 27.7 
In crop rain  (mm) 590 590 590 590 
Planting time  
(months from Dec 
1st) 
0.08 0.14 0.08 0.14 
Variety  (local 0, hybrid 1) 0 1 1 1 
Weeding  (poor 0, good 1) 0.66 0.74 0.66 0.74 
Soil Depth  (shallow 0 deep 1) 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
Fertiliser timing  
(months from 
planting) 
0.91 0.80 0.91 0.80 
Soil Phosphorous (kg/ha) 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 
Model estimates 
Maize yield (kg/ha) 1,392 1,921 1,955 2,293 
Average yield response 
NUE N  (kg 
grain/kg N) 
Mean conditions 18 23 26 29 
Phosphorus deficient 10 15 19 21 
Weeding = 0.5 18 24 26 30 
15,000 plants/ha 16 24 24 24 
In crop rain 500mm 16 22 24 28 
Planted mid Dec 18 24 27 30 
NUE P2O5  Mean conditions 3 0 1 3 
(kg grain /kg P2O5) Phosphorus deficient 29 31 23 29 
Plant population (kg/10,000 plants/ha) 332 438 363 346 
Weeding (kg/poor to good) 524 505 524 567 
  % yield gain 60% 36% 37% 33% 
Planting time (kg/1 month delay) -115 -44 -53 -59 
  % yield loss -8% -2% -3% -3% 
Fertiliser timing (kg/1 month delay) 37 69 58 69 
Variety (kg local to hybrid) na 570 562 635 
 
Notes: ‘Plant population’ estimated from reported seed rate (kg/ha) with 1,080 plants per kg seed; ‘In crop 
rain’ uses average in crop rainfall recorded in simulations for 1928-2004;’ Weeding’ quality  
represented by %  plots with two  or more weedings; ‘Soil depth’ dummy set at 0.5; ‘Fertiliser timing’ 
represented as time of first fertiliser application in months after planting although this does not 
exactly describe the variable constructed for the modelling of the simulation results; ‘Soil 
Phosphorous’ set at 0.75 to represent possible proportion of soils affected by phosphorous deficit.  
 
The top part of table 7.2 shows the means for the management variables in different sets of plots 
that received subsidised fertiliser: local maize plots (a), and three sets of hybrid plots: first one 
representing average reported management (b), then one considering the effects of hybrid adoption 
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replacing local maize for plots where all other management variables are unchanged (c), and finally, 
since the recorded mean plant population for hybrid appears to be very low, the final column (d) 
uses average hybrid management variables except for plant population where a higher plant 
population is introduced. Columns (c) and (d) therefore allow examination of isolated effects of 
hybrid maize adoption and increased plant population.  
The lower part of the table then shows estimated average yield and yield responses under the 
different management regimes represented in the top part of the table.  
The results show the following; 
- NUE(N) , yield responses to N of 18 and 23 kg maize per kg N  are estimated under mean 
management and conditions for local and hybrid maize respectively (see columns (c) and (d)).  
- with other variables held constant, responses to N may be higher with higher plant populations 
or lower where Phosphate is limiting. They also fall with higher rates of Nitrogen application, 
but appear to be relatively unaffected by weeding quality and planting date (though overall 
yields are affected by weeding quality and planting date).  
- yields are not very responsive to phosphate application unless soil phosphate levels are low, in 
which case yields are highly responsive13.  
- Plant population and weeding quality also have large effects on yield. Late planting is estimated 
to reduce yield, but not as much as suggested by the original simulation results. This under-
estimate is probably indicative of the effects of collinearity between rainfall and time of 
planting and hence of potentially biased estimates of their yield effects, and further illustrates 
the difficulties of estimating yield responses from regression models of survey data.  
Overall these results (with local maize NUE varying from 10 – in phosphorus deficient soils without 
phosphate application - to 18 kg grain per kg yield, and hybrid maize NUE varying from 15 – in 
phosphorus deficient soils without phosphate application – to 29 kg grain per kg yield) suggest that 
incremental production impacts from incremental input use are a little higher than those used in 
benefit cost analysis in previous evaluation reports. However it may be thought that these estimates 
may err on the high side if they under-estimate (a) the extent of phosphorus deficiencies in 
Malawian soils, (b) the effects of late planting, (c) the effects of variable and patchy poor rainfall, 
and/or (d) the effects of pests and diseases. On the other hand previous analysis has not allowed for 
yield responses to phosphate fertilisers (and even if there are only limited immediate benefits there 
should be longer term benefits from the prevention of soil mining and yield impacts on more P 
sensitive leguminous crops grown as relay or intercrops) and it is likely that plant populations are 
higher than estimated here from farmers’ reports of seed use. These results also suggest that 
previous estimates of the gains from increased adoption of hybrid seed were under estimated – 
although the effects of displacement on incremental seed use were not allowed for.   
7.1.5 Incremental production estimates 
The information presented above on NUE for nitrogen and the estimated yield effects of adopting 
hybrid maize instead of local maize allows, with farm survey information on cropping patterns and 
fertiliser application, estimation of incremental production as a result of the FISP. A complex 
spreadsheet was constructed with estimated NUE from the regression models described above 
applied to average patterns of crop management observed in 2012/13 household data for plots with 
subsidised fertiliser, and subsidised and unsubsidised fertiliser, by maize variety (local, OPV or 
hybrid)14. Separate and interactive incremental effects of incremental fertiliser and seed type were 
then estimated using survey data on fertiliser and seed rates, and these were related to subsidy 
                                                          
13Makumba et al. (2012) report low phosphate levels in soils in southern Malawi. 
14 The OPV NUE is assumed to be an average of hybrid and local maize NUE 
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sales reported by the Logistics Unit. This provided estimated incremental production before 
adjustments for  
a. Discrepancies between estimated total subsidy receipts and disbursements, as discussed in 
section 6, 
b. Discrepancies between NUE rates estimated from the crop simulation as described above 
and likely on farm conditions 
c. The effects of displacement by subsidy sales of commercial seed and fertiliser sales that 
would have happened in the absence of the subsidy.  
Table 7.3 sets out incremental production estimates with different assumptions on each of these 
issues.  We consider fertiliser leakages from 5% to 20%,   estimated NUEs from the crop simulation 
adjusted downwards by 10% to 30%., and fertiliser displacement ranging from 5 to 25%, and seed 
displacement ranging from 40% to 60%. These choices are informed by the following: 
a. Potential discrepancies between household survey estimates of total receipt of subsidised 
fertiliser and MoAFS figures on total sales, depending on total numbers of rural households 
or farm families, as set out in table 6.1. 
b. If roughly 25% of subsidised fertiliser is applied to plots mainly in the Southern region 
without complementary phosphate fertiliser then this is estimated to reduce the estimated 
NUE(N) for both hybrid and local maize by about 10%. We use this as our upper estimate for 
NUE.   
c. Estimates of fertiliser displacement in Malawi have ranged from 3% in 2008/9, a year with 
very high commercial fertiliser prices (Ricker-Gilbert and Jayne, 2010), to 22% in 2006/7 
(Ricker-Gilbert et al., 2010) with a more recent estimate of 15% in 2010/11 (Chirwa et al., 
2011b). For seed Mason and Ricker-Gilbert (2012) estimate very high displacement of 56% in 
Malawi. However econometric estimation of displacement measures changes between 
seasons in the difference between beneficiary and non-beneficiary purchases of subsidised 
inputs. It does not, however, make any allowance for potential longer term and cumulative 
impacts of the subsidy in stimulating a general increase in input use by both beneficiaries 
and non- beneficiaries. As discussed in section 5, there is evidence of substantial growth in 
commercial sales of hybrid maize seed over the life of the subsidy, but not in fertiliser sales.  
Table 7.3 therefore sets out estimated incremental production of maize under these different 
conditions, with the central cell highlighted, considered to be the most likely and approximate mean. 
This figure falls within the range of incremental production estimates made and used in evaluations 
of previous FISP seasons, with somewhat higher NUEs (18.4 and 14.4 as compared with 18 and 12 
for hybrid and local respectively used in previous evaluations) and higher incremental effects of 
hybrid and OPV seed counterbalanced by somewhat higher estimates of leakage and displacement – 
with previous evaluations paying less attention to leakage or diversion. Inspection of the table shows 
that estimates are sensitive to changes in leakage and displacement and to changes in NUE15. They 
are less sensitive to changes in seed displacement. No account is taken of possible post-harvest 
losses. 
  
                                                          
15 The table does not show any changes in production from changes to incremental benefits of hybrid seed 
without changes in fertiliser use, which are responsible for between 8 and 18% % of estimated incremental 
production, depending on NUE and displacement parametres used. 
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Table 7.3  Incremental maize production estimates under different assumptions 
Seed 
displacement 
NUE 
reduction 
Hybrid 
NUE 
Local 
NUE 
Fertiliser displacement &leakage 
10% 30% 45% 
40% -10% 22.1 17.5 1,038,563  828,267  670,545  
 
-20% 19.6 15.5 923,167  736,238  596,040  
 
-30% 17.2 13.6 807,772  644,208  521,535  
50% -10% 22.1 17.5 1,023,192  812,895  655,173  
 
-20% 19.6 15.5 909,504  722,574  582,376  
 
-30% 17.2 13.6 795,816  632,252  509,579  
60% -10% 22.1 17.5 1,007,820  797,524  639,802  
 
-20% 19.6 15.5 895,840  708,910   568,713  
 
-30% 17.2 13.6 783,860  620,296  497,623  
 
No crop simulation yield information or estimates of displacement are available for estimating the 
incremental production of legumes from the distribution of subsidised legume seed, and yield 
estimates are complicated by variable intercropping patterns and, for beans, the picking of leaves as 
a vegetable. Yield estimates for legumes were therefore drawn largely from collation of results of on 
farm trials.  
• For groundnuts, the legume for which most seed was distributed, an average yield of 8.3 kg 
of grain per kg of seed was calculated from 7 trials for CG7 planted in November and 
December. Inclusion of trials where planting date was not specified (but excluding those 
with planting from January onwards) gave a slightly higher average yield to seed ratio of 8.7 
kg of grain per kg of seed from 21 trials for CG7. Yield records from 14 yield sub plots in 
Lilongwe gave an average of 10kg of grain per kg of seed at a lower plant density. We 
therefore use yields of 8 and 10kg grain per kg seed in our incremental production 
estimates.  
• For beans, very little trial data on on-farm climbing beans yields could be found, but the few 
trials available suggest again 8 to 10 kg grain per kg yield.  
• Evidence from on farm soya bean trials and MoAFS guidelines suggest the same range of 
yield to seed ratios (but it should be noted that since plant population rates and seed rates 
differ between crops and between intercrop and sole crop stands, the similar yield to grain 
ratios allow for a range of yields per ha between crops and different types of crop stand).  
• The smaller grain sizes of cow peas and pigeon peas and their planting patterns mean that 
they have lower seed rates and higher yield to seed ratios than the large seeded legumes, 
with reviews of on farm trial data suggesting around 40 to 60 kg grain per kg seed for 
determinate cowpeas and 0 to 110 kg grain per kg seed for medium duration pigeon pea 
varieties such as Mwayiwathu Alimi. These ratios are highly variable (pigeon pea for example 
is very susceptible to pest attack and to early cessation of the rains limiting soil moisture for 
grain maturation). However the small quantities of cow pea and pigeon pea seed distributed 
under FISP mean that their overall contribution to incremental production is low, as is the 
sensitivity of overall production to errors or variation in these yield ratios.  
Table7.4 sets out estimates for incremental production by type of legume, using the yield 
parametres described above. A high rate of displacement may be expected for some crops but not 
others (for example soya and to a lesser extent groundnuts) but the replacement of local varieties by 
certified seed for new varieties should mitigate against this. No attempt is made to value potential 
benefits to soil fertility and maize production.  There is little evidence of benefits to maize yields 
from rotation with groundnuts or intercropping with beans (the two dominant crops promoted 
through subsidised seed) and unless the area under pure legume stands increases, the per ha soil 
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fertility benefits are likely to be small. However as argued by Chirwa et al. (2011a) if the use of 
inorganic fertiliser and hybrid seeds promoted by FISP can lead to higher maize yields and lower 
maize prices, then this may allow farmers to reduce the area under maize without compromising 
food security, making space for a legume rotation which would then allow them to reduce their 
reliance and expenditure on inorganic fertilisers (Snapp et al., 2010) while at the same time offering 
income and human nutrition benefits. If a crop is planted as a new sole crop then lost production of 
the other crop it replaces should be set against the incremental production (assuming land 
constraints) but the lack of information on this and small scale of the legume component in FISP 
suggest that there will be limited costs and benefits from this.  
 
Table 7.4 Estimated incremental production of legumes under yield and displacement assumptions 
Seed 
displacement 
Legume 
crop 
Seed supplied 
(MT) 
Yield kg/kg seed Incremental production 
Lower Higher Lower Higher 
30% Beans      6512 8 10 3,650  4,563  
 
Cow peas             41 40 60 1,138  1,707  
 
Groundnuts        1,867 8 10 10,455  13,068  
 
Soya  358 8 10 2,007  2,508  
 
Pigeon pea             56 40 110 2,240 4,299  
50% Beans      6512 8 10 2,607  3,259  
 
Cow peas             41 40 60    813  1,219  
 
Groundnuts        1,867 8 10 7,468  9,334  
 
Soya  358 8 10 1,433  1,792  
 
Pigeon pea             56 40 110 2,512  3,071  
 
7.2 Crop and beneficiary household returns 
Beneficiary households gain direct benefits from receipt of subsidised inputs in one of three 
different ways, depending on their use of the coupon and inputs: 
a. an immediate cash benefit if they sell the coupon or input,  
b. an immediate cash saving if the subsidised input displaces a full priced cash purchase they 
would otherwise make, or  
c. increased value of production if they use the input on their own farm  
The value of the benefit under (a) or (b) depends simply upon the price that they receive for selling 
the coupon or inputs under option (a) or upon the price they would have otherwise paid for the 
unsubsidised input under option (b), in each case adjusted for any buying and selling costs incurred.  
As noted in section 6, however, the majority of beneficiaries reported that they use the coupon to 
buy inputs which they then use in maize production on their farm.  
Table 7.5 sets out estimated net benefits and VCRs (Value Cost Ratios) for the adoption of different 
subsidised and unsubsidised inputs. Full details of the calculations are set out in Annex A. NUEs used 
are reduced by 20% from those estimated using the crop simulation model (as discussed in section 
7.1.4)16. Estimates are provided for different input adoption combinations, adding fertiliser to local 
maize, replacing local maize seed by OPV or hybrid maize seed on unfertilised or fertilised plots, or 
adding fertiliser and replacing local maize seed by OPV or hybrid maize seed (the full subsidy 
                                                          
16 Fertiliser prices are average Urea and 23:21:0 prices reported by FAM (Fertiliser Association of Malawi), 
unsubsidised seed prices are the prices paid by MoAFS to seed suppliers (and may therefore be a slight 
under-estimate),  fertiliser rates and subsidy redemption costs are calculated from the 2012/13 household 
survey, and wage rates from Lilongwe and Zomba surveys. Costs include transaction costs and incremental 
field and harvest labour. 
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package). Net benefits in MK/ha and VCRs are calculated with two maize prices, MK125 per  kg (the 
average 2013/14 maize price predicted by MVAC) and MK100 per kg, a lower price more likely to be 
achieved soon after harvest. Points of interest from table 7.5 include 
• All subsidised options yield extremely high VCRs, and for free OPV seed these are infinite;  
• For unsubsidised inputs VCRs for OPV or hybrid seed fertiliser are high, VCRs for fertiliser 
application are lower but still around or above 2 at a price of MK100/kg, and are a little 
higher with a price of MK125/kg - suggesting that the use of unsubsidised fertiliser is 
basically profitable on hybrid maize (a VCR of 2 is normally reckoned as the minimum 
required to make fertiliser application profitable enough for smallholder farmers).  
• A ‘subsidy pack’ of fertiliser applied at average rates provides a net incremental benefit to 
subsidy beneficiaries of a little under MK100,000 per ha on hybrid or OPV at a maize price of 
MK125 per kg and around half that on local maize. 1 bag of 23:21:0 and 1 bag of urea are 
enough for about 0.8ha of hybrid maize at average application rates reported in the 
household survey,  but 5 kg of seed is enough for only about 0.4ha at reported average 
hybrid seed rate. If some of the fertiliser is applied to this 0.4 ha of hybrid then the 
remainder would cover a little under 0.6 ha of local maize. Together this would then provide 
an incremental benefit to a beneficiary household a little under MK70,000 at a maize price 
of MK125 per kg (or around MK50,000 at a maize price of MK100 per kg) – or more if they 
bought more unsubsidised hybrid seed. These represent a gain of 500 kg or more of maize 
per beneficiary household, or 200 to 400 kg of maize for households getting one fertiliser 
coupon without or with a maize seed coupon. This will of course vary with local soil and 
rainfall conditions and with plot management (principally time of planting, weeding, and 
plant density).  
• All estimates take no account of possible post harvest losses. 
 
Table 7.5  Estimated net benefit and VCR of subsidised and unsubsidised inputs 
   
Subsidised inputs Unsubsidised inputs 
Maize price (MK/kg) 125 100 125 100 
 
Adoption From To 
Net 
benefit 
VCR 
Net 
benefit 
VCR 
Net 
benefit 
VCR 
Net 
benefit 
VCR 
Fertiliser 
Local no 
fertiliser 
Local & 
fertiliser 
47,185 65.8 35,098 52.6 22,042 2.3 9,955 1.9 
OPV seed 
Local no 
fertiliser 
OPV no 
fertiliser 
7,606 n.a. 5,795 n.a. 4,790 3.2 2,979 2.6 
Hybrid 
seed 
Local no 
fertiliser 
Hybrid 
no 
fertiliser 
24,216 111.1 18,388 88.9 17,265 4.0 11,437 3.2 
OPV seed 
Local & 
fertiliser 
OPV & 
fertiliser 
28,816 n.a. 21,955 n.a. 23,709 6.7 16,849 5.4 
Hybrid 
seed 
Local & 
fertiliser 
Hybrid & 
fertiliser 
57,265 187.2 43,543 
149.
8 
47,552 6.8 33,830 5.4 
OPV seed 
& 
fertiliser 
Local no 
fertiliser 
OPV & 
fertiliser 
80,060 86.2 59,913 68.9 43,620 2.7 23,472 2.1 
Hybrid 
seed & 
fertiliser 
Local no 
fertiliser 
Hybrid & 
fertiliser 
97,376 87.5 73,079 70.0 59,587 3.1 35,290 2.5 
Notes: Net benefit MK/ha 
VCR = Value to Cost Ratio 
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7.3 Food Security, Health and Education 
An immediate effect of the farm input subsidy programme on beneficiary household welfare should 
be to improve food availability and security at household level. Food security can also lead to 
medium and long-term benefits on health and education. In the absence of panel data, the effects of 
the subsidy programme are very difficult to infer as differences in the food security, health and 
education indicators between recipients and non-recipients of farm input subsidies may be the 
result of prior differences between the two groups (selection bias) and any impacts of subsidy 
receipt on beneficiary status are likely to take time and are difficult to detect in the year of subsidy 
implementation, Consideration of the effects of earlier subsidy receipt should be possible using 
methods such as propensity scoring, but this requires more time than is available for inclusion in this 
report. Nevertheless differences between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries were examined for 
various food security, health and education related variables in the data set, and we briefly report on 
this work here, recognising that it may tell us as more about targeting (effective targeting should 
lead beneficiaries having worse scores than non-beneficiaries) than it does about subsidy impacts.   
Several self-reported indicators are used to measure the food security, including adequacy of food 
production, adequacy in food consumption, food consumption and coping strategy indices. With 
regard to the incidence of smallholder farmers running out of own produced maize before the next 
harvest, it appears that households that report more receipt of subsidies in the past are more likely 
to report food shortages from own production. As noted above it is not possible without further 
work to determine from this the interactions between initial differences between the two groups 
and the impacts of subsidy receipt. 
Analysis of households’ perception of the adequacy of food consumption over the month and year 
preceding the time of interview suggest that households that have been recipients of subsidies in 
more seasons tend to report better food security outcomes than those that have received subsidies 
in fewer seasons. 
Differences in food security measured by two indices of food security were also investigated. The 
Food Consumption Score (FCS), following World Food Progamme (2008), was computed as a 
composite score based on dietary diversity, food frequency and relative nutritional importance of 
different food groups consumed in the household during the previous seven days. The higher the 
score the more food secure is the household. Following Maxwell and Caldwell (2008), the Coping 
Strategy Index (CSI) was computed as the frequency of use of coping strategies over the last year is 
combined with severity weights. The CSI is a proxy for household food security interpreted such that 
the higher the CSI the more a household has to cope, indicating greater food insecurity.  Strategies in 
the CSI include relying on less preferred foods, borrowing food or relying on friends and relatives, 
limiting portion sizes, restricting consumption by adults in favour of small children, and reducing the 
number of meals eaten per day. 
Analysis of FCS among households with greater or lesser past receipt of subsidies shows generally 
adequate scores and no clear differential pattern. This is not surprising with the survey taking place 
at harvest time, and tells us little about food security problems experienced at other times of the 
year. With respect to the CSI, however, there is a clear negative relationship between times of 
receiving subsidies and the CSI, suggesting that recipients are less likely to be food insecure.  
We further explored the relationships between farm input subsidy receipt and health and education 
using three indicators: incidence of illness in households in the past season, of under-5 illness, and of 
school attendance in households with school-going members. There is no clear relationship between 
the extent of subsidisation and the incidence of illness (averaging around 85%) or under-5 illness 
(averaging around 60%), With respect to school attendance rates, there is very little variation 
between households that have received more or  less subsidies in the past, with all groups reporting 
average rates between 80 and 85%.  
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7.4 Vulnerability and Shocks 
Poor households are susceptible to shocks and stresses. It is well documented that most shocks and 
stresses experienced by rural households in Malawi are agricultural related. These agricultural 
shocks may be in the form of crop/livestock failures or low yields, unexpected falls in produce prices 
and unexpected rises in food prices. However investigation of subsidy impacts on vulnerability and 
resilience to shocks faces the same challenges as those discussed earlier for food security, health 
and education.  
A high incidence of shocks (over 80%) is reported among rural households in the past 2 seasons. This 
is not surprising as this period coincided with the period of a major policy shift on exchange rate 
management with devaluation in May 2012 and eventual floatation of the Malawi Kwacha resulting 
in increases in general prices. No clear relationships with subsidy receipt are apparent except that 
the incidence of agricultural related shocks (averaging over 50%) appears to be somewhat lower 
among households that have received subsidized inputs in more seasons. 
7.5 FGD views on direct subsidy impacts 
Views expressed in FGDs on the direct subsidy impacts appear to be quite nuanced in drawing a 
distinction between food security and wider livelihood impacts.  
As regards the former, in discussion about possible graduation from the programme some 
participants likened reducing the number of recipients to committing murder, arguing that a 
reduction in the number of households receiving subsidized fertilizer and seeds would result in 
hunger in most parts of Malawi since they considered that most people survived on the little that 
they harvest using the subsidized inputs. Coupled with the poor rains and soils, they argued, not 
giving them subsidized fertilizer would result in serious hunger for many households. This suggests 
important production and food security benefits from FISP.  
There was also a view, however, that Impacts of the 2012/13 FISP program on people’s livelihoods 
are very small. Hardly noticeable impacts arise because amounts of inputs that people get are small, 
and this is exacerbated by their at times being forced to share the little they have with others. With 
population growth and stagnant beneficiary and coupon numbers it is impossible to notice any 
changes in people’s livelihoods, or on the community. It was also recognised, however, that impacts 
for the ultra-poor are very significant in that it enables them to harvest a little which they were not 
able to do without the programme. Such impacts are not, however, large,  in the sense that subsidy 
receipt reduces but does not by any means eliminate such people’s food insecurity problems.  
These nuanced views may be summarised and reconciled by recognising that although the amount 
of subsidy received by most people was too small to help them advance their livelihoods, by 
identifying the food security benefits of subsidised input receipt they implicitly recognised that it 
was helping them survive. In the terminology of livelihood dynamics this might be characterised as 
helping them hang in, but not step up or step out, which is of course their aspiration.  
As reported in FGDs in previous years, there were also comments in some places that the 
programme would have had a good impact on yield had the rains been favourable. Again, as in 
previous years, some considered that the programme benefits people who were already doing a 
little better,  because these people are able to buy coupons and subsidised fertilizers from the village 
head, and hence to harvest more.  
In Dedza it was indicated by men that the real beneficiaries were vendors because they bought 
subsidized fertilizer and resold it at higher prices. 
We return to these issues in the next section when we discuss FGD views on wider impacts of the 
programme.  
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8 Wider impacts 
Throughout this report a distinction has been made between direct impacts of the programme on 
beneficiaries and indirect impacts on the wider economy and hence on both beneficiaries and non-
beneficiaries. These wider impacts are set out in broad terms in the analytical framework to the 
evaluation set out in figure 1.1, and are caused by the secondary effects of direct impacts on labour, 
maize and other markets through changes in the supply and demand for labour and other goods and 
services. 
The relationship between direct and indirect impacts in the rural economy is set out in more detail in 
figure 8.1. This identifies three possible uses of the subsidy by subsidy recipients: reselling of 
coupons or of subsidized inputs, use of the inputs with displacement of otherwise unsubsidised 
purchases (effectively increasing the cash available to the recipient household), and incremental use 
of the inputs in production (the real purpose of the programme).  
In the first two cases the immediate income benefits should lead to a tightening of the labour 
market and a rise in wages, as poorer households hire out less labour (as their income from selling 
coupons allows them to hire out less ganyu to earn food) and an expansion of hired labour demand 
by less-poor households (who have more resources available to hire labour).Increased wages lead to 
immediate consumption gains to poorer households (recipients and non-recipients) and increased 
demand and growth in the wider rural economy should also benefit non-beneficiaries as well as 
subsidy beneficiaries.  
Impacts of a subsidy are also expected in the season following its implementation: if households 
have increased stocks of grain produced with the subsidy this should reduce the need for pre-
harvest purchases of grain by households with insufficient stored grain (lowering maize prices) and 
reduce the need for poorer households to hire out ganyu to earn cash and food (thus tightening the 
labour market and raising wages).  
 
Figure 8.1 Potential rural economy impacts of the FISP 
 
These indirect effects are very difficult to study. Macroeconomic effects (illustrated in figure 1.1) 
have been modelled with national CGE models by Buffie and Atolia (2009) and   by Arndt et al. 
(2013), and the latter also consider maize price impacts. Dorward and Chirwa (2011) introduce rural 
economy growth (or multiplier) effects into benefit cost analysis, but do not attempt to actually 
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estimate the scale of the effects. Dorward and Chirwa (2012b) attempt to model the local economy 
interactions more directly in a partial equilibrium simulation framework, with strong modelling of 
household behaviour but more rudimentary modelling of rural economy linkages. There have also 
been attempts to look at impacts of the FISP on wages, both qualitatively (in previous evaluation 
reports) and using econometric techniques (Ricker-Gilbert (2011) finds small but significant effects). 
In this section we introduce a new approach to examining rural economy wide effects and 
supplement this first with consideration of 2012/13 changes in maize markets and their implications 
for the FISP, and then with examination of wage rates.  
8.1 Local Economy-wide Impact Evaluation of the FISP
17
 
As noted above, the FISP has both direct and indirect impacts on Malawi’s rural economy. It directly 
impacts the households that receive input subsidies. If fertilizer subsidies induce farmers to use 
more fertilizer and stimulate production, the full income of beneficiary households rises. However 
these households also gain income if they sell their coupons or if subsidies displace private input 
purchases, as farmers pay less for the fertilizer that they would have applied anyway. Whether the 
FISP induces extra production or displaces existing input use, it indirectly injects a considerable 
amount of cash into local economies, with beneficiary households the channel through which this 
cash enters local economies. As FISP households then spend this cash, the program’s impacts spread 
to other households and businesses inside (and outside) the rural economy.  Where the FISP leads to 
higher maize production by beneficiary households, this may lower maize prices, benefiting all 
consumers, not just beneficiaries. 
8.1.1 The LEWIE Model 
To investigate these processes and the local economy effects of the FISP on household income and 
welfare of both beneficiary and non-beneficiary households, we use a local economy-wide impact 
evaluation (LEWIE) modeling approach. This makes it possible to not only simulate the FISP’s rural 
economy-wide impacts but also to understand what shapes these impacts and how complementary 
policies and programs might influence them. Our FISP LEWIE is based on the methodology 
developed by Taylor and Filipski (2014).18 
LEWIE nests models of FISP-beneficiary and non-beneficiary households within a model of the rural 
Malawi economy. Each household model reflects the dual nature of agricultural households as both 
producers and consumers of crops. The rural economy-wide model explicitly captures the linkages 
between these two household groups, for example, the FISP households’ demand for goods and 
inputs supplied by other FISP households or by households that do not receive the FISP subsidy.  
8.1.2 Data and Parameterization of the Model 
Our LEWIE model for rural Malawi and the individual household models constituting it were 
parameterized using data from the 2010-2011 Malawi Integrated Household Survey (IHS3). 
Econometric methods were used to estimate production functions and household-specific demand 
functions. These methods allow the estimation of both model parameters and their standard errors, 
giving the distribution of each parameter around its mean. Monte Carlo methods are then used to 
construct confidence bands around the simulation results. We also use sensitivity analysis to test the 
robustness of our results to alternative assumptions about how rural markets work. 
The baseline model represents a rural economy in which there is unemployed labor, with a highly 
elastic supply of labor so that that production can expand and employ labor without putting 
                                                          
17 The modelling and analysis reported in this section is the work of Karen Thorne and Ed Taylor.  
18See also (Thome et al., 2013) 
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significant upward pressure on wages. It also assumes that households face liquidity or seasonal 
credit constraints reducing their ability to afford the purchasing of inputs. The model then describes 
two effects of cheaper inputs from the FISP, increasing the profitability of their use and the 
affordability of their purchase. Initial prices of maize, other goods, and labor are initially set using 
information from IHS3 data, but then change within the model as result of changing interactions 
between local supply and demand stimulated by changes in production and cash stimulated by the 
FISP. National maize prices are assumed to be largely insulated from world markets. The baseline 
model then simulates the impact of a 75% reduction in input price for the FISP-beneficiary 
households. 
After simulating the impacts of the FISP using the baseline model, we test the robustness of our 
findings by repeating the simulation using a less constrained model, in which rural households do 
not face liquidity constraints. We also test whether the size of the FISP matters by simulating the 
impact of a smaller subsidy—25% instead of 75% of input prices. The purpose of this simulation is to 
explore whether diminishing returns to inputs substantially reduces the effectiveness of the FISP at 
raising production and incomes, and whether a scaled-back program might lead to a cheaper and 
more cost effective and efficient programme.   
8.1.3 Simulations and Results: Rural Economy-wide Impacts of the FISP 
Table 8.1 describes predicted impacts of the FISP on real incomes in rural Malawi, with the income 
effects of the FISP in the baseline model summarized in the first data column (the second and third 
columns present other models’ results and are discussed below). The model distinguishes between 
two types of benefit generated by FISP: higher income, principally for beneficiary households, and 
lower food prices, which benefit both beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. Changes in real incomes 
(cash incomes adjusted for prices) reflect both of these benefits. The baseline simulations find that 
the FISP generates a total real income multiplier of slightly more than MK 2 per MK of program cost, 
with a 90% confidence interval of MK 1.91 to 2.10. That is, each Kwacha of subsidy creates an 
additional Kwacha of spillovers. Most of this spillover—MK 0.63—accrues to the beneficiary 
households. That is, beneficiary households receive the Kwacha of subsidy plus an additional MK0.63 
in real income spillovers (from reduced maize prices and increased local business and employment 
opportunities). Nevertheless, the FISP also creates positive real income gains for non-beneficiaries, 
as well. Non-beneficiary households’ real income rises by MK 0.37 per MK of subsidy to beneficiary 
households. This finding highlights important positive impacts not documented by FISP evaluations 
that focus exclusively on the beneficiary households or ignore the effects of transfer benefits and 
their spillovers on beneficiaries. These estimates of spillover effects are higher than those estimated 
by Dorward and Chirwa (2012b) for both beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries, but show a similar 
relationship, with higher spillovers for non-beneficiaries.  
Table 8.2 sets out estimated production impacts from FISP, with the first column again presenting 
the results from the base model. Income multipliers are generated from FISP’s production impacts, 
which vary by sector and household group. FISP therefore has its largest impact on maize production 
with the real value of maize output increasing by 1.53 per Kwacha of subsidy in the baseline model. 
There are substantial positive effects on other sectors, for example other crops (0.95) and retail 
(0.20).  
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Table 8.1. Impacts of the FISP on Real Incomes in Rural Malawi 
Outcome 
Model 
BASE MODEL 
No Liquidity 
Constraint 
Lower Subsidy Rate 
Elasticity of Labor Supply 100 100 100 
Liquidity Constraint (1=yes) 1 0 1 
Subsidy Rate 0.75 0.75 0.25 
iterations 501 501 501 
MULTIPLIERS 
   
Total Real Income 2.01 2.04 1.15 
90% CI (  1.91-  2.10) (  1.94-  2.15) (  1.10-  1.21) 
By Household Group 
   
A: Beneficiaries 1.63 1.94 0.96 
B: Non-beneficiaries 0.37 0.1 0.19 
 
 
Table 8.2. Production Impacts of the FISP 
Outcome 
Model 
BASE MODEL 
No Liquidity 
Constraint 
Lower Subsidy Rate 
Production 
   
Maize 1.53 1.6 0.81 
90% CI (  1.37-  1.68) (  1.37-  1.83) (  0.73-  0.88) 
Ag Retail 0.05 0.04 0.02 
90% CI (  0.04-  0.06) (  0.03-  0.05) (  0.02-  0.03) 
Other Crops 0.95 0.96 0.53 
90% CI (  0.83-  1.08) (  0.83-  1.11) (  0.47-  0.60) 
Livestock 0.07 0.07 0.04 
90% CI (  0.04-  0.09) (  0.04-  0.10) (  0.03-  0.05) 
Retail 0.2 0.26 0.12 
90% CI (  0.14-  0.26) (  0.18-  0.34) (  0.08-  0.16) 
 
By stimulating input use, the FISP has a positive productive impact on the beneficiary households 
(see Table 8.3). Maize production by these households increases by MK2.24 per Kwacha of subsidy. 
Non-beneficiary households’ maize activity does not benefit from the FISP but is adversely affected 
by lower maize prices, and it must compete with beneficiary households for labor and other inputs. 
The simulations show a small but positive impact of FISP on wages, but the model’s structure means 
that this is likely to be an underestimate.  Non-beneficiary households’ maize production value 
therefore drops by MK0.71 per Kwacha transferred to beneficiary households. However non-
beneficiary households’ benefits from the higher consumption demand in the rural economy more 
than make up for this. The value of retail sales increases by MK0.2 per Kwacha of subsidy, and nearly 
all of this gain accrues to the non-beneficiary households.  
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Table 8.3.Production Impacts by Household Group 
Outcome 
Model 
BASE MODEL 
No Liquidity 
Constraint 
Lower Subsidy Rate 
Production Multiplier by Household Group 
Maize        
A : beneficiaries 2.24 3.15 1.23 
B: non beneficiaries -0.71 -1.55 -0.42 
Ag Retail  
A : beneficiaries 0.63 0.65 0.3 
B: non beneficiaries -0.58 -0.61 -0.28 
Other Crop         
A: beneficiaries 1.25 1.46 0.72 
B: non beneficiaries -0.3 -0.5 -0.19 
Livestock         
A: beneficiaries 0.07 0.07 0.04 
B: non beneficiaries 0 0 0 
Retail   
A: beneficiaries 0.01 0.01 0 
B: non beneficiaries 0.19 0.25 0.11 
 
 
We now turn to consider the alternative model specifications outlined earlier.  
The second data column in each table reports FISP multipliers when liquidity constraints are not 
present. The “No Liquidity Constraint” column reveals that real income and production effects are 
smaller—though only slightly so—if households are not liquidity constrained. This result suggests 
that as modeled the most important impact of FISP is via lower input prices rather than via a 
loosening of liquidity constraints on input purchases. This may be the result of a lack of 
differentiation in the model between poorer and less poor, more and less liquidity constrained 
households, or due to difficulties in modeling seasonal constraints, but it may nevertheless provide 
realistic estimates given the limited extent to which FISP is successful in targeting poorer 
households, as discussed in section 6. The largest difference between the baseline model and the 
model without liquidity constraints is in regard to maize production impacts (see table 8.2), for 
which the FISP multiplier is larger in the unconstrained model. Given that households must come up 
with the liquidity to purchase inputs (albeit at a subsidized rate), the subsidy stimulates crop 
production more when such constraints are not a major factor. However these results are likely to 
be sensitive to the scale of subsidy modelled, the specification of household typologies, and the 
ways that liquidity constraints and subsidy rationing are modeled.  
The third data column in each table presents multipliers from a very much scaled-back FISP, in which 
subsidies constitute a smaller share of input prices (25% instead of 75%). If there are sharply 
diminishing returns to inputs in crop production, we would expect the FISP multipliers to be larger 
for smaller subsidies as appears to be the case when comparing the 95% and 75% subsidies earlier. 
However our findings show the opposite here: the real income and production multipliers, it seems, 
would be uniformly smaller if the FISP were scaled back to cover a smaller share of input costs for 
beneficiary households. This is not surprising given the very low rates of modern input usage among 
Malawi farmers and the way that a subsidy has to be implemented at a large scale if its impacts on 
beneficiaries are going to have a substantial impact on the wider rural economy and on non- 
beneficiaries within that economy. This conclusion is likely to be strengthened by more accurate 
modeling of rationing and liquidity constraints in the model. However the benefits of reduced 
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government expenditure and ‘crowding out’ of government expenditure on other sectors or on 
other activities within agriculture are not allowed for. 
8.1.4 Summary 
The development and application of the LEWIE model to investigate economy wide impacts within 
the rural economy has yielded a number of important insights, demonstrating the potential 
importance and possible scale of these impacts, and teasing out their effects on different elements 
of the economy – maize production, production in other sectors, maize prices, and an increasing 
diversification of the economy. This supports arguments that the FISP has a potentially important   
role in driving wider growth within Malawi (see for example Chirwa and Dorward (2013a) or Chirwa 
et al. (2011a)) and points to the need for complementary policies that will support and extend FISP’s 
very significant positive potential for driving growth in rural areas and in the Malawian economy as a 
whole. It is also important for discussions about the future role and scale of the FISP. In this it 
complements the more country wide CGE analysis of the FISP, which also demonstrates positive 
spillovers, from a different perspective and using different methods.   
However, like all models (and as a model still being developed), it does not at present attempt to 
describe all elements of the Malawian rural economy that affect the way that FISP may impact 
different households and the interactions between them – such as seasonality of peak labour 
demands in crop production, subsidy rationing, liquidity constraints and wages; differentiation 
between   areas with different agro-ecological and socio-economic characteristics and structures 
(affecting for example maize productivity, land holdings, economic activity, poverty incidence, and 
labour markets); and differentiation between  household types within areas as regards land 
holdings, labour and dependency ratios, off farm income, and seasonal labour and liquidity 
constraints. Ideally further development of the model should address these issues, and there is also 
a need to investigate the sensitivity of findings to structural assumptions and specifications (for 
example supply elasticities, the maize production function, the endogenous determination of maize 
prices, different assumptions about liquidity constraints, and the impacts of allowing for some of the 
issues discussed above).  
A particularly important issue here is the assumption that maize prices are endogenously 
determined. In the past this appeared to reflect Malawi’s domestic prices normally lying between 
widely spaced import and export parity prices (except in years of exceptionally low production). 
Recent events, however, suggest that this is no longer the case. In the next section we therefore turn 
to examine the changing nature of the relationship between domestic and external prices, and their 
implications for FISP and more widely for the Malawian economy and the welfare of Malawians.  
8.2 Diversification 
One of the effects of increased maize productivity from greater use of improved maize seeds and of 
greater availability of legume seeds should be a process of diversification out of maize. Two different 
processes should be at work here: 
• increased maize productivity among beneficiaries should lead to reduced need to plant 
larger maize areas to achieve the same production, and  
• increased access to legume seed among beneficiaries should promote more legume 
cultivation through both greater access to seed and higher yielding seed (although there 
may also be some displacement of existing seed use).  
Lower maize prices relative to wages could also lead to wider processes of diversification if maize 
becomes relatively less profitable – though this would depend upon relative potential prices of and 
incomes from other crops – and as discussed later maize prices have also been affected by wider 
economic and other events. On the other hand falls in tobacco prices in some years might be 
expected to increase relative cultivation of maize.  
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Figure 8.2 Changes in estimated holding cropping patterns, 2004/5 to 2012/13 
 
Figure 8.2 shows cultivated holding sizes and areas per holding under different annual crops 
(specified as the most important crop in each plot) in ha and as % of holding19 as estimated from 
different nationally representative surveys in the period 2004/5 to 2012/1320.  
A number of points of interest may be noted from figure 8.2.  
a. There is an apparent trend for holding size to decline over the period of study, but the rate 
of decline suggested by IHS2 and the AISS and FISS survey is lower than would be expected 
from simple application of population growth rates, presumably as a result of some 
extension of cultivated area(the decline from IHS2 to IHS3 is considerably faster than this, 
perhaps linked to methodological changes in collection of data on plot and holding sizes); 
b. There is a clear trend of declining proportion of the holding under maize cultivation and in 
declining area under maize;   
c. The proportion of the holding under hybrid maize is, however, relatively constant, as is the 
area per holding under hybrid maize (although the area per holding may have fallen 
somewhat after 2006/7, and it should be noted that constant or small falls in area per 
holding may be occur even as the total national area increases, due to increasing numbers of 
holdings); 
d. There appears to be fairly consistent increases in the proportion of land main-cropped with 
legumes, principally groundnuts but also soya (intercrops also include beans, pigeon peas 
and cowpeas). 
e. The area under tobacco rises in 2008/9 and 2009/10 but then falls back in 2012/13.  
This pattern suggests that intensification of maize production is occurring, together with some 
diversification out of both maize and tobacco, consistent with FISP supporting such diversification. 
Evidence for FISP promoting diversification is provided by (Karamba, 2013) whose analysis of the 
IHS3 uses instrumental variables to isolate programme effects and finds thatreceipt of any form of 
subsidy voucher in 2009/10 “leads to a substantial decrease in the share of land allocated to maize, 
which suggests intensification in the production of maize” (op.cit., abstract). (Holden and Lunduka, 
                                                          
19 Cassava is included as an annual crop in line with data collection protocols used in IHS2 and in the AISP/FISP 
surveys. In IHS3 cassava was considered a tree crop, but the calculations in Figure 8.2 include cassava plots.  
20 Data points are referenced by the year of planting, with 2004/5 (including some 2003/4 plots) from IHS2, 
2006/7 and 2008/9 from AISS1 and AISS2, a second 2008/9 data point and 2009/10 from IHS3, and 2012/13 
from FISS4. FISS3 (2010/11) was not nationally representative. IHS3 data protocols were different from the 
protocols in other surveys and are therefore connected by different lines. All areas are farmer estimates.  
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2010b) also estimate that rising maize yields are associated with small falls in overall maize area and 
maize area share (with a net increase in maize production). (Chibwana et al., 2012), however, 
estimate positive correlations between subsidy receipt and maize and tobacco21 areas in a small 
study of 380 farmers intwo districts in Malawi. (Karamba, 2013)however suggests that the method 
used by (Chibwana et al., 2012) may produce inconsistent results with small samples. 
8.3 Maize markets 
An understanding of maize markets and prices is important to FISP for three main reasons: 
• One of the benefits from FISP should be  a fall in maize prices relative to the incomes of poor 
consumers, and this depends on maize prices and wages  
• The economic benefits from FISP depend upon maize prices, with high maize prices leading 
to higher estimated value of the increased output from FISP to producers, while falls in 
maize prices as a result of FISP are important benefits to consumers 
• Consequently  determining the prices to use in FISP benefit cost analysis is critical for 
estimating the economic returns to FISP 
These issues must be considered in the wider context of the importance of maize prices, relative to 
incomes, for poor Malawian consumers, many of whom are farmers, and for the Malawian economy 
as a whole.  
In this examination of maize markets and prices we consider the complex interplay of prices, 
production, market structures, and policy interventions. The section builds on a large literature on 
maize markets in Malawi, but suggests recent, on-going and rapid changes in the regional market 
context. These changes pose major challenges to the welfare of poor Malawian consumers, to 
household and national food security, and to Malawi Government policies regarding domestic prices 
and the FISP itself.  
8.3.1 Market structures and policies 
There is a long standing and extensive literature22 that describes changes in market policy in Malawi 
(notably regarding the role of ADMARC), the growth of market trading, and the extent of 
competition among maize buyers (and the extent of monopsony power exercised by ADMARC or its 
agents and by private traders). It is clear from this literature that there is significant correlation and 
interaction between markets, that there is increasing penetration of markets by maize buyers, and 
that mobile phone penetration is improving farmers’ marketing information and power – but this is 
still highly variable, and there are concerns about reliability of weighing scales and about pressures 
on farmers to sell to the first rather than the highest bidder. At the same time there has been 
declining ability of ADMARC to defend either minimum or maximum prices, due to frequent policy 
changes and cash flow constraints, but nevertheless fear among traders of risks in large scale 
imports or storage  as a result of government intervention in markets (through price setting or direct 
importation). Tschirley and Jayne (2010) and Ellis and Manda (2012) examine the consequent 
dysfunctional and self-perpetuating interactions between government and private traders in the 
face of fluctuating domestic production. These interactions tend to lead to delayed imports and 
excessive price swings and volatility. We suggest below that these interactions may also undermine 
the potential and fundamental benefits of the FISP in stabilising and lowering maize prices in the 
face of both normal seasonal variation between harvests and shocks affecting specific seasons – as a 
                                                          
21The study was based on data collected in 2009, when tobacco fertilisers were also subsidised alongside maize 
subsidies. 
22 See for example (Chirwa and Zakeyo, 2006; Dorward and Chirwa, 2010a; Ellis and Manda, 2012; Gabre-
Madhin et al., 2001; Kherallah and Govindan, 1999; Manda, 2010; Mapila et al., 2013; Meyers, 2008; 
Tschirley and Jayne, 2010; Zeller et al., 1998) 
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result of adverse rains, or policy or economic shocks such as major devaluations or government 
supported exports. The continuing vulnerability of poor Malawian farmers, the reliance of many on 
market purchases to top up their own meager production, and the need for many sellers of maize to 
sell quickly have not changed.  
While internal policies and market structures and conduct have been changing, external market 
conditions have also been changing, with rising maize prices among Malawi’s regional neighbours. 
World prices have risen and become more volatile since a large world price hike in 2008, while in 
addition to Zimbabwe’s earlier move from grain exporter to grain importer there is recent anecdotal 
evidence that rapid and massive growth in the coal industry in Tete, Mozambique, has created a new 
centre for food demand.  
8.3.2 Maize prices, imports and exports 
The interactive effects of external and internal trends, shocks and seasonal cycles can be seen by 
comparing domestic and regional prices. These are shown in figures 8.3 to 8.4 and in figure8.5 we 
compare these with available data on net imports and exports  
 
 
Figure 8.3 Monthly Malawi domestic prices in Malawi Kwacha and in US$ equivalents (at official 
exchange rates) 
Source: MoAFS monthly market price survey 
Figure 8.3 shows domestic monthly Malawi prices from 2000 to June 2013 averaged over the 
markets where the MoAFS monitors prices. The left hand panel shows current prices in Malawi 
Kwacha. Four features of the price series should be noted 
• There are four periods with price spikes: at the end of 2001/ early 2002, late 2005/ early 
2006, late 2008/ early 2009, and late 2012/ early 2013 – but the 2008/9 spike extends to 
2009/10, while the much greater 2012/13 spike is also preceded by a smaller one in 
2011/12. 
• There is a clear seasonal pattern of low prices after harvest in the middle of most years rising 
to the pre-harvest period early in the following year. 
• There is a steady rise in ‘base’ prices from 2000 to 2011. 
• The 2012/13 spike is quite exceptional with prices increasing by a factor of 6 in just a few 
months of rapid inflation and devaluation of the Kwacha. 
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Changes in the value of the Kwacha are allowed for in the right hand panel of figure 8.3, which 
shows the domestic maize prices of the left hand panel converted into US$ using current exchange 
rates each month. Some aspects of the pattern are similar (the four spikes and annual seasonal 
fluctuations) but others are markedly different – there is no steady rise in base prices and most 
strikingly the 2012/13 spike is lower than the other three, and very similar to a fifth, 2011/12, spike. 
Given that national 2012 maize production was not considered to be particularly low, despite local 
problems in a number of areas, this raises a question about the reason for the very high increases in 
domestic prices in 2012/13. We address this question below.    
First, however, we ask which of these price series and patterns is most relevant to different 
stakeholders, to policy, and to the FISP. The similarities across the two series are clearly of wide 
relevance. The role of dysfunctional interactions between policy and private traders/ importers in 
causing major spikes has been discussed above in terms of the analysis of Tschirley and Jayne (2010) 
and Ellis and Manda (2012). Traders’ mistrust is also likely to exacerbate seasonal fluctuations since 
it depresses the incentives for traders to invest in seasonal storage (in both facilities and in stock). 
These difficulties are made more problematic by the major difference between the two panels in 
figure 8.3, the extraordinarily high 2012/13 price spike in Kwacha terms, which is much lower in US$ 
terms. For Malawian consumers, Malawi Kwacha maize prices need to be compared with wages 
(Dorward, 2013) and, as shown later in section 8.3, wage rates did not rise much in Kwacha terms in 
2012/13. Malawian consumers therefore faced, and continue to face, very high real maize prices, as 
suggested in the left hand panel of figure 8.3. For maize traders, however, the US$ maize prices need 
to be compared with export parity prices to determine if exports will be profitable (that is cheaper 
than in neighbouring countries). Figure 8.4 therefore shows two different comparisons of Malawi 
domestic prices in US$ terms against regional prices which give some indication of export parity 
prices.   
 
Figure 8.4 Monthly Domestic and Regional prices in US$$ equivalents (at official exchange rates) 
Sources: MoAFS monthly market price survey; SAFEX; FEWSNet Monthly Price Watch 
 
The left hand panel of figure 8.4 shows Malawi domestic prices in US$ terms (as in the right hand 
panel of figure 8.3), and compares this with SAFEX prices. Two SAFEX price lines are shown, the 
upper line is the SAFEX price, the lower line the SAFEX price minus US$0.1/kg to represent the 
approximate costs of transporting maize from Malawi to South Africa. This has in the past been 
accepted as roughly representing the normal export price that can be achieved. Examination of this 
shows that it has in general risen over the period , with high prices in 2008 which fell back somewhat 
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in 2010, but not as low as 2000, 2001 and 2003 prices. This pattern largely reflects increasing and 
increasingly volatile global prices for maize.  The domestic Malawi price briefly fell below this ‘SAFEX-
0.1’ price in 2007 and again in 2012. This suggests that there were incentives for Malawian grain 
traders to export maize at these times. The graph also, however, recognises that minus US$0.1/kg 
transport costs may no longer be the appropriate export parity price for Malawi as countries in the 
region with maize deficits (such as Zimbabwe) face an import parity price of the SAFEX price plus 
transport costs from South Africa. Malawi’s consequent opportunity to export to these countries 
means that the export parity price should be somewhere around the SAFEX price. With this situation 
becoming increasingly prevalent from the mid-2000s, this suggests that while there were very 
limited if any incentives for exporting maize prior to 2007, there were substantial incentives in 2007, 
2011 and 201223.  
This then suggests an explanation for very high domestic price increases in 2012/13 if the 
devaluation of the Malawi Kwacha in mid-2012 led to domestic prices falling below export parity 
prices, and subsequent exports then sucked maize stocks out of Malawi leading to shortages later in 
the season. These export induced shortages then explain the high domestic prices in late 2012/early 
2013.  
This analysis is supported by examination of the right hand panel of figure 8.4 which shows prices  
collected by FEWSNet for Nampula, Lusaka and Tete (unfortunately only for the limited periods 
shown). No data are available for 2007, but while Nampula, Lusaka and Malawi prices were fairly 
similar from 2008 to 2010, this was not the case in mid-2011 and mid-2012 when Malawi prices fell 
below the other prices, again suggesting incentives to export.  
The analysis is also supported by examination of import and export data shown in figure 8.5. Here 
the left hand panel shows official annual maize trade statistics from 2000 to 2010, and the right 
hand panel shows informal monthly maize trade statistics for 2008 to early 2013. The left hand panel 
shows large maize exports in 2007 (following large imports in 2002 and to a lesser extent in 2005) 
while the right hand panel shows large net maize exports in mid-2010 and smaller net exports in 
2012/13 (when there was an export ban in place, which is likely to have led to both a reduction in 
exports and under reporting).  
 
Figure 8.5 Annual formal and monthly informal imports and exports 
Sources: FAOStat; FEWSNet 
                                                          
23 We do not present any information about possible exports and export parity prices to Kenya. 
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8.3.3 Policy challenges and options 
The situation outlined above, with changes in international and regional maize markets combining 
with the very large devaluation of the Malawi Kwacha to make the export of maize profitable 
despite very high Kwacha denominated prices for local consumer, poses severe policy challenges to 
the Malawi Government. These are well recognised, as shown, for example, by statements by the 
previous Minister of Agriculture in April 2013 that Malawi’s problem is that its maize prices are too 
low. The problem is particularly severe because of the lack of trust between private traders and 
government, and hence incentives for traders to export when maize is cheap in the post-harvest 
period rather than store it for domestic resale when prices rise later in the year. This then leads to 
even greater price swings and higher spikes in the following pre-harvest period – as shown by very 
high prices in 2007/8, 2011/12 and 2012/13 after low prices and exports in mid-2007, mid-2011 and 
mid-2012. The result is the paradoxical and damaging situation that a large harvest leads to 
immediate low prices that stimulate exports that in turn may lead to higher and very harmful prices 
later in the season. This is a serious problem not only for general welfare and growth in the 
economy, it also poses a specific problem for the FISP: if the FISP is supposed to raise production but 
much of the extra production is then exported at low prices and there is no benefit to Malawian 
consumers from low prices later in the year, then the benefits from FISP are largely captured by 
consumers outside Malawi, and the food security and growth returns to Malawi from the FISP are 
severely undermined.  
Policy options for addressing this problem are limited. The policy adopted by the government over 
many years has been to impose export bans.  This no doubt has some effect, but the porous borders 
between Malawi and its neighbours make it very difficult to enforce such a ban, and it is widely 
believed that there are still significant exports despite a ban. At the same time the imposition of 
export bans contributes to policy instability perceived by traders, particularly when such bans follow 
early announcements of export surpluses. The result is an increase both in mistrust of policy and in 
risks from investment – the problem discussed by Tschirley and Jayne (2010) and Ellis and Manda 
(2012). These authors suggest that this can be addressed by the establishment of long term ‘rules’ 
which state clearly  the conditions under which export bans and other policy interventions will be 
made: these rules must then be consistently implemented by policy makers – but this is not easy 
when maize prices are (rightly) an intensely political issue. A transparent system of export tariffs 
might address some of the difficulties of an export ban, but enforcement would still be a problem. 
However one issue that could be addressed immediately and that could help address the problem in 
the short term would be for government to develop a more transparent and independently 
verifiable system for estimating annual crop production, particularly of maize. A variety of options 
could be explored here, including combining the use of satellite and rainfall information with crop 
simulation modeling of the type discussed earlier in section 7.  
A specific option that should be considered is to examine ways that can actively provide incentives 
for traders to invest in domestic storage and stocks for later resale. This might be achieved by, for 
example, greater use of warehouse receipt systems and imaginative use of options and contracts for 
government to buy specified (and possibly bonded) maize stocks at a minimum price in the pre-
harvest period while allowing traders to sell these stocks domestically themselves on or after a 
specified date if local prices were higher. Such measures could provide traders with the incentive to 
engage in storage, act to reduce maize exports and stabilize seasonal maize prices, and work to build 
up a more effective and more efficient maize market system. They may also need to be 
accompanied by measures that will relieve credit constraints on traders and the consequent need to 
turn stocks over quickly. The development of such instruments is beyond the scope and expertise of 
this evaluation, but highly relevant to the ability of the FISP to deliver major benefits to the Malawi 
people and their economy.  
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Finally, government may itself engage in seasonal maize storage as part of its strategic grain reserve 
activities. Given the difficulties and very large costs involved in managing the SGR and the likely 
negative impacts on private incentives to enter the seasonal storage activities, it is likely to be much 
better for this to be entered into only as a means of supporting private sector engagement, rather 
than as a substitute for it.  
8.4 Labour markets 
As discussed earlier, one of the pathways through which the farm input subsidy can affect growth 
and poverty  is through effects on wages within the rural economy. In Malawi, ganyu labour is one 
important source of income for the poor and a common coping strategy for food deficit households. 
The household survey data revealed that about 24% of households that experienced food shortages 
from own production following the 2011 and 2012 harvests went for ganyu to earn income to 
purchase food. For such people an increase in the maize purchasing power of wages can help 
alleviate poverty and stimulate growth in the economy.  
Figure 8.5 shows ganyu wage trends and tobacco prices relative to maize prices based on household 
information on the prices experienced or observed at different time periods. Panel (a) shows a lot of 
price variability of maize prices across districts, but consistent patterns of change with July 2012 
prices much higher than July 2011 prices and January 2013 prices much higher than January 2012 
prices. January prices are also much higher than July prices.    In panel (b) tobacco prices also rose 
between July 2011 and July 2012, and relative to maize prices there was an increase in real tobacco 
prices.  
 
 
Figure 8.6 Average maize prices, tobacco prices and Ganyu wages 2011 - 2013 
Source: Computed by authors based on FISS4 
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Panel (c) of figure 8.6shows the ganyu wage developments with nominal price increases across all 
districts. The lowest wages were in Machinga while the highest wages were recorded in Blantyre and 
Lilongwe (reflecting likely urban effects). Panel (d) shows real ganyu wages measured in the amount 
of maize which could be purchased by the average daily wage incomes. There is a general decrease 
in real wages across the districts, with the exception of Karonga. Overall, there was an estimated 
22% decrease in real ganyu wages, with the highest decrease of 43% in Machinga. Such decreases in 
real wages undermine the effects of the subsidy on poverty reduction and rural economic growth. 
In the resident enumerator survey, data on labour markets were collected every month between 
November 2012 and April 2013 in Lilongwe and Zomba. Figure 8.7 shows the monthly money wages 
earned from ganyu by households in Lilongwe and Zomba. November was the month over which 
wage incomes were highest. However, wage incomes almost remained flat between December 2012 
and March 2013, which is also a lean period in terms of food availability in Malawi. Average daily 
ganyu wage rates have been increasing since December 2012, but despite this it appears that 
demand for ganyu labour was not readily available. This implies that households that had food 
shortages from their own production and rely on ganyu will have struggled during the lean season 
given the high maize prices, with negative consequences on their welfare.  
 
 
Figure 8.7 SeasonalGanyu wages in Lilongwe and Zomba, 2012 - 2013 
Source: Computed by authors based on RES Survey 
 
It is not possible to tease out the impacts of FISP on these wage rates. There is evidence that FISP 
has stimulated wage rate increases in the past, for the benefit of the poor (see for example  (Chirwa 
and Dorward, 2013a)) and it may be that the FISP has mitigated the fall in wages experienced as a 
result of wider changes in the Malawi economy, but it is not possible to demonstrate this.  
 
8.5 FGD views on wider, direct subsidy impacts 
Earlier discussion in section 7 of FGD views on the direct impacts of FISP suggested that they 
recognised immediate benefits from extra production by households receiving subsidy coupons. 
However the amount of subsidy received by most people was too small to help them advance their 
livelihoods  - or (In the terminology of livelihood dynamics)FISP helps them hang in, but not step up 
or step out. The people who are recognised as benefiting in a more dynamic way are the less poor or 
better off who are able to use their influence or resources to access more subsidised inputs, which 
then allow a greater increase in income wealth to allow further investment to step up or step out.  
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Views on the wider impacts of FISP reflect this understanding of the primary benefit of FISP in being 
its food security and hanging in benefits. However there is widespread concern that this is being 
undermined by the rapid population growth that Malawi is experiencing. The implications of this for 
national food security are discussed later in section 10.2.  
In an interesting parallel with the discussion above in section 8.2 on maize exports, the male FGD 
group in Mangochi commented that with regard to better off people who managed to get ahead by 
illegally getting more subsidised inputs, group participants were particularly concerned by the way 
that these better of subsidy recipients then sold the maize outside the area, depriving the  local 
community of greater availability of the much needed commodity. They complained ‘zikutipwete 
kachifukwa akakololanso amakagulitsa zokolorazo kutalio satimmudzi mommuno’:what bothers 
them is the fact that the produce is being shipped out of the community. 
Another matter of wider concern raised by some FGDs and also raised in previous studies is the 
negative impact that the programme has brought in some areas on community relations, that is 
relations both among community members and between them and their leaders.  
FGD with women in Phalombe mentioned the fact that they have new knowledge on how to 
cultivate maize using fertilizer because of the subsidy program. 
There was consensus among men and women FGDs in Machinga and Nkhotakota (men FGD) that 
cases of malnutrition among children have declined especially because of the inclusion of legumes 
(groundnuts) which they process into flour for porridge. 
9 Macroeconomic impacts 
The FISP continues to account for a significant share of the fiscal budget. In the 2012/13 budget 
funding to the FISP constituted 10% of the total fiscal budget and 60% of the Ministry of Agriculture 
budget (Government of Malawi, 2012) . This has fallen to 9% of the total fiscal budget and 47% of 
the Ministry of Agricultural budget in 2013/14 fiscal year  (Government of Malawi, 2013). Table 9.5 
presents some macroeconomic indicators between 2007 and 2012. Overall, the macroeconomic 
environment in 2012 was characterized by macroeconomic instability, partly owing to the 
devaluation of the Malawi Kwacha which had multiplier effects on other macroeconomic indicators. 
The agricultural sector grew at 6.7% in 2011, but it contracted by 2.3% in 2012. The reduction in 
agricultural growth in 2012 was attributed to decline in the production of maize and 
tobacco(Reserve Bank of Malawi, 2012). 
 
Table 9.1 Macroeconomic performance indicators, 2007 – 2012 (%) 
Indicator 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Real Agricultural Growth 
Real GDP Growth 
Inflation 
Deficit/GDP Ratio (after grants) 
Debt/GDP ratio 
12.3 
9.5 
7.9 
-1.6 
8.2 
11.8 
8.6 
8.7 
-7.8 
17.4 
10.4 
8.9 
8.4 
-8.2 
16.4 
6.6 
9.5 
7.4 
4.0 
16.3 
6.7 
3.8 
8.8 
-7.5 
15.9 
-2.3 
1.8 
21.3 
-6.5 
28.9 
Source: Reserve Bank of Malawi, Monthly Economic Review, April 2013 
 
The deteriorating performance of the agricultural sector is reflected in the decline in the growth rate 
of real domestic product from 3.8% in 2011 down to 1.8% in 2012. The economy also witnessed high 
price instability following a period of reported single digit inflation, with general prices rising by 
21.3% in 2012 compared to 8.8% reported in 2011. The fiscal balance deteriorated from a surplus of 
4% of gross domestic product to deficits of -7.5% in 2011 and -6.5% in 2012. Government borrowing 
also worsened to unsustainable levels from 15.9% in 2011 to 28.9% in 2012. The macroeconomic 
indicators in 2012 suggest that the FISP was implemented under harsh economic conditions 
compared to the previous years.  
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The extent to which the FISP has contributed to the macroeconomic instability is not clear, although 
evidently exchange rate reforms have been associated with high inflation. The programme makes 
heavy demands on the budget, with total expenditure of US$144 million or just under MK53 billion 
(see section 4.5 and Annex A1) at the expense of other sectors and activities, and, due to its large 
share of the budget, contributed to the deficits  outlined above. The payment of over MK40 billion of 
foreign exchange for fertilisers also put pressure on the countries’ foreign exchange reserves and on 
the value of the Malawi Kwacha. However this must be set against the possible need for spending of 
budgetary resources and foreign exchange on maize imports in the absence of FISP (discussed later 
in section 10.2), earning of foreign exchange from exports (despite the problems of maize exports 
discussed earlier in section 8.2) and direct donor support of MK6.4 billion, and the wider benefits to 
the country discussed in section 8.  Nonetheless, the scale of resources allocated to FISP in the 
context of these economic difficulties has generated public debate, rightly or wrongly, about the 
sustainability of the farm input subsidy programme. It is clear that efficient implementation of the 
programme has implications for the macroeconomy and is also affected by macroeconomic 
conditions.  
 
10 Benefit cost analysis 
In this section of the report we present estimates of the benefit cost ratio for the 2012/13 FISP and 
in this context also examine the contributions of the programme to national food security. 
10.1 Benefit cost analysis 
Benefit cost analysis, looking at both the overall returns to the programme in terms of its wider 
economic social costs and benefits and at the returns to government investment, has two main 
functions: 
a) it should allow comparison of returns to investment across different investment alternatives, 
and  
b) it should provide information on features of the programme which are particularly critical to 
programme returns and which therefore need particular attention in  programme design 
and implementation. 
Dorward and Chirwa (2011)and Chirwa and Dorward (2013a)review some of the challenges in 
applying benefit cost analysis to the FISP. These include difficulties in determining appropriate maize 
prices and estimates of incremental production, difficulties in estimating and allowing for the 
indirect impacts of the programme, and difficulties in establishing meaningful comparisons between 
returns to the FISP and other types of programme where different analytical methods and 
assumptions are used in estimating benefits and costs. The method adopted here builds on that 
developed and outlined in Dorward and Chirwa (2011), but utilises insights and new information 
presented in earlier sections of this report, together with specific information on the 
implementation, achievements and  outcomes of the 2012/13 programme24. In particular it draws on  
• Information on input disbursements and costs presented in section 4; 
• Information on coupon receipts presented in section 6; 
• Information on direct programme impacts in section 7, with new estimates of fertiliser 
responses, of incremental maize and legume production,  and of on farm costs and returns 
with subsidised inputs; 
                                                          
24 As in Dorward and Chirwa (2011) and Chirwa and Dorward (2013a) this separates out consumer and 
producer benefits (through estimates of consumer and producer surpluses) but ‘without subsidy’ prices are 
estimated using import parity prices  estimated from SAFEX forward prices with a transport mark up in 
recognition of the changed regional maize market situation described in section 8.3.2.  
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• Insights from the LEWIE modelling in section 8 as regards the application of economy wide 
multipliers; 
• The discussion - in section 8 of the changing relationship of Malawi domestic maize prices 
with international and regional prices 
• Household survey information on cropping patterns and input use not explicitly presented in 
the report 
Table 10.1 summarises the estimated economic costs and benefits of the programme. Costs are 
divided between programme costs and incremental farmer costs. Incremental production is taken 
from section 8, using the ‘middle of the range’ estimates. Farmer costs are based on the figures 
provided in Annex 2. Multipliers are applied as set out in Dorward and Chirwa (2011), with a 
multiplier of 1.4 applied to the estimated incremental consumer surplus, 1.3 applied to the 
incremental producer surplus, and 1.2 applied to non-rural costs.  The estimated returns are similar 
to those estimated in recent years (Chirwa and Dorward, 2013a; Dorward and Chirwa, 2012a), 
NUE(N) and hybrid maize benefits are a little higher as discussed in section 7, as are maize prices  
(with  high ‘with subsidy’ estimated domestic prices and the use of a SAFEX forward price, with a 
$100/MT transport mark-up, to give an import parity price of US$330/MT in the no-subsidy 
situation). The displacement and leakage figure (30%) is a little higher than in previous years, but this 
does not affect the BCR much, and has more impact on the NPV and Fiscal Efficiency (FE).  The use of 
multipliers boosts estimated returns, but evidence presented from the LEWIE model in section 8 
supports already strong arguments for their use(Chirwa and Dorward, 2013a; Dorward and Chirwa, 
2011).  
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Table 10.1 Estimated programme benefits, costs and returns  (US$ million) 
 
    
Before 
displace-
ment& leakage 
After 
displace-
ment& 
leakage 
With 
multipliers 
  
Incremental maize production (MT) 1,071,288  722,574  722,574    
Producer surplus, maize 349.69  234.62  305.00  (1.3) 
Consumer surplus, maize 3.27  3.45  4.83  (1.4) 
Producer net gain legumes 22.87  22.87  29.73  (1.3) 
Total Producer & Consumer gains 375.83  260.94  339.56    
  
   
  
Programme Cost summary 
 
      
  Fertilisers 123.23  86.26  
 
  
          less farmer contribution  (4.22)  (2.95) 
 
  
  Hybrid seed 8.34  4.17  
 
  
  OPV seed 2.33  1.16  
 
  
  Legume seed 4.89  4.89  
 
  
  Other programme costs 9.03  9.03  
 
  
  
Total programme costs 143.59  102.56  123.07  (1.2) 
  
   
  
Farmer Cost summary         
  OPV seed purchase payments                    -   
 
  
  Hybrid seed purchase payments 0.33  0.16  
 
  
  Fertiliser purchase payments 4.22  2.95  
 
  
  Fertiliser transport costs 5.06  3.54  
 
  
  Fertiliser procurement costs 2.11  1.48  
 
  
  Fertiliser application labour 5.06  3.54  
 
  
  Extra harvest labour 58.71  39.60  
 
  
  
Total farmer costs 75.48  51.27  66.66  (1.3) 
  
 
   
  
TOTAL COSTS 219.07           153.83  189.73    
  
 
   
  
Benefit Cost Ratio (BCR) 1.72  1.70  1.79    
Net Present Value (NPV) 156.75  107.10  149.84    
  Fiscal Efficiency (FE) 1.09  0.75  1.04    
 
These estimates suggest good economic benefits of FISP. However, as noted earlier, benefit cost 
analysis can also provide valuable information on issues that are critical for the achievement of high 
economic returns and should therefore be of interest in programme design and implementation.  
Figure 10.1 therefore shows the effects on programme returns from variation in five different 
variables and hence both show the sensitivity of estimates to the parameter estimates used and 
suggest ways in which the benefits, effectiveness and efficiency of FISP could be substantially 
improved.  
In the upper left panel we plot against the right hand axis the effects of rising fertiliser prices on BCR 
and Fiscal Efficiency (or FE, the ratio of NPV to fiscal costs), and  on the left the effects on NPV and 
programme costs. As would be expected, fertiliser prices have a major impact on all these measures 
of programme performance, with a doubling of price leading to a 70 to 80% increase in total costs, 
and substantial falls in fiscal efficiency (or economic returns to budgetary expenditure), in NPV, and 
in BCR.  
 93 
 
Turning to the upper right panel, high levels of displacement do not appear to reduce the BCR, but 
this is misleading as the calculation of the BCR ignores the costs of fertiliser that is displacing existing 
commercial purchases, treating it as a social transfer. However the falling NPV is being generated by 
a constant level of government expenditure, and the result is falling fiscal efficiency and reduced 
effectiveness of government expenditure in delivering social benefits. Reducing displacement and 
leakage for example through improved control and better targeting would therefore lead to 
significant improvements in programme effectiveness and efficiency.  
 
 
Figure 10.1 Effects of parameters on estimated economic benefits and returns from FISP 
 
Notes: Maize prices as a ratio of prices used in estimates in table 10.1.  
In the lower left panel the effects of increasing farmer contributions are examined. Assuming that it 
does not significantly affect farmer uptake and displacement or leakage, raising farmer contributions 
has little impact on the NPV or BCR, but it leads to falling programme costs and a dramatic increase 
in fiscal efficiency. However Holden and Lunduka (2013) estimate that a drop in subsidy in 2009/10 
from 90% to 70% would have led to a fall in the proportion of households willing to purchase 
subsidised fertiliser from approximately 85% to 70%.As noted earlier, raising farmer contributions 
may also reduce the value of the coupons and of subsidised inputs, and thus reduce criminal interest 
in and opportunities for corrupt acquisition of coupons.  
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The lower right panel of figure 10.1 shows the effects of changes in yield response to subsidised 
inputs with steady falls in FE, NPV and BCR. Increasing yields, of course, substantially improves 
programme achievements. Finally, the bottom panel shows the sensitivity of estimated returns to 
the programme to changing maize prices25. 
10.2 National food security 
The FISP medium term plans sets out the objectives of the FISP as being to ‘increase food security at 
household level through agricultural output growth’ by increasing agricultural productivity and input 
market development. Various sections of this report have examined achievements of different 
aspects of goals and purposes of FISP, including incremental production, domestic maize markets, 
and household food security.  The consideration of production impacts and domestic maize markets 
are particularly relevant to FISP’s contribution to national food security, but we have left explicit 
examination of national food security to the end of the report, after consideration of the overall 
economic analysis of the programme: discussion of food security contributions needs to be fully 
informed by prior discussion of these other issues, and is also relevant to the discussion of the 
programme’s economic contribution.  
The Malawi Government faces three broad options in attempting to promote national food security:  
• reliance on imports by the private sector,  
• maize importation by government itself, and  
• promotion of increased maize production for domestic consumption.  
As regards imports, a distinction may also be made between small scale importation to meet 
relatively small shortfalls in Malawi’s maize balance, and large scale imports to meet large deficits 
due to major production shortfalls. The former (small scale imports) have been common in the past, 
with a large volume of informal private sector imports (as shown earlier in figure 8.5), particularly 
into the southern region from Mozambique. However even with increased volumes supplemented 
by imports from Tanzania and Zambia these were not sufficient to prevent drastic maize price spikes  
in years following major production shortfalls, such as the 2001/2 and 2005/6 marketing years.  In 
such seasons much larger scale formal imports are needed from further afield than Malawi’s 
immediate neighbours. However as mentioned in the discussion of maize markets in section 8, there 
are systemic difficulties in government and private sector coordination in such large scale 
importation. While improved coordination between government and private sector importers, and 
increased roles of private importers, should be a long term policy goal, questions remain about how 
this should be achieved in the short term. There are also new challenges from two major changes 
affecting domestic supply and demand, changes that have not to our knowledge been properly 
considered in formal reports on and discussions about the impacts of the FISP. These are first the 
effects of rapid population growth on domestic consumption demand and second (as discussed 
earlier in section 8) emerging regional deficits of maize and the implications that this has for maize 
supplies and prices in Malawi.  
Figure 10.2 sets out estimated national production, consumption needs and deficits and surpluses 
from the 2001/2 marketing season to 2013/14. Consumption needs are estimated by multiplying the 
annual population by 193 kg maize per person, with population figures taken from the 2008 census 
reports and population projections. Production estimates are from annual MoAFS crop estimates for 
maize, but these have been adjusted downwards by 10% from the 2007/8 marketing season (2006/7 
production season) onwards to provide some allowance for likely over-estimates of production (as 
suggested by comparison of these estimates, discussed for example by Chirwa and Dorward (2013a). 
                                                          
25 This shows the effects of identical proportional increases in with and without subsidy prices. Increases in 
‘without subsidy’ prices raise both producer and consumer benefits from the subsidy, whereas increases in 
‘with subsidy’ prices raise producer benefits but reduce consumer benefits.  
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The domestic surplus or deficit is then calculated as the difference between production and 
consumption. There appears to be a clear division of the graph into two periods, before and after 
the beginning of the FISP (or AISP as it was initially called). Prior to the introduction of the FISP (or 
AISP) in 2005, estimated production was below estimated consumption with an annual deficit which 
in 2001/2 and 2005/6 were of crisis proportions. This was despite implementation of the smaller 
scale TIPS subsidy programme in these years (surpluses were estimated in the 1999/200 and 
2000/2001 marketing years, following seasons when the larger Starter Pack programme boosted 
production). From the 2006/7 marketing year, however, the situation appears to have changed, and 
apart from a very small deficit in the 2008/9 marketing year there are no years with estimated 
deficits. This pattern is supported by export and import figures presented earlier in figure 8.5. It 
suggests that FISP may have played an important role in reducing the need for imports. This can be 
investigated by trying to estimate what production and surpluses or deficits there might have been 
in the absence of FISP. Figure 10.3 presents such an estimation, with production represented by 
MoAFS estimates (adjusted as above) for each subsidy year less estimates of incremental subsidy 
production from previous evaluation studies. 
 
 
Figure 10.2 Estimated consumption, production and surplus/deficit by marketing year 
Sources: (National Statistics Office, 2008, 2009), MoAFS Crop Estimates. 
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Figure 10.3 Estimated consumption, production and surplus/deficit in the absence of subsidies by 
marketing year 
Sources: (National Statistics Office, 2008, 2009), MoAFS Crop Estimates, Evaluation studies. 
 
There is considerable uncertainty about the accuracy of these figures, but the general picture is clear 
– the estimated surpluses for the FISP years are wiped out in the ‘no FISP’ scenarios in figure 10.3 
and replaced by deficits: the programme is estimated to have saved an average of around 385,000 
MT of imports per year over its life and around 430,000 MT of imports in 2013/14. Given the 
concerns that the high maize prices in recent years may suggest MoAFS over-estimates of 
production in recent years, even with a 10% reduction allowed for figure 10.3 is more likely to 
under-estimate rather than over-estimate the extent to which deficits rather than surpluses would 
have been experienced without FISP. Put at it most simple, we may ask how maize production could 
have changed without FISP, to turn persistent pre-FISP deficits into surpluses while consumption 
demands are increasing with population growth of around 3% per year - giving (at constant per 
capita consumption) an increase in national demand of nearly 17% every five years and of 28% from 
2005/6 to 2013/14. 
This analysis suggests that the FISP has played a substantial role in promoting national food security 
in the past. The value of saved imports from the 2007/8 to 2013/14 market seasons is estimated at 
between 85% and 110% of FISP programme costs depending on the use of domestic or SAFEX import 
prices for valuing maize imports. This analysis does not allow on the one hand for (subsidised) sales 
income from imported maize sales or on the other for the benefits of households having more local 
access to maize, the dangers of reliance on often late imports, or the long term social, economic and 
health costs of periods of widespread food shortages and high prices. It also ignores the wider 
economic benefits from FISP discussed in section 8. However it must also be recognised that the 
emergence of a seasonal regional export market poses challenges to FISPs continued role in 
supporting national food security, if a large part of the surpluses it generates are exported. This, 
however, is a threat to national food security in either the presence or absence of FISP.   
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11 Summary and conclusions 
11.1 Evaluation methods 
This report aims to provide policy makers, technical staff and other interested stakeholders with 
information and analysis that will assist them to determine the overall value for money of 
investments in the FISP; its contributions to agricultural production, food security, and farmers’ and 
consumers’ welfare; and areas where design and implementation of the programme may be 
improved. The report uses information from a variety of sources, principally data on programme 
implementation from the Logistics Unit, a survey of input suppliers carried out in 12 districts in early 
2013, a nationally representative household survey including 2,000 households in 13 districts in May 
2013, supported by a ‘Community Survey’ in 100 sampled enumeration areas and Focus Group 
Discussions with male and female groups in sampled districts. A further sample survey of 120 
households in Lilongwe and Zomba districts was carried out from December 2012 to June 2013 to 
gather more information about cropping patterns and practices, yields and labour use. Data from 
the NSO 2010/11 Integrated Household Survey (IHS3) was analysed to gain information on maize 
cropping practices and yields and on FISP coupon access and use in the 2008/9 and 2009/10 seasons. 
Information was also made available to the team from nationwide on-farm trials investigating maize 
yields with different legume inter-crops and rates of inorganic fertiliser. 
Data from these different sources was brought together with information from maize crop 
simulation modelling (to examine smallholder maize yield responses to fertiliser use with local and 
hybrid seeds) and with the development of a model using an innovative Local Economy Wide 
Modelling Impact Evaluation (LEWIE) approach to examine the indirect benefits of the programme. 
In addition specific information was gathered from a variety of sources on domestic and regional 
maize prices in order to analyse recent structural market changes and their implications for Malawi 
and specifically for the effectiveness of the FISP in improving national food security and contributing 
to inclusive growth. 
11.2 Programme implementation and costs 
Drawing largely on data from the Logistics Unit weekly and annual reports, section 4 of the report 
presents a detailed analysis of programme implementation activities, achievements and costs.  
Given the size of the programme, implementation involves complex coordination of activities and 
stakeholders in order to meet critical seasonal deadlines aimed at maximizing the programme 
benefits. The 2012/13 FISP reached out to 1.5 million smallholder farm households out of 4.4 million 
registered farm households in rural Malawi. It involved distribution of more than 6 million coupons, 
over 3 million bags of fertilizers and nearly 3 million bags of seeds across the country whose road 
infrastructure poses a lot of challenges to reach to remote areas.  
As in previous seasons, the private sector was mainly responsible for the procurement of fertilizers 
to the programme through the tendering process, but did not participate in retail sales of subsidized 
fertilizers to farmers.  Different from previous seasons, the tendering and procurement were 
initiated earlier in the 2012/13 season, but the initial call was cancelled leading to subsequent delays 
resulting in tender awards in September. The delays in some ways resulted in large spreads in prices 
and some very high prices for fertilizers, some of which were also delivered in late November or 
December. The delays in tendering led to delays in the delivery of fertilizers to depots, although they 
seem to have helped averting storage problems experienced in previous years. It should be noted, 
however, that the fundamental storage and transport constraints evident in previous years have not 
gone away, and solutions involving for example much earlier delivery, distribution and redemption, 
and the involvement of the private sector in these processes need to be considered. Nonetheless, 
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uplifts to unit markets were similar to previous seasons but limited uplifts by the end of October are 
a matter of concern for early planting and fertiliser application. 
A new issue that arose in 2012/13, or at least arose at a much greater scale than in the previous 
seasons, concerns the theft of fertiliser during transport from depots to markets. This needs to be 
addressed through improved vetting of transporters prior to the award of transport contracts, and 
through better procedures for monitoring stock from the depots through transport to market sale. 
The ESOKO pilot shows promise but also highlights issues that need to be addressed regarding staff 
and management commitment and mobile phone coverage and use. 
The delays in payment of invoices from fertilizer and seed suppliers constitute a significant risk for 
the private sector, with the potential to influence future pricing of tenders especially when 
government builds a reputation of inefficiency in payment systems. Given the very large proportion 
of programme costs accounted for by fertiliser procurement, any improvements in tendering and 
other payment processes that can reduce fertiliser prices have the potential to significantly reduce 
overall programme costs. 
As for the last four years, the programme is to be commended for its adherence to budgeted costs. 
As noted above, however, there should be opportunities for reducing costs of fertiliser with more 
streamlined and tighter tendering. In addition, the cost of the programme can also be reduced by 
raising farmer contributions (reducing the value of the subsidy). While the prices of fertilizers have 
risen over time, the farmer contribution has remained the same in nominal terms and as a 
proportion of the cost of delivered fertiliser it has fallen from 35% in 2005/6 to 3% in 2012/13. With 
the falling value of the Malawi Kwacha, holding the farmer contribution constant increases fertiliser 
costs for government and hence overall programme costs. Raising farmer contributions may also 
reduce benefits and hence incentives for criminal activity around the theft of coupons but will make 
it more difficult for the poorest beneficiaries to redeem their coupons.  
Issues regarding the targeting of beneficiaries, access to coupons, redemption processes and farmer 
choice in seed types and varieties are critical for achieving programme objectives.  We note, 
however, continued achievements in promoting access to legume seed, but also constraints on the 
supply of some seeds. 
11.3 Input supply systems and the private sector 
Section 5 of the report presents an analysis of information collected from a survey of input suppliers 
in early 2013, linking this, where appropriate, to information about programme implementation 
from section 4.  
The input supply system comprises distributors/importers, ADMARC/SFFRFM, independent Agro-
Dealers and other wholesale shops and cooperatives. The sector is fragmented into all season 
operators, seasonal operators and intermittent operators accounting for 38%, 57% and 6%, 
respectively. The seasonal suppliers target rain-fed cultivation, and most of the agro-dealers fall in 
this category. Most distributors/importers operate throughout the year and on average create 4.7 
paid jobs per outlet while agro-dealers create 1.7 paid jobs per outlet. The average number of 
months that suppliers operate their businesses is 6.8 months.  Distributors and agro-dealers sell a 
diversified range of goods in addition to agricultural inputs, including sale of maize, groceries and 
building materials, all of which are important in the rural economy. 
Independent agro-dealers play important roles in making seeds of different kinds accessible to 
farmers, but play a much lower role in the fertiliser market, their exclusion from the retail of 
fertilizers under the subsidy programme being a major cause of this. ADMARC and SFFRFM tend to 
specialize in fertilizers and fewer outlets reported having maize seed stocks in 2012/13.  While the 
bulk of seeds sales were for maize, the availability of legume seeds remained problematic and highly 
variable among the suppliers. 
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Most of the fertilizer stocks carried forward from 2011/12 and acquisitions in 2012/13 were sold 
within the season across all the types of the suppliers. Nonetheless, on average, 29 tonnes remained 
at the end of the season among distributor/importer outlets compared with only 2.8 tonnes in 
ADMARC/SFFRFM. Most of the seed sales were under the subsidy programme, with very few 
suppliers indicating that their customers were also buying commercial seeds at the same time as 
they were redeeming the seed coupons. 
Hybrid maize seeds were the most stocked seeds among suppliers and also tended to be the most 
sold seeds under the subsidy programme, with 81% of hybrids sold using coupons compared to 92% 
of OPV maize seeds and more than 97.5% of legume seeds.  The most popular hybrid varieties were 
SC 403, DKC 8053, MH26 and PAN 53, with SC403 being the most wanted variety by farmers. ZM 623 
and ZM 621were the most popular OPV variety with farmers and ZM623 turned out to be the most 
wanted variety by farmers. 
The seed market remains highly concentrated in terms of varieties and seed producers. For instance, 
82% of seed for the most popular OPV varieties came from two seed producers and 77% of seed for 
most popular hybrid varieties came from two firms. The market concentration levels are high, such a 
structure offers limited choice to farmers and may not result in competitive seed pricing. There is 
also high concentration of suppliers in the upstream market, although there had been a marginal 
increase in the number of competitors at local level. 
There was a general problem of stock outs of preferred seeds and fertilisers, and long queues across 
supplier type. The majority of suppliers (more than 75%) reported some days without stocks of 
preferred seeds and at least 49% reported some days with long queues of farmers, independent of 
supplier type. 
The subsidy programme appears to have both promotional and displacement effects. Most suppliers 
attributed any business contraction to the subsidy programme. There were mixed ratings of the seed 
and fertilizer subsidy system among the suppliers, with the private sector being more positive about 
the seed system but being more negative about the fertilizer subsidy system. However, there has 
been some growth in number of outlets, particularly among distributors/importers and agro-dealers 
with 43% and 40% indicating expansion, respectively. More agro-dealers (41%) reported increase 
than decreases (38%) in the sale of commercial fertilizers in the past 5 seasons compared to 38% of 
distributors experiencing an increase and 56% a decrease in commercial sales of fertilizers. 
Although some of the suppliers attributed the contraction of their input business to the subsidy 
programme, most of suppliers’ comments were on improvements to the current system, including 
increasing the number of beneficiaries for seeds, increasing the number of beneficiaries for 
fertilizers (more from respondents at parastatal outlets but less so from private sector respondents), 
earlier implementation of the programme, and allowing the private sector to retail subsidized 
fertilizers (the dominant view among the private sector respondents). 
11.4 Access to and use of coupons and inputs 
Information on farm household’s access to and use of coupons and inputs is derived largely from a 
nationally representative household survey conducted in May/June 2013, and an analysis of this 
information is presented in section 6 of the report. This is supplemented where appropriate with 
information from Logistics Unit reports (as presented in section 4) and from focus group discussions 
with rural people and a ‘community survey’ with local leaders in 13 districts. Findings are compared 
with the findings of previous reports.  
The coupon allocation and distribution systems have not changed much in the past few seasons. At 
programme level, in 2008/9 one innovation was the use of open meetings during the registration 
and distribution of coupons. In the 2012/13 season, another innovation was to make available the 
list of beneficiaries within the communities in order to improve transparency and accountability. The 
lists of beneficiaries were expected to be publicly available. Other innovations at a local level are 
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more focussed on coupon redemption processes and include establishment or market committees 
and organisation of redemption by villages on specific days. 
Although the proportion of rural households receiving coupons has risen over time, the number of 
coupons received per household declined in 2012/13 compared to the previous seasons, suggesting 
increasing sharing of coupons particularly in the southern and central regions of Malawi. The 
average number of coupons received by households in the northern region has remained fairly 
stable averaging above 1.5 compared to averages below 1.5 and nearly 1 in the central and southern 
regions respectively. 
Survey estimates of total coupon receipts derived from national population data collected by NSO 
suggest that a significant number of coupons did not reach rural households, with 37% of fertilizer 
coupons, 32% of maize seed coupons and 48% of legume seed coupons ‘unaccounted for’ in 
comparisons of total coupons supplied and estimated household receipts. These estimates are 
similar to those obtained in previous surveys. If farm families registration data collected by the 
Ministry of Agriculture are used, for which there are more incentives for households to split, the 
estimate of coupons reaching rural households is greater than the number of issued coupons. It is 
important that reasons for discrepancies between the numbers of farm families and rural 
households be resolved in order to demonstrate the probity of the programme and/or identify and 
eliminate theft and leakages of coupons, garner policy and public support for the programme, and 
ensure that policy decision and programme designs are based on a reliable understanding of the 
number and nature of smallholder farmers.  
Targeting of coupons remains a critical issue in the implementation of the FISP. As has been the case 
in previous studies an increasing proportion of households that receive coupons receive 1 or less 
coupons and this is particularly the case in the south and the centre. Nationally, survey estimates 
suggest that 40% of the rural population did not receive coupons, 41% received 1 or less coupons 
and only 18% received more than 1 coupon in the 2012/13 season. In addition, although all 
categories of households are likely to receive coupons, poor and vulnerable households, young 
households and female headed households tend to receive less. The analysis also suggests that the 
redistribution of coupons that take place in the communities occurs among poor households while 
better-off beneficiary households tend to keep their two coupons. 
Although the beneficiary list has more female headed households, the survey results suggest that 
male headed households are dominant recipients but the gender imbalance of recipients is less 
pronounced, suggesting that in a substantial proportion of male headed households female 
members were the recipients of coupons. 
While open meetings are widely used in allocation and distribution of coupons, the results from the 
survey suggests that most such meetings do not empower communities to make decisions in the 
allocation and distribution of coupons. Instead the open meetings are widely used to inform the 
communities of coupon allocation decisions already made by the village head or traditional 
authority. This suggests that the targeting of beneficiaries is prone to biases that are inconsistent 
with the targeting criteria. Similarly, while 30% of the respondent households were aware of the 
availability of the beneficiary list at mainly the village head’s house, only 10% of these reported that 
a member of the household had actually seen the list of beneficiaries, and most of these had seen 
the name of a household member on the list. 
In terms of the confidence in the coupon allocation and distribution systems in 2012/13 compared 
with the previous years, the perceptions are that the number of coupons is declining relative to the 
number of potential beneficiaries, there is indifference regarding changes in the coupon distribution 
methods, and there is a decrease in the rating of the timing of coupon distribution. Targeting the 
poor with 100 kg of fertilizers or targeting all households with 50 kg of fertilizers are preferred and 
ranked the same, with the ranking improving over the 2010/11 figures. With increasing sharing of 
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coupons already taking place, providing 50 kg of fertilizers to all rural households is seen by many as 
a fair system. 
As reported in previous studies, approximately 1% of respondents reported that fertilizer coupons 
were obtained after paying some money, mainly to traditional leaders, agricultural staff members 
and traders. However sensitivities in getting such information mean this is likely to be an under-
estimate. Such payments varied considerably, but on average MK600 was paid per coupon. As 
reported in previous studies, most of the coupons were used to purchase fertilizers, with very few 
coupons (5% of fertilizers, 2% of maize seeds and 6% of legume seed) being sold or not used by the 
farmers. One of the reasons for not using the coupons was lack of inputs at stockists, as also 
reported from the input supplier survey. 
Some redemption of coupons required farmers to ‘pay tips’ for redemption of fertilizer coupon 
above the official price of MK500 per bag and such extra payments were in the region of MK30 – 
MK4,500 with a median of MK1050. The incidence of such extra payments was lower in the northern 
region than in the central and southern regions. 
Hybrid maize seeds tend to dominate on the types of maize seeds obtained with a coupon, 
accounting for 87% of the reported redemptions with the remainder being OPV maize seeds. With 
regard to legumes, groundnuts had the highest proportion redeemed and cow peas and pigeon peas 
had the lowest redemption rate. Some of these redemption outcomes may be determined by the 
availability of the types of seeds at the retail supplier rather than by farmer choice, with the supplier 
survey also showing variations in the stock levels for hybrid maize seeds (dominant) and limited 
stocks of legume seeds. However, most farmers got the type of inputs they wanted, except that 
about 27% who wanted hybrid maize seeds were forced to opt for OPV maize seeds. Two maize seed 
types dominated redemption, SC403 and SC627 produced by one company, accounting for 57% of 
the market share although these also tended to be the most preferred varieties among 63% of the 
farmers.  The dominant structure of the seed system is also reflected in the seed stocks carried by 
various input suppliers. It is not known whether this is a result of farmers’ choice or the aggressive 
marketing strategies of the seed producer. 
Beneficiaries face a variety of problems in the redemption of vouchers and these problems are more 
pronounced with respect to fertilizer vouchers. The most reported problems in fertilizer voucher 
redemption at ADMARC or SFFRFM outlets are long queues (reported by 47% of beneficiaries) and 
queue jumping (40%), long distances and vendors (30% each), input shortages  and slow service 
(30% each). Demands for ‘tips’, abusive language, and gender-based violence were reported more 
among ADMARC outlets (22%, 11% and 8%  respectively) than among SFFRFM outlets (8%, 3% and 
0%, respectively). With respect to maize seed voucher redemption, the problems were more 
pronounced among ADMARC/SFFRFM outlets than private sector outlets (long queues for example 
being reported respectively by 31% and 11% of beneficiaries). 
Most of the inputs (97% of fertilizers, 96% of hybrid maize, and 89% of OPV seeds) procured using 
coupons were used on beneficiaries own gardens, with only 1% of subsidized fertilizers sold. All of 
the fertilizers were reported to have been used on maize gardens. 
There is increasing evidence that the current extension system is not reaching out to the farmers 
and this has the potential to undermine the benefits of the programme. Extension services are one 
of the complementary programmes that can enhance the production impacts of the FISP. The results 
suggest that only 11% of the farmers in 2012/13 compared to 14% in 2006/07 and 13% in 2010/11 
received advice from field assistants. The low reported access to advice and apparent deterioration 
of access to technical advice over time calls for a serious review of the suitability of the demand-
driven extension system in the smallholder farmer agricultural system in Malawi. 
There appears to be limited demand for other (non-maize) inputs to be provided under subsidy.  
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11.5 Direct impact of the FISP 
FISP generates benefits to beneficiaries and more widely through increased production of maize and 
legumes as a result of increased use of subsidised certified seeds and inorganic fertiliser inputs. 
Estimation of the productivity of these inputs on Malawi’s smallholder farms is critical for the 
estimation of the impacts of the FISP, but previous evaluation and other studies have failed to 
deliver reliable information on this critical issue.  
Analysis of IHS3 survey data on crop management and yields suggests that it is not possible to use 
crop survey data to obtain reliable and unbiased estimates of yield responses to inorganic fertiliser 
and the use of improved seeds. It also explains the inconsistency in different studies’ estimates of 
these yield responses. An alternative approach for investigating smallholder maize yield responses 
was developed, using physiological crop yield simulation models. A model was developed and 
calibrated to describe the growth of hybrid and local maize on four Malawian soils with different 
management practices, and yields were then simulated for different rainfall conditions (derived from 
long term rainfall records) and different smallholder management practices (derived from 2012/13 
household survey data). The results were used to estimate a regression model linking yields to 
management practices.  This model was then linked to 2012/13 household survey data to allow 
estimation of the incremental production impacts of incremental smallholder subsidy use.  
The Nutrient Utilisation Efficiencies (NUEs) estimated in this way are a little higher than those used 
in the past.  Some upward bias in estimates is expected (as a result of patchy rainfall, soil variability, 
and pests and diseases on smallholder farms).  Once some allowance is made for this, estimated 
NUEs for subsidised fertiliser use under average management conditions on plots without any other 
fertiliser applications are approximately 19 and 14.4 kg grain per kg N for hybrid and local maize 
varieties respectively. These are supplemented by NUEs for phosphate application of approximately 
1.1 and 3.3 kg grain per kg P2O5, although phosphate responses vary with soil type. A switch from 
local to hybrid maize is estimated to yield 18 kg of grain yield per kg of seed irrespective of further 
gains from fertiliser application. These fertiliser responses are somewhat higher than the rules of 
thumb used in previous evaluations: NUE(N) of 18 and 12 kg grain per kg N for hybrid and local 
maize varieties respectively, no extra allowance for responses to  P2O5, plus 16kg kg of grain yield per 
kg of hybrid seed. This leads to an estimate of 1.1 million tonnes of incremental maize production 
from the 2012/13 before displacement of any inputs (that is assuming that all of the subsidised 
fertiliser and maize seed sales are used by smallholders who would not have bought unsubsidised 
inputs in the absence of the subsidy).  This is considerably higher than estimates of incremental 
production in previous years. This estimate falls, however, to over 722,000MT if allowance is made 
for a higher rate of seed and fertiliser displacement and leakage (based on past estimates of seed 
and fertiliser displacement rates and allowing for higher rates of leakage given discrepancies 
between official input sales and survey estimates of coupon receipt). Incremental legume 
production is estimated at a little over 32,000MT, mainly groundnuts.  
Analysis of the maize crop yield simulation model results also reiterates the importance of timely 
planting of maize, timely weeding, and high plant populations for raising yield responses and hence 
returns to the use of subsidised fertiliser. This means that there is potential for substantial increases 
in incremental production and in the programme benefits if coupon and fertiliser distribution and 
input sales can be completed before the start of the planting season, and also suggests an important 
extension role in helping farmers to get more out of their inputs.  
 Estimates of net direct incremental benefits to beneficiaries from subsidised fertiliser and maize 
seed inputs are estimated to be between MK50,000 and MK70,000 per subsidy pack depending 
upon maize prices, or around 500 kg of incremental maize, if all input use is incremental. This will of 
course vary with local soil and rainfall conditions and with plot management (principally time of 
planting, weeding, and plant density). All calculations take no account of possible post harvest 
losses.  
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It has not been possible to investigate possible subsidy impacts on beneficiaries’ food security, 
health or education without analysis of panel data, which is not available.  
Important insights on programme impacts were provided from Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) with 
male and female groups in each district. There are widespread views that the programme helps poor 
people with problems of food insecurity, indeed plays a critical role in this, but the scale of the 
programme (both the number of beneficiaries in each locality and the number of coupons received 
per beneficiary) is not large enough to overcome problems of food insecurity and allow people to 
advance their livelihoods. This may be characterised as helping people to ‘hang in’ but not ‘step up’ 
or ‘step out’. Population growth plays a critical role here as the number of coupons and the amount 
of inputs disbursed in 2012/13 is roughly the same as in 2005/6, but the population has increased 
substantially since then (by around 24%). This not only reduces the number of coupons and amount 
of inputs available per person or household (as recognised by FGD members) but does this in a 
context where there are increasing pressures on land and other resources.  
11.6 Wider, indirect impacts of the FISP 
Wider indirect impacts of the FISP should arise as a result of increased supply of maize and 
consequent lower maize prices, reduced supply of and increased demand for labour and consequent 
higher wages, and consequent increased incomes and expenditure stimulating growth and 
diversification in the rural economy. Such processes are very difficult to demonstrate empirically. A 
novel Local Economy Wide Impact Evaluation (LEWIE) model was constructed using IHS3 data and 
initial application suggests that there should be substantial wider benefits from the FISP beyond 
direct production and income benefits, and that these accrue to both beneficiaries and non-
beneficiaries. Alternative model simulations also suggest that a large scale subsidy is important for 
the achievement of these benefits, which would be reduced if the programme were to be scaled 
down. There is potential for further development of the model to provide more robust and detailed 
information about the nature and scale of these wider benefits and about the factors that affect 
them. 
We do know, however, that the behaviour of maize markets is critical for these wider benefits, as a 
major expected benefit of FISP is its promotion of low and stable maize prices relative to incomes of 
the poor in the medium and long term. However, maize prices have not been stable and have 
trended upwards and spiked in recent times, both in Malawi Kwacha and US dollar terms. Although 
the number of buyers has increased and there is better, albeit variable, market information, the 
changing market structure has not resulted in competitive pricing of maize. In addition, owing to 
liquidity constraints, ADMARC has increasingly been unable to defend either minimum or maximum 
prices. The maize price swings in some cases have offered incentives to traders to export some 
maize as domestic maize prices have fallen below export parity prices, particularly in 2007, 2011 and 
2012. Such exports have occurred notwithstanding the existence of export bans on maize, 
suggesting the need for policy instruments that provide a win-win solution to the private sector and 
government in ensuring low and more stable prices to maize consumers. This is a major challenge, 
and some suggestions are made regarding specific policy options.  
Labour markets, where FISP again has the potential to drive important indirect benefits for the poor, 
have also been adversely affected by recent macroeconomic conditions with the devaluation of the 
Malawi Kwacha and rapid inflation. Household survey Information indicates that real wages 
(measured against maize prices) fell by around 22% from January 2012 to January 2013. It is not 
possible to determine if the FISP has played any role mitigating this fall in wages (so that wages 
would have fallen by more in its absence).  
As with the consideration of the direct impacts of FISP, valuable insights on indirect programme 
impacts were provided from Focus Group Discussions (FGDs). These reiterated the concern that FISP 
does not appear to be driving any wider livelihood changes: the absence of positive change is very 
visible, but it is not possible for people  to see ways in which it may be providing some protection 
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against or mitigation of the negative effects of macroeconomic shocks and rapid population growth. 
There are however concerns that competition for and arguments over access to coupons and inputs 
leads to tensions within communities and sours relations in various ways. There are also concerns 
that those who benefit the most are often more powerful and less scrupulous people who do not 
then share the wider benefits of subsidy receipt (such as increased maize for local sale) within the 
community.  
11.7 Macroeconomic impacts 
In the last two years Malawi has faced well known and severe macroeconomic challenges. The FISP 
makes large demands on scarce government and foreign exchange resources. However it also plays 
important roles in maize production and national food security, and reduces the need for 
government expenditure and use of foreign exchange for maize imports which would be needed in 
its absence. It is not possible to determine the programme’s macroeconomic impacts. It is, however, 
clear that efficient implementation of the FISP is important in for Malawi’s macroeconomic situation, 
and that the FISP is severely affected by adverse macroeconomic conditions and currency 
devaluation.  
11.8 Benefit cost analysis and national food security 
Benefit cost analysis has two main functions, investigation of the value of the programme as 
compared with alternative uses of resources, and identification of features of the programme critical 
for effective and efficient achievement of its objectives. A Benefit Cost Ratio (BCR) of 1.7 is 
estimated from direct impacts only, and this rises to 1.8 with (conservative) allowance for wider 
indirect benefits. Fiscal efficiency (the ratio of net economic benefits to government expenditure) is 
estimated at 0.75 for direct benefits and 1.04 including indirect benefits.  These estimates are 
however sensitive to maize prices, incremental maize productivity, and fertiliser costs used in their 
calculation. The Fiscal Efficiency of the programme and its overall cost are also affected by likely high 
rates of displacement of unsubsidised by subsidised inputs, and by the subsidy rate and low farmer 
contributions.  
Analysis of national food security scenarios with and without the FISP suggests that in the last 6 
years it may have led to average annual savings of maize imports of some 385,000MT, directly 
offsetting up to between 85 and 110%  of programme costs.  
Overall, despite its high cost the FISP is making a positive set of contributions to the welfare of 
Malawians, and this represents a considerable achievement by all those involved in its resourcing, 
design and implementation in challenging conditions. These contributions are threatened by 
macroeconomic pressures; by high and increasing population pressure in rural areas; by the high 
visibility of instances of late implementation, corruption and theft; by evidence of poor targeting; 
and by political and economic pressures. These contributions and these pressures call for renewed 
efforts to both work for and demonstrate the benefits and probity of the programme and to improve 
its efficiency and effectiveness. 
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Glossary of Acronyms and Terms 
ADD   Agricultural Development Division 
ADMARC  Agricultural Development and Marketing Corporation 
AISAM  Agricultural Input Suppliers Association of Malawi 
AISP    Agricultural Input Subsidy Programme 
AISS  Agricultural Input Subsidy Survey 
AU  African Union 
BCR  Benefit Cost Ratio 
Bomas  District administrative / commercial centres 
Chitowe 23:21:0  fertiliser  
CNFA  Citizens Network for Foreign Affairs 
CPI   Consumer Price Index 
CSI  Coping Strategy Index 
DfID  Department for International Development 
Dimba  Wetland cultivated in the dry season 
EU   European Union 
FEWSNET  Famine Early Warning System Network 
FAO   Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 
FCS   Food Consumption Score  
FE  Fiscal Efficiency (the ratio of NPV to fiscal costs) 
FGD  Focus Group Discussion 
FISP    Farm Input Subsidy Programme 
FISS  Farm Input Subsidy Survey 
Ganyu  hired casual labour  
GDP   Gross Domestic Product 
GOM   Government of Malawi 
IHS2   Second NSO Integrated Household Survey (2004/5) 
IHS3  Third NSO Integrated Household Survey (20010/11) 
IMF   International Monetary Fund 
LU  Logistics Unit 
MASAF   Malawi Social Action Fund 
MK   Malawi Kwacha  
MOAFS   Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security 
MRFC   Malawi Rural Finance Company 
MVAC  Malawi Vulnerability Action Committee 
NASFAM  National Smallholder Farmers Association of Malawi 
NEPAD     New Economic Partnership for African Development 
NFRA   National Food Reserve Agency 
NGO   Non-Governmental Organization 
NPV   Net Present Value 
NSO   National Statistical Office 
NUE  Nutrient Use Efficiency (kg incremental yield per kg applied) 
OPV   Open pollinated varieties (of maize) 
PRSP   Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 
RBM   Reserve Bank of Malawi 
SFFRFM  Smallholder Farmers’ Fertilizer Revolving Fund of Malawi 
SGR   Strategic Grain Reserve 
TIP   Targeted Inputs Program 
VCR  Value Cost Ratio 
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Appendix 1: Detailed programme cost breakdown 
Million US$ 
  2005/6 2006/7 2007/8 2008/9 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 
Exchange rate, MK/US$ 140.00 140.00 140.00 140.00 141.31 151.55 166.71 364.92 
Recorded costs 
Seeds - flexi / legumes 0.00 0.00 1.89 5.24 2.83 6.66 6.26 4.89 
Seeds – maize  0.00 5.23 4.58 7.33 17.13 21.64 15.12 11.01 
Cotton chemicals 0.00 0.00 0.24 n/a 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Fertiliser b/f from y-1 0.00 0.00 11.82 24.88 35.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Fertiliser  - new supply 51.62 61.16 77.60 237.63 57.18 115.28 112.63 119.52 
Fertiliser - private retail 0.00 17.43 24.53 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Transport Costs n/a 4.76 5.99 9.24 6.33 5.95 5.54 3.70 
Logistics Unit operations n/a 0.37 0.42 0.24 0.21 0.34 0.38 0.36 
ADMARC operations n/a n/a 0.00 0.06 1.06 2.24 1.57 1.11 
SFFRFM operations n/a 0.75 1.41 n/a n/a 2.05 0.98 0.90 
District financing n/a 0.19 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Coupon production n/a 0.11 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 0.09 
Communications n/a 0.20 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 0.01 
Input quality monitoring n/a 0.05 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
M&E n/a 0.29 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 0.23 
Buyback finance fees 0.00 0.39 n/a 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Total recorded costs 51.62 90.92 128.58 284.63 119.92 154.16 142.53 142.55 
Less: Farmer redemption due 19.62 17.02 21.32 23.12 11.43 10.59 8.39 4.22 
          Unused stock (exc. buyback) 0.00 0.00 19.83 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.46 
Net recorded Costs 32.00 73.90 107.26 241.68 108.49 143.57 134.06 137.87 
Estimated other costs         
   Brought forward stocks 0.00 0.00 n/a 0.62 1.76 0.00 0.00 0.00 
    MoAFS operations n/a n/a n/a 7.86 7.78 7.26 6.60 6.60 
   ADMARC/ SFFRFM n/a n/a n/a 1.26 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
   Voucher printing n/a n/a n/a 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.12 n/a 
    Other agencies' costs n/a n/a n/a 0.23 0.23 0.21 0.19 0.19 
    Total est. other costs n/a 0.00 0.00 10.11 9.91 7.60 6.91 6.79 
Total net costs, recorded & 
estimated n/a 73.90 107.26 251.79 118.40 151.17 140.97 144.66 
Total costs, recorded & 
estimated exc. stock cf n/a 90.92 128.58 274.91 129.83 161.76 149.36 144.20 
Programme budget 36.43 53.57 82.14 139.14 155.04 129.99 129.48 131.81 
Funding         
   Direct Donor Support 0.00 9.51 7.13 37.75 17.48 22.05 44.85 17.56 
   Balance: Malawi 
Government  n/a 64.39 100.13 214.04 100.92 129.12 95.84 127.11 
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Appendix 2Farm level budgets for input use with and without subsidy 
         From base Local no fert Local no fert Local no fert Local &fert Local &fert Local no fert Local no fert 
     To actual Local &fert OPV no fert Hyb no fert OPV &fert Hyb&fert OPV &fert Hyb&fert 
     Adoption fert OPV seed Hyb seed OPV seed Hyb seed OPV seed &fert Hyb seed &fert 
               no subs fert     
Incremental inputs & costs, subsidised prices   kg MK kg MK kg MK kg MK kg MK kg MK kg MK 
Seed OPV   @MK/kg 0   - - 8.5 0 - - 15.4 0 - - 13.4 0 - - 
  Hybrid   @MK/kg 20   - - - - 13.1 262 - - 18.3 367 - - 12.8 257 
Fertiliser                     
  N kg/ha    33.2  -  -  -  -  40.4  39.6  
  P2O5     8.3  -  -  -  -  12.2  11.4  
  NPK 3:21 kg/ha    39.5  -  -  -  -  58.1  54.3  
  Urea kg/ha    52.3  -  -  -  -  58.8  58.9  
  Cost MK/kg 10 Cost MK  919  -  -  -  -  1,169  1,132 
Transport etc 8 hrs/bag @ 75    1,102  -  -  -  -  1,403  1,358 
    250 MK/bag      459  -  -  -  -  585  566 
Fertiliser application  0.16 hrs/kg @ 75 MK/hour  1,102  -  -  -  -  1,403  1,358 
Extra harvest labour 0.2 hrs/kg @ 100 MK/hour  9,670  1,449  4,663  5,489  10,977  16,118  19,437 
Total extra costs         
 
13,252 
 
1,449 
 
4,925 
 
5,489 
 
11,344 
 
20,678 
 
24,108 
Incremental yield  kg/kg seed  OPV   - - 8.5 72 - - 17.8 274 - - 8.5 114 - - 
   kg/kg seed  Hybrid  - - - 0 17.8 233 - - 30.0 549 - - 17.8 228 
   kg/kg fert    5.3 484 - 0 - 0 - - - - 5.9 692 6.6 744 
   Total Incremental yield (kg/ha)   484  72  233  274  549  806  972 
Gross benefit @ 125 MK/kg      60,438  9,055  29,141  34,304  68,608  100,738  121,484 
Net benefit  MK/ha @ 125 MK/kg maize price    47,185  7,606  24,216  28,816  57,265  80,060  97,376 
VCR       65.80  n.a.  111.10  n.a.  187.19  86.16  87.48 
Net benefit  MK/ha @ 100 MK/kg maize price   35,098  5,795  18,388  21,955  43,543  59,913  73,079 
VCR            52.64  n.a.  88.88  n.a.  149.75  68.93  69.98 
Unsubsidised prices                     
Seed OPV @MK/kg  331   -  2,816  -  5,106  -  4,438  - 
  Hybrid @MK/kg  550   -  -  7,213  -  10,079  -  7,065 
Fertiliser mixed Cost MK/kg 283.72   26,062  -  -  -  -  33,172  32,112 
Net benefit  MK/ha @ 125 MK/kg maize price    22,042  4,790  17,265  23,709  47,552  43,620  59,587 
VCR       2.32  3.22  4.04  6.72  6.81  2.68  3.10 
Net benefit  MK/ha @ 100 MK/kg maize price   9,955  2,979  11,437  16,849  33,830  23,472  35,290 
VCR            1.86  2.57  3.23  5.37  5.45  2.14  2.48 
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